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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, Husband and
Wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-vs-

WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES NO.
SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATON, INC., and Idaho
corporation,

2

Defendant-Respondent,
and
DOES I-X, inclusive,
Defendants.

Supreme Court No. 45390-2017

Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho.

HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER S. NYE, Presiding

Daniel W. bower, STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS, PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100, Boise, Idaho 83713
Attorneys for Appellants

Chris T. Troupis, TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, P.A.
701 E. State Street, Ste. 50, PO box 2408, Eagle, Idaho 83616
Attorneys for Respondent
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CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-3425
Dale Thomas Lee, Kathi Lee
vs.
Willow Creek Ranch Estates homeowners association

§
§
§
§
§
§

Location:
Judicial Officer:
Filed on:
Appellate Case Number:
Previous Case Number:

Canyon County District Court
Nye, Christopher S.
04/11/2016
45390-2017
CV-2016-3425-C

CASE INFORMATION

Statistical Closures
09/22/2017
Closed
Bonds
Transcript Bond
9/22/2017

AA- All Initial District Court
Case Type: Filings (Not E, F, and Hl)

#CV-2016-3425
Posted

$100.00

DATE

CASE ASSIGNMENT

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV-2016-3425
Canyon County District Court
04/11/2016
Nye, Christopher S.

PARTY IN.FORMATION

Lead Attorneys
Plaintiff

Bower, Daniel Wayne

Lee, Dale Thomas

Retained
208-345-3333(W)
Bower, Daniel Wayne

Lee, Kathi

Retained
208-345-3333(W)
Defendant

Willow Creek Ranch Estates homeowners association

Parks, Matthew Christopher

Retained
208-343-5454(W)
EVENTS

DATE

04/11/2016

& ORDERS OF THE COURT

INDEX

New Case Filed Other Claims

New Case Filed-Other Claims
04/11/2016

Complaint Filed

Complaint Filed
04/11/2016

Summons Issued

Summons Issued
04/12/2016

Miscellaneous

Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Court of any type not listed in categories E,
F and H(l) Paid by: Bower, Daniel W (attorney for Lee, Dale Thomas) Receipt number:
0022735 Dated: 4/12/2016Amount: $221.00 (Check) For: Lee, Dale Thomas (plaintiff) and
Lee, Kathi (plaintiff)
04/21/2016

Affidavit of Service

Affidavit ofService - 04.13.16 - Willow Creek Ranch HOA (Rhonda Curry) (Fax)
05/04/2016

Miscellaneous

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by:
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CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-3425
Troupis, Chris T (attorney for Willow Creek Ranch Estates homeowners association) Receipt
number: 0027529 Dated: 5/4/2016 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: Willow Creek Ranch
Estates homeowners association (defendant)
05/04/2016

Answer
Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Complaint

05/04/2016

Notice of Service
Notice O/Service

05/10/2016

Order
Order to File Stipulated Trial Dates

05/25/2016

Stipulation
Stipulation/or Scheduling Trial (fax)

06/03/2016

Miscellaneous
Order Setting Pretrial Conference and Jury Trial

06/03/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/28/2017 09:00 AM) 3 day

06/03/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 12/22/2016 11 :00 AM)

06/06/2016

Notice of Service
Notice O/Service

06/17/2016

Stipulation
Stipulation/or Scheduling and Planning (Fax)

06/20/2016

Motion
Plaintiffs Motion/or summary judgment

06/20/2016

Memorandum
Memorandum in support ofPlaintiffs Motion for summary judgment

06/20/2016

Miscellaneous
Declaration ofAlan Mills

06/20/2016

Miscellaneous
Declaration ofDale Lee

06/20/2016

Certificate of Service
Certificate of Service

06/20/2016

Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing 8/18116 9am

06/20/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/18/2016 09:00 AM)

07/14/2016

Notice
Notice ofAssociation of Counsel (fax)

08/04/2016

Memorandum
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion/or Summary Judgment

08/04/2016

Affidavit
Affidavit ofMatthew C. Parks in Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment
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CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-3425
08/04/2016

Affidavit
Declaration ofRay Tschohl

08/09/2016

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result/or Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/18/2016 09:00 AM· Hearing Vacatedcounsel to file amended notice moving the SJM to 9115

08/09/2016

Notice of Hearing
Amended Notice Of Hearing (fax)9/15116

08/09/2016

Affidavit of Service
Affidavit OfService (lax)

08/09/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 09115/2016 09:00 AM) Pits. Motn for summary judgment

08/18/2016

CANCELED Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Vacated
Hearing result/or Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/18/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacatedcounsel to file amended notice moving the SJM to 9/15

08/19/2016

Affidavit
Affidavit ofRay Tschohl Jax

09/08/2016

Memorandum
Reply Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Fax)

09/15/2016

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result/or Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/15/2016 09:00 AM· District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Patricia Terry
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages Pits. Motn for
summary judgment

09/15/2016

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/15/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing Held Pits.
Motnfor summary judgment

09/15/2016

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/15/2016 09:00 AM· Motion Held Pits.
Motnfor summary judgment

09/15/2016

Miscellaneous
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/15/2016 09:00 AM· Plan Denied Pits.
Motnfor summary judgment

09/15/2016

Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Pits. Motnfor summary judgment Hearing result/or Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/15/2016
09:00 AM· District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Patricia Terry
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages

09/28/2016

Notice of Service
Notice OfService of Plaintiffs Interrogartories -fax

10/27/2016

Notice of Service
Notice OfService ofDiscovery

12/15/2016

Pretrial Memorandum
Defendant's Pre-trial Memorandum (fax)
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CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-3425
12/15/2016

Miscellaneous
Plaintiffs Pre-trial Statement (fax)

12/22/2016

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result/or Pre Trial scheduled on 12/22/201611:00AM· District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tamara Weber
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100 pages

12/22/2016

Hearing Held
Hearing result/or Pre Trial scheduled on 12/22/201611:00AM: Hearing Held

12/22/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 01/23/2017 08:30 AM) telephonic; Court to initiate

12/22/2016

Pre Trial (11:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Hearing result/or Pre Trial scheduled on 12/22/201611:00AM· District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tamara Weber
Number a/Transcript Pages/or this hearing estimated: Less than JOO pages

01/23/2017

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 01123/2017 08: 30 AM- District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tamara Weber
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100 pages

01/23/2017

Hearing Held
Hearing result/or Conference - Status scheduled on 01/23/2017 08:30 AM· Hearing Held

01/23/2017

Continued
Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 01/23/2017 08: 30 AM: Continued

01/23/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 02/16/2017 08:45 AM) telephonic; court to initiate

01/23/2017

Status Conference (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Hean·ng result/or Conference - Status scheduled on 01/23/2017 08:30 AM- District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tamara Weber
Number a/Transcript Pages/or this hearing estimated: Less than 100 pages

01/24/2017

Motion
Defendant's Motion in Limine (Fax)

01/24/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in Support ofDefendant's Motions in Limine (Fax)

01/24/2017

Motion
Defendant's Motion to Shorten Time for hearing in Defendant's Motions in Limine (wlorder)
(Fax)

01/30/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine

01/30/2017

Affidavit
Declaration ofDaniel W Bower in Support ofthe Lees' Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion in Limine

01/31/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 02/0112017 01 :00 PM) motion to shorten time/motion in
limine

01/31/2017

Hearing Scheduled

I
!

I

I
I

!
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CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CV-2016-3425
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 02/01/2017 10:00 AM) motion to shorten time/motion in
/imine
02/01/2017

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result/or Motion Hearing scheduled on 02/01/2017 10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated
motion to shorten time/motion in limine

02/01/2017

CANCELED Motion Hearing (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Vacated
motion to shorten time/motion in limine Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on
02/01/2017 10:00AM: Hearing Vacated

02/10/2017

Motion
Joint Motion To Postpone Trial wolorder-Fax

02/16/2017

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages:
Hearing result/or Conference - Status scheduled on 02/16/2017 08:45 AM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tamara Weber
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100 pages

02/16/2017

Hearing Held
Hearing result/or Conference -Status scheduled on 02/16/2017 08:45 AM: Hearing Held

02/16/2017

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 02/28/2017 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 3 day

02/16/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 06/15/2017 09:00 AM) all motions

02/16/2017

Status Conference (8:45 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 02/16/2017 08:45 AM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tamara Weber
Number o/Transcript Pages/or this hearing estimated: Less than 100 pages

02/28/2017

Court Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
03/01/1017-03/02/2017
3 day Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 02/28/2017 09:00 AM· Hearing Vacated

I

05/18/2017

Motion
Motion to strike or in the alternative, postpone defendants motion/or summary judgment (fax)

05/18/2017

Motion
Defendant's motion/or summary judgment w/out order

05/18/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in support of defendant's motion/or summary judgment

05/18/2017

Notice of Hearing
Notice OfHearing on defendants motion/or summary judgment June 15, 2017 9:00am

05/22/2017

Memorandum
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike or in the Alternative
Postpone Defendant's Motion/or Summary Judgment (Fax)

05/30/2017

Memorandum
Reply memorandum in support ofmotion to strike or in the alternative, postpone, defendans
motion for summary judgment (Fax)

06/05/2017

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 06/15/2017 09:00 AM· Hearing Vacated
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CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-3425
all motions defnd motnfor summary judgment

06/05/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 07/14/201711:00 AM) all motions defnd motnfor
summary judgment

06/06/2017

Notice of Hearing
Amended Notice Of Hearing- 07.14.2017

06/15/2017

CANCELED Status Conference (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Vacated
all motions defnd motn for summary judgment Hearing result for Conference - Status
scheduled on 06/15/2017 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

07/14/2017

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages:
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 07/14/201711 :00 AM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tamara Weber
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages

07/14/2017

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 07/14/201711:00 AM· Hearing Held

07/14/2017

Continued
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 07/14/201711:00 AM: Continued

07/14/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/1712017 09:00 AM) all motions pending I to be filed
def MSJ

07/14/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 09/21/2017 01:30 PM) Court Trial (11/2 days)

07/14/2017

Notice of Hearing
Amended Notice Of Hearing on defendants motion for summary judgment and defendants
motion in limine

07/14/2017

Motion Hearing (11:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 07/14/201711:00 AM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tamara Weber
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages

07/21/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment

07/21/2017

Motion
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment or alternatively partial summery judgment on issue of
partial performance

07/21/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in support ofplaintiffs' motion for summary judgment or alternatively partial
summary judgment on issue ofpartial performance

07/21/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofRichard Horn

07/31/2017

Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing

08/03/2017

Motion
Willow Creek Ranch Estates Motion To Amend Answer

7
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CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-3425
08/03/2017

Objection
Willow Creek Ranch Estates Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment

08/03/2017

Memorandum
Willow Creek Estates Rely Memorandum In Support Of Defendant's Motion For Summary
Judgment

08/03/2017

Affidavit
Declarayion Of Ray Tschohl

08/07/2017

Memorandum
Plantiffs Memorandum in oppostion to defendants motion to amend answer

08/07/2017

Memorandum
Reply Memorandum in support ofplaintiffs motion for summary judgment or alternatively
partial summary judgment

08/09/2017

Answer
Willow Creek Ranch Estates Reply Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Amend Answer (fax)

08/17/2017

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/17/2017 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated all
motions pending I to be filed
def MSJ

08/17/2017

CANCELED Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Vacated
all motions pending I to be filed
def MSJ Hearing result/or Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/17/2017 09:00 AM: Hearing
Vacated

08/31/2017

Decision or Opinion
Memorandum Decision and Order on parties' motion for summary judgment and HOA 's
motion to amend

09/13/2017

Memorandum
Willow Creek Ranch Estates Memorandum ofCosts and Attorney Fees

09/13/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofMatthew Parks in Support of Willow Creek Ranch Estates No 2 Subdivision
Homeowners' Association, Ines Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees

09/14/2017

Judgment
Judgment - Dismissed

09/14/2017

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 09/21/2017 01: 30 PM· Hearing Vacated Court
Trial (1 1/2 days)

09/14/2017

Civil Disposition Entered
Civil Disposition entered for: Willow Creek Ranch Estates homeowners association,
Defendant; Lee, Dale Thomas, Plaintiff; Lee, Kathi, Plaintiff. Filing date: 9/14/2017

09/14/2017

Status Changed
Case Status Changed: Closed

09/14/2017

Dismissed With Prejudice
Party (Lee, Dale Thomas)
Party (Lee, Kathi)
Party (WiJlow Creek Ranch Estates homeowners association)

8
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CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-3425
09/21/2017

Court Trial (1 :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Court Trial (11/2 days) Hearing result/or Court Trial scheduled on 09/21/2017 01:30 PM·
Hearing Vacated

09/22/2017

Miscellaneous
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid by: Stewart Taylor &
Morris PLLC Receipt number: 0052805 Dated: 9/22/2017 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Lee,
Dale Thomas (plaintiff) and Lee, Kathi (plaintiff)

09/22/2017

Bond Posted - Cash
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 52806 Dated 9/22/2017 for 100.00) (Court Record)

09/22/2017

Reopen (case Previously Closed)
Reopen (case Previously Closed)

09/22/2017

Notice of Appeal
Notice ofAppeal

09/22/2017

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
Appealed To The Supreme Court

09/22/2017

Status Changed
Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk action

09/25/2017

Motion
Motion to Disallow Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees (fax)

09/25/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs Motion to Disallow Willow Creek Ranch Estates
Memorandum ofCosts and Attorney Fees (fax)

09/26/2017

Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees
Willow Creek Ranch Estates Amended Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees (fax)

10/05/2017

Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing

10/05/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 11/15/2017 09:00 AM) motn to disallow memo of costs
andfees

10/26/2017

"l1Notice of Hearing
Amended

11/17/2017

"l1Response
Def Response to Plf Mot to Disallow Costs & Fees

11/21/2017

"l1Notice of Withdrawal of Attorney
as Co-Counsel

11/27/2017

.Notice of Hearing
Second Amended Notice ofHearing 1-18-18 9:00am

12/01/2017

.Order
(SC - Conditionally Dismissing Appeal)

12/14/2017

Miscellaneous

9
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CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-3425
Balance paid/or clerk's record on appeal, $61.85
12/14/2017

II Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc
Order Dismissing Appeal

12/14/2017

II Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc
Order to Withdraw Dismissal and Reinstate Appeal

12/21/2017

CANCELED Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Vacated
motn to disallow memo of costs andfees

01/18/2018

Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Pit Mo Disallow Costs

DATE

FINANCIAL INFORI\IATION

Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates homeowners association
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 12/15/2017

136.00
136.00
0.00

Plaintiff Lee, Dale Thomas
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 12/15/2017

411.85
411.85
0.00

Plaintiff Lee, Kathi
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 12/15/2017

0.00
0.00

o.oo

Plaintiff Lee, Dale Thomas
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 12/15/2017

10
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APR 11 2016
CANYON COUNTY OLERK
A GALLEGOS, DEPUTY

Daniel W. Bower, ISB #7204
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone: (208) 345-3333
Fax No.: (208) 345-4461
dbower@stm-law.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffe

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
DALE LEE and KA THI LEE, husband and
wife,
Plaintiffs,

COMPLAINT
vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and DOES I-X, inclusive,

Category: A.A.
Filing Fee: $221.00

Defendants.

COME NOW, Plaintiffs, Dale and Kathi Lee (collectively "Lees"), by and through their
attorney of record, Daniel W. Bower, of the firm Stewart Taylor & Morris PLLC, and allege the
following claims and causes of action against Defendants Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2
Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc. ("Willow Creek HOA"), and Does I-X, inclusive, as
follows:

COMPLAINT - 1

JUDGE
CHRIS NYE
11

-

I.

On June 10, 1997, the Lees and Kemp Family Trust executed an Agreement for Sale of
Real Property ("Sale Agreement") whereby the Lees sold a 1.8 acre parcel of real property to the
Kemp Family Trust.
II.
The Kemp Family Trust needed the 1.8 acre parcel to develop, as a subdivision, adjoining
property, referred to as the "Kemp Development Property."
III.
That 1.8 acre parcel is described as being part of Lots 5 and 6 of Block 5, Willow Creek
Estates No. 2, as is referred to herein as "Transferred Property."
IV.
The Transferred Property was adjacent to a larger parcel of property that the Lees
intended to develop at a future date. The remaining Lee property is referred to herein as the "Lee
Development Property." Attached hereto as Exhibit A, is a true and accurate depiction of the
Transferred Property, the Kemp Development Property and the Lee Development Property.
V.
To be clear, the Sale Agreement contemplated that both parties would develop their
respective properties, and as part of that contemplated action, granted the Lees certain accesses.
VI.
· Significantly, the Sale Agreement provided that:

COMPLAINT - 2

12

-

-

FUTURE DEVELOPMENT. Both Seller [Kemp Family Trust]
and Buyer [Lees] are contemplating future development of their
existing properties which adjoin each other.

In the event that Buyer constructs a recreational center for use by
residents of Willow Creek Ranch Estates, Seller shall be entitled to
use and shall also be subject to payment of dues.
Seller shall also be entitled to 3 driveway accesses from the gravel
road to be constructed by Buyer adjoining Seller's property. Such
access shall be constructed at Seller's cost and subject to Seller
obtaining any necessary government approvals.

A copy of the Sale Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
VII.

The purpose of the above-cited language was to ensure access for the Lees at a
future date when the Lees developed the Lee Development Property.
VIII.

The terms of the Sale Agreement were at least partially performed by the parties.
IX.

The "gravel road" referenced in the Sale Agreement is now known as "Kemp Road."
X.

And, consistent with the "access" language of the Sale Agreement, the Kemp Family
Trust, as the buyer under the Sale Agreement and the developer of the subdivision, constructed
Kemp Road with three access points that presently abut Kemp Road and include culverts, gravel
covering those culverts, and gates--clear and obvious to the public that access by the Lees was
intended.
COMPLAINT - 3

13

,~---

-

XI.

As part of the development process, the Kemp Family Trust, created and ran the Willow
Creek HOA until it was transferred to the owners of the respective lots in the development in
2005 (referred to as the "HOA transfer").
XII.

At the time of the HOA transfer, Willow Creek HOA had actual and constructive
knowledge of the existence of the Sale Agreement and its terms, including the terms that
provided the Lees access to Kemp Road.
XIII.

In the fall of 2014, the Lees informed Willow Creek HOA that they intended to access
Kemp Road to further develop the adjacent Lee property.
XIV.

On October 12, 2014, Rhonda Curry, the president of the Willow Creek HOA, informed
Lees' counsel by written correspondence that "the board has decided to decline access to Kemp
Road for any development by the Lee's [sic]."

xv.
Willow Creek HOA is claiming that because the Sale Agreement was not recorded at the
time of the HOA transfer, and because the terms were not disclosed on the Subdivision Plat for
the Willow Creek HOA, there is no enforceable easement or servitude and that it is not required
to provide the Lees the access contemplated by the Sale Agreement.

COMPLAINT-4

14

•
XVI.
The Lees have objected to the claim asserted by the Willow Creek HOA and explained
that the Lees' development, included planned access for the Lees, was part of a common scheme
and plan by Willow Creek HOA's predecessor in interest, the Kemp Family Trust, and that the
Sale Agreement is binding on the Willow Creek HOA, because they had actual and constructive
notice of the Sale Agreement, or at least the portion of the agreement related to providing the
Lees with access to Kemp Road.
XVII.
Indeed, a former board member of the Willow Creek HOA at or near the time of the
HOA transfer, Alan Mills, has made clear to the parties, that at the time of the HOA transfer,
Willow Creek HOA had knowledge of the Sale Agreement, including the agreement that the
Lees would have three driveway access points to Kemp Road.
XVIII.
The Lees have relied upon the terms, conditions and agreements in the Sale Agreement,
to provide them access points to Kemp Road, and are entitled to the benefit of those terms,
conditions and agreements.
XIX.

The terms, conditions and agreements set forth in the Sale Agreement constitute an
equitable servitude because the Lees have an enforceable interest against the original promisor,
here the Sale Agreement and the Kemp Family Trust, and the successor in interest, Willow
Creek HOA, had actual knowledge of the Sale Agreement.

COMPLAINT - 5

15

•

•
xx.

Willow Creek HOA should be compelled by this Court to set forth what claim it has to
preclude the Lees from moving forward with their planned development including allowing
access to Kemp Road, consistent with the Sale Agreement; the Court should rule that there is no
merit to such claim.
XXL

The Lees, plaintiffs in this action, are entitled to a judgment and decree of this Court
declaring that they are entitled to utilize the three accesses, referenced in the Sale Agreement,
and that Willow Creek HOA is subject to an equitable servitude, covenant, condition and
restriction allowing access as described in the Sale Agreement.
XXII.

As a result of Willow Creek HO A's refusal to allow the Lees access, the Lees have had to
retain counsel and are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to statute, including but not limited to
Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-121 and Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, the Lees, pray that judgment be entered in their favor as
follow:
1.

That the Court make a final determination that the Kemp Development Property,

including Kemp Road, is encumbered by equitable servitudes, conditions and restrictions
allowing for access by the Lees as set forth in the Sale Agreement; and
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2.

•

That the Court enter its preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the

Willow Creek HOA from doing any of the foregoing set forth in the preceding paragraph; and
3.

Plaintiffs, the Lees, be awarded their reasonable costs and attorney's fees; and

4.

For such other and further relief to which Plaintiffs, the Lees, may be entitled as

the Court deems just and proper.
DATED: April 11, 2016.
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB #4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, P.A.
801 E. State Street, Ste 50
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616

F I A.k l~

QM.

MAYO\ 2016
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY

Tel: (208) 938-5584

Fax: (208) 938-5482

Attorney for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates
No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc.
DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
DALE LEE and KATID LEE, husband and
wife,

)
)

) Case No. CV 16-3425
Plaintiffs,

)
)

) ANSWER
) AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
) TO COMPLAINT

vs.

WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
_ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and DOES 1-X, inclusive,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defend ants.

.

Defendant WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES NO. 2 SUBDIVISION
HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., answers Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows:
1.

Except for the allegations specifically admitted below, Defendant denies the allegations

of each and every Paragraph of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
2.

In response to Paragraph XI of the Complaint, Defendant admits that the Willow Creek
HOA was transferred to the owners of the lots in the subdivision in 2005.

Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Complaint

1
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3.

In response to Paragraphs XIII and XIV of the Complaint, Defendant admits that the Lees
communicated with the Willow Creek HOA at some time in 2014 and the Willow Creek
HOA responded to the Lees by written correspondence.

4.

In response to Paragraph XV of the Complaint, Defendant denies that the allegations state
all of the claims of this Defendant, and/or the facts supporting those claims.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
First Affirmative Defense
That the facts alleged by Plaintiff fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Second Affirmative Defense
This Defendant is not bound by, subject to, or encumbered with the Plaintiffs purported

'equitable servitude" because this Defendant did not receive timely actual notice of the purported
"equitable servitude," nor could this Defendant be charged with the receipt of timely constructive
notice of the purported "equitable servitude".
Third Affirmative Defense
The Plaintiffs are guilty of laches which bars their claims for equitable relief. Plaintiffs'
purported equitable servitude is based on language in a sale agreement dated June 1, 1997.
Plaintiffs did not record the sale agreement, or otherwise provide any prior notice to the members
of Willow Creek HOA who purchased and improved residential lots in the subdivision, ignorant
of the undisclosed claims of the Plaintiffs, and in reliance upon the existing state of the disclosed
title to their respective lots and the common areas, including Kemp Road.
Fourth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs are estopped by their conduct from claiming an equitable servitude against this
Defendant.

2
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Fifth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs waived their claim of equitable servitude by their conduct in failing to preserve
the purported accesses in record title at the time they entered into the sale agreement, in failing to
require that the sale agreement be recorded, and in failing to timely notify lot owners affected by
the equitable servitude.

Sixth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs' purported equitable servitude is subject to a condition precedent that was not
fulfilled.

RESERVATION OF ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
The statement of affirmative defenses in this Answer is without prejudice to the Defendant's
right to allege additional defenses to which it may be entitled. Defendant reserves the right to amend
this Answer to allege additional affirmative defenses that are disclosed or developed during the
pendency of this case through pretrial discovery.

ATTORNEYS' FEES
With respect to Paragraph XXII of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this Defendant denies that
Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under any provision ofldaho law. In the
event that this Defendant prevails in this action, it is entitled to recover its reasonable fees and costs
pursuant to Idaho Code §12-120, 12-121 and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 54(e).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendant prays for judgment as follows:

1;

For the Plaintiffs' Complaint to be dismissed with prejudice;

2.

For reasonable attorneys' fees and costs; and

3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

3
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DATED this 2nd day of May, 2016.

TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, PA

Christ T. Troupi
Attorney for Defendant
Willow Creek Ranch Estates
No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners'
Association, Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of May, 2016, I served a copy of the
foregoing Answer and Affirmative Defenses by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed
as follows:
Daniel W. Bower
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Ste 100
Boise, Idaho 83713

Christ T. Troupis7'
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Daniel W. Bower, ISB #7204
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone: (208) 345-3333
Fax No.: (208) 345-4461
dbower@stm-law.com

CANYON COUNTY OLERK
A GALLEGOS, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,

Case No. CV 16-3425

Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDNISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation; and DOES I - X, inclusive,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, Dale and Kathi Lee (collectively "Lees"), by and through their attorneys of
record, Stewart Taylor & Morris PLLC, hereby move this Court for summary judgment under
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) finding in Lees' favor that certain real property owned by
the Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc. is subject to
valid encumbrances, conditions, servitudes and/or restrictions that allow the Lees to utilize
already defined and improved access points to their adjoining real property.
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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This motion is based upon the supporting memorandum and declarations filed
concurrently herewith as well as all pleadings and other papers on file in this action, and such
other matters as may be presented to the Court at the time of the hearing.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED: June 16, 2016.
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS
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Daniel W. Bower, ISB #7204
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone: (208) 345-3333
Fax No.: (208) 345-4461
dbower@stm-law.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV 16-3425
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDNISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and DOES I -X, inclusive,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, Dale and Kathi Lee (collectively "Lees"), by and through their attorneys of
record, submit this brief in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment filed
concurrently herewith.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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INTRODUCTION

The Lees respectfully request this Court enter summary judgment in the Lees' favor,
finding that certain real property owned by the Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision
Homeowners' Association, Inc. ("Willow Creek HOA" or "HOA") is subject to valid
encumbrances, conditions, servitudes and/or restrictions that allow the Lees to utilize already
defined and improved access points to their adjoining real property. The legal issue here is
simple--whether the defendant, Willow Creek HOA, is obligated to honor an easement
agreement and/or equitable servitude encumbering property, as a successor in interest, to the
Kemp Family Trust ("Kemps"), where it is incontrovertible fact that Willow Creek HOA had
actual and constructive notice of the servitude at the time Willow Creek HOA received an
interest in the subject real property.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

In the summer of 1997, Dale Lee was approached by the Kemps about a possible

real estate transaction. See June 17, 2016 Declaration of Dale Lee ("Lee Deel."), ,r 2.
2.

The Kemps and the Lees both owned real property north of Purple Sage Road in

Middleton, Idaho. See Lee Deel., Ex. A (A map of the property reflecting ownership of the land
in 1997).
3.

To develop the "Kemp property" the Kemps needed approximately 1.8 acres of

real property owned by the Lees. The Lees were willing to sell them the 1.8 acres needed, but
required as a condition of that sale, that they be given access to the road that was to ·be
constructed by the Kemps. See Lee Deel., ,r 4.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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4.

Significantly, the real estate agent for the Kemps was Alan Mills, of Mills & Co.

Realty Inc. See Lee Deel., ']I 5; see also June 14, 2015 Declaration of Alan Mills ("Mills Deel."),
Exhibit A.
5.

That road referenced above, presently known as Kemp Road, was to be

constructed by the Kemps and was to run along the southern border of the Kemp property
("Kemp Road"). See Lee Deel., ']I 6.
6.

It was access to Kemp Road, that the Lees conditioned the sale of their 1.8 acre

parcel. See Lee Deel., 'J[ 7.
7.

On June 1, 1997, the Lees and the Kemps executed an Agreement for Sale of Real

Property ("Agreement"). See Lee Deel., Exhibit B.
8.

In that Agreement the Lees agreed to sell to the Kemps the 1.8 acres of real

property that the Kemps needed to develop their property into the present day subdivision. Id.
9.

The Agreement clearly provided that the Kemps and the Lees were planning

future development of their adjoining properties--both the Kemp property and the Lee property.

Id.
10.

The Agreement also made clear that the parties agreed to provide the Lees access

to the road:
Seller [Lees] shall also be entitled to 3 driveway access from the gravel road
[Kemp Road] to be constructed by Buyer [Kemps] adjoining Seller's [Lees']
property. Such access shall be constructed at Seller's [Lees'] cost and subject to
Seller [Lees] obtaining any necessary governmental approvals.

Id.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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11.

Accordingly, the Lees sold the Kemps the property and the Kemps began

developing the subdivision that is now Willow Creek Ranch Estates #2. See Lee Deel., 'l[ 12.
12.

By executing the Agreement, the Kemps granted the Lees an express easement to

construct the three access points and an implied easement to use Kemp Road.
13.

In 2000, at the time that Kemp Road was constructed, consistent with the

Agreement, the Kemps paid to have the three driveway access points constructed giving the
Lees' property adjacent to Kemp Road access to Kemp Road. See Lee Deel., 'l[ 13.
14.

This construction included the creation of three access points, including 24 foot

culverts, and gravel extending from Kemp Road to the Lees' property. Around that same time,
wood fencing and metal gates corresponding to the three access points, were constructed along
the property giving the Lees' property clear and obvious access to Kemp Road. See Lee Deel.,
'l[ 14, Exhibit C.

15.

As part of the development of the Willow Creek Ranch Estates, the Kemps

transferred Kemp Road to the HOA as a common area owned by the HOA. See Lee Deel.,
Exhibit D ("The Trust was the developer of Willow Creek Ranch Estates. It transferred Kemp
Lane to the HOA as part of the common area owned by the Association.") (LEE00lO).
16.

In 2005, at the time the Kemps transferred Kemp Road to the HOA, the board of

directors for the HOA was primarily controlled by the Kemps. See Mills Deel., Exhibit A.
17.

Mary Kemp, trustee of the Kemps, and Alan Mills, the Kemps' real estate agent,

served as the initial board members for the HOA. Mr. Mills served as president. Id.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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18.

Alan Mills has admitted that he had knowledge of the Kemps' agreement to

provide access points along Kemp Road to the Lees. Id.
19.

On or about June 11, 2015, Alan Mills, the former real estate agent for the Kemps

and a former member of the HOA board of directors at the time the Kemps transferred Kemp
Road to the HOA, provided a letter wherein he stated:
During the development of the Willow Creek Subdivision, I served as one of the
initial board of directors for the Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2, Subdivision
Homeowner's Association Inc. (the "HOA") along with Mary Kemp, the trustee
for the Kemp Family Trust. As the developer of the Subdivision and who also
controlled the HOA, the Kemp Family Trust paid to have the three driveway
access constructed just as the parties agreed to do in the Agreement For Sale of
Property. As a former HOA board member, I can say with a high degree of
certainty that the HOA at the time was aware of the Agreement and its terms
regarding the three driveway access.
See Mills Deel., Exhibit A; see also Lee Deel., Exhibit D.

20.

Thus, at the time that Kemp Road was transferred to the Willow Creek HOA in

2005, the Willow Creek HOA Board of Directors, had knowledge of the Agreement, including
the Kemps' agreement to provide the Lees the three access points. See Lee Deel., 'l[ 20.
21.

Furthermore, the subsequent actions of the Lees, Kemps and the HOA, including

the construction of the three access points, including culvert construction, gravel work, fencing
and gates, evidence the promise found in the Agreement. See Lee Deel., 'fl 13 and 14.
LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to "eliminate the necessity of trial
where the facts are not in dispute and where the existent and undisputed facts lead to a
conclusion of law which is certain." Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441, 444, 690 P.2d 896, 899
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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(1983). Summary judgment shall be granted if the "pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c). A nonmoving party's failure to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, on which the party bears the burden of
proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment in favor of the moving party. See Jarman
v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 955-56, 842 P.2d 288, 291-92 (Ct. App. 1992).

Here, the Lees are entitled to summary judgment. There is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the Lees are entitled to prevail on their claims as a matter of law.
DISCUSSION
The Lees are entitled to summary judgment on two alternative legal theories. First, the
Agreement incontrovertibly created an express easement that is enforceable against Willow
Creek HOA regardless of whether or not the Agreement was recorded because Willow Creek
HOA had actual notice of the easement.

Second, the Agreement, the acts of the parties,

including the initial construction of the culverts, gravel road, wood fencing and metal gates that
reflect the three access points, create an equitable servitude that is also enforceable against
Willow Creek HOA.
I.

The Agreement Constitutes An Enforceable Easement Because Willow Creek HOA Had
Actual And Constructive Notice Of The Agreement
It is well-established law that "[o]ne who purchases land expressly subject to an

easement, or with notice, actual or constructive, that it is burdened with an existing easement,
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takes the land subject to the easement." Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 152 P.2d 585,
587 (1944) (emphasis added). Here, it is not in dispute that the Agreement creates an easement.
See Lee Deel., Exhibit D (September 22, 2014 Letter from Christ Troupis to Willow Creek

Ranch Estates Board of Directors) ("In this case, the Seller (Dale and Kathy [sic] Lee) reserved
an easement across land they were selling to the Buyer, the Kemp Family Trust. So, the Kemp
Family Trust acquired property encumbered with an easement in favor of the Lees, allowing
them to construct the three driveways and access the gravel road. The property the Kemp Family
Trust acquired was subsequently improved with a gravel road, which now comprises a portion of
Kemp Lane.")
Indeed, here, the only factual question is whether Willow Creek HOA had notice, actual
or constructive, of the existing easement. And, as established by Allan Mills, Willow Creek
HOA had actual notice of the Agreement at the time it obtained title to the real property that was
encumbered.
During the development of the Willow Creek Subdivision, I served as one of the
initial board of directors for the Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2, Subdivision
Homeowner's Association Inc. (the "HOA") alone with Mary Kemp, the trustee
for the Kemp Family Trust. As the developer of the Subdivision and who also
controlled the HOA, the Kemp Family Trust paid to have the three driveway
access constructed just as the parties agreed to do in the Agreement For Sale of
Property. As a former HOA board member, I can say with a high degree of
certainty that the HOA at the time was aware of the Agreement and its terms
regarding the three driveway access.
See Mills Deel., Exhibit A. Thus, to the extent that the Kemps had notice of the Agreement--and

it is undisputable fact that they did as they were parties to the Agreement--the HOA also had
notice. Mary Kemp, the trustee for the Kemps, was, along with Alan Mills, the Willow Creek
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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HOA board. Id. Furthermore, Alan Mills, who was the realtor for the Kemps, that facilitated the
sale of the Lees' property to the Kemps, also had knowledge of the Agreement that created the
at-issue easement. As explained by Mr. Mills:
I was the real estate agent for the Kemp Family Trust, the party that purchased
certain property from Mr. Dale Lee. As part of that agreement the Kemp Family
Trust agreed to provide 3 driveway accesses from a gravel road. That gravel road
in now known as Kemp Road that runs through Phase 2 of the Willow Creek
Subdivision.

See Mills Deel., Exhibit A. There cannot be any meaningful dispute that, at the time that Willow
Creek HOA received title to Kemp Road, the HOA had actual notice of the encumbrance that the
Lees are seeking to enforce in this action. Accordingly, regardless of whether the encumbrance
was recorded, it is enforceable as a matter of law against the HOA.
II.

An Equitable Servitude Exists That Allows The Lees To Enforce The Agreement And
Promise To Allow The Lees Access Points To Kemp Road
Even if there was no enforceable easement, the incontrovertible facts establish an

equitable servitude that also provides the Lees with legal access. An equitable servitude is not an
easement. See Birdwood Subdivision Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Bulotti Const., Inc., 145 Idaho
17, 23, 175 P.3d 179, 185 (2007). It concerns a promise of the landowner to use his land in a
certain way. See, e.g., Idaho Power Co. v. State, By & Through Dep't of Water Res., 104 Idaho
575, 587, 661 P.2d 741, 753 (1983) ("restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes" relate to
"[a]greements not to assert ownership rights.") Like an easement, an equitable servitude is
restrictive in character. See St. Clair v. Krueger, 115 Idaho 702, 703 n. l, 769 P.2d 579, 580 n.1
(1989). However, an equitable servitude arises "because of the actions of the parties, such as
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oral representations." West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 84, 106 P.3d 401,
410 (2005); see also Birdwood, 145 Idaho at 23, 175 P.3d at 185 (quoting 20 Am.Jur.2d,
Covenants, Etc., § 155 (2005) (an equitable servitude arises "by implication from the language of
the deeds or the conduct of the parties."). 1 Here, the conduct of the parties clearly creates an
equitable servitude.
"The test relevant to determining if a promise regarding the use of land runs against a
successor in interest of the original promisor is 1) whether or not the party claiming the
enforceable interest actually has an interest against the original promisor; and 2) if such right
exists, whether it is enforceable against the subsequent purchaser." West Wood Investments,
141 Idaho at 84, 106 P.3d at 410 (citing Middlekauff v. Lake Cascade, Inc., 103 Idaho 832, 834,
654 P.2d 1385, 1387 (1982) (Middlekauff I)). Whether a party has an enforceable interest against

The foregoing concepts were well summarized by a California appellate court in Comm. To
Save Beverly Highlands Homes Ass'n v. Beverly Highlands Homes Ass'n, 92 Cal. App. 4th 1247
(2001):
1

An easement is an interest in the land of another, which entitles the owner of the
easement to a limited use or enjoyment of the other's land ....
An easement differs from a covenant running with the land and from an equitable
servitude, in that these are created by promises concerning the land, which may be
enforceable by or binding upon successors to the estate of either party, while an
easement is an interest in the land, created by grant or prescription. A covenant
running with the land is created by language in a deed or other document showing
an agreement to do or refrain from doing something with respect to use of the
land. An equitable servitude may be created when a covenant does not run with
the land but equity requires that it be enforced.

Id. at 1269 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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the original promisor may depend on the original promisor' s representations to the promise. See
Middlekauff, 103 Idaho at 834-35, 654 P.2d at 1387-88. If it is oral, the terms of the agreement

can be a question of fact. See id.; see also Birdwood, 145 Idaho at 23, 175 P.3d at 185. Here,
where the terms are contained in the Agreement, there is no question of fact. Thus, the only
question here is whether Willow Creek HOA, as the successor in interest, takes its interest in
Kemp Road, subject to the agreement between the Kemps and the Lees.
"Whether a successor in interest takes the interest subject to the equitable servitude is a
question of notice." Id. at 85, 106 P.3d at 411. Facts which may establish actual notice include
whether a buyer has actual knowledge of agreements creating the servitude, or has actual
knowledge of the use of the servitude at the time of purchase. See West Wood Investments,
141 Idaho at 85-86, 106 P.3d at 411-12. A purchaser who has notice of the servitude is not a
bona fide purchaser. Id. (citing Middlekauff[).
Here, it is incontrovertible that Willow Creek HOA had actual notice of the Agreement.
Mr. Mills, who is not a party to this action, establishes this plain and undisputed fact in his
June 11, 2015 letter. Furthermore, it is indisputable that Willow Creek HOA had constructive
knowledge of the servitude as the improvements--the gravel road extensions at the access points,
the culverts and fencing with gates--are plain and obvious. See Lee Deel., Exhibit D (picture of
access point). Here, as illustrated above, notice cannot be meaningfully contested. The same
person who served as Trustee for the Kemps, Mary Kemp, was also on the board of the HOA.
And, indeed, it was during the time period that Willow Creek HOA gained possession of Kemp
Road.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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In short, as a matter of law, regardless of any easement, the Lees are entitled to enforce
an equitable servitude against Willow Creek HOA. The terms of an written agreement that allow
access at three access points is undisputable fact. Further, it is undisputed fact that the promise
was enforceable against Willow Creek HOA's predecessor in interest the Kemps. And, it is
incontrovertible that Willow Creek HOA had knowledge of the servitude--the promise to allow
the Lees access.

Accordingly, a second independent basis exists that mandates summary

judgment in favor of the Lees.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Lees respectfully request that the Court grant summary
judgment finding that Kemp Road, owned by the Willow Creek HOA, is subject to an easement
or servitude that allows the Lees to move forward with their designs to utilize the three access
points already designated and improved.
DATED: June 16, 2016.
STEWARTTAYLOR&MoRRISPLLC
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Daniel W. Bower, ISB #7204
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone: (208) 345-3333
Fax No.: (208) 345-4461
dbower@stm-law.com
Attorneys for Plaintif.fe

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,

Case No. CV 16-3425

Plaintiffs,

DECLARATION OF ALAN MILLS
vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and DOES I-X, inclusive,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
County of Canyon

)

Alan Mills, declare and state as follows and under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws
of the state of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct:
1)

I am over the age of eighteen ( 18) and make this declaration of my own personal
knowledge and belief.

DECLARATION OF ALAN MILLS - 1

35

ORIGINAL

I

-

-

2)

Attached to this declaration as Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of a letter that I
sentto legal counsel for Dale Lee, the above captioned plaintiff, on June 11, 2015.

3)

The contents and representations in that letter are true and accurate.

Dated: June~ 2016.

Al~Z&d
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June 11, 2015

RE: Driveway Access from Kemp Road

Dear Victor,

Thank you for your question regarding the three driveway accesses referenced in the
Agreement For Sale of Property. As your client may recall, I was the real estate asent for the
Kemp Family Trust, the party that purchased certain property from Mr. Dale Lee. As part of
that agreement the Kemp Family Trust agreed to provide 3 driveway accesses from a gravel
road. That gravel road in now known as Kemp Road that runs through Phase 2 ofthe Willow
Creek Subdivision.
During the development of the Willow Creek Subdivision, I served as one of the initial board of
directors for the Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association Inc.
(the "HOA") along with Mary Kemp, the trustee for the Kemp Family Trust. As the developer of
the Subdivision and who also controlled the HOA, the Kemp FamtlyTrustpaid to have the three
driveway accesses constructed just as the parties agreed to do in the Agreement For Sale of
Property. As a former HOA board member, I can say with a high degree of certainty that the
HOA at that time was aware of the Agreement and its terms regarding the three driveway

accesses.
let me know if I can answer any more questions for you.

Sincerely,

Alan Mills

Mills & C9. Realty lflC.

EXHIBIT

I

A
LEE0014
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Daniel W. Bower, ISB #7204
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83 713
Telephone: (208) 345-3333
Fax No.: (208) 345-4461
dbower@stm-law.com

CANYON C0UNry
A GALLEGOS O CLERK
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
DALE LEE and KA THI LEE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV 16-3425
Plaintiffs,

DECLARATION OF DALE LEE
vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and DOES I -X, inclusive,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Canyon

)

I, Dale Lee, declare and state as follows and under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws
of the state of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct:
1)

I am over the age of eighteen (18) and make this declaration of my own personal
knowledge and belief.
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2)

In the summer of 1997, I was approached by the Kemp Family Trust ("Kemps")
about a possible real estate transaction.

3)

We both owned real property north of Purple Sage Road in Middleton, Idaho. A map
of the property reflecting ownership of the land in 1997 is attached as hereto as
Exhibit A (LEE0016).

4)

To develop the "Kemp property" the Kemps needed approximately 1.8 acres of real
property owned by the Lees. My wife and I were willing to sell them the 1.8 acres
needed, but as a condition of that sale, wanted to ensure that we would have access to
the road for that was to be constructed by the Kemps.

5)

The real estate agent for the Kemps was Alan Mills, of Mills & Co. Realty Inc. See
also June 14, 2015 Declaration of Alan Mills, Exhibit A (LEE0014).

6)

That road referenced above, presently known as Kemp Road, was to be constructed
by the Kemps and was to run along the southern border of the Kemp property
("Kemp Road").

7)

Access to Kemp Road, was given as a condition to the sale of the 1.8 acre parcel.

8)

On June 1, 1997, the Lees and the Kemps executed an Agreement for Sale of Real
Property ("Agreement"). A true and accurate copy of the Agreement is attached
hereto as Exhibit B (LEE0008).

9)

In that Agreement we agreed to sell to the Kemps the 1.8 acres of real property that
the Kemps needed to develop their property into the present day subdivision. Id.
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10)

The Agreement clearly provided that the Kemps and the Lees were planning future
development of their adjoining properties--both the Kemp property and the Lee
property. Id.

11)

The Agreement also made clear that the Kemps agreed to give us, the Lees, access to
the road:
Seller [Lees] shall also be entitled to 3 driveway access from the
gravel road [Kemp Road] to be constructed by Buyer [Kemps]
adjoining Seller's [Lee's] property.
Such access shall be
constructed at Seller's [Lee's] cost and subject to Seller [Lees]
obtaining any necessary governmental approvals.
Id.

12)

Accordingly, we sold the Kemps the property and the Kemps began developing the
subdivision that is now Willow Creek Ranch Estates #2.

13)

In 2000, at the time that Kemp Road was constructed, consistent with the Agreement,
the Kemp Family Trust paid to have the three driveway access points constructed
giving the Lee's property adjacent to Kemp Road access to Kemp Road.

14)

This construction included the creation of three access points, including 24 foot
culverts, and gravel extending from Kemp Road to the Lee's property. Around that
same time, wood fencing and metal gates corresponding to the three access points,
were constructed along the property giving the Lee property clear and obvious access
to Kemp Road. See Exhibit C attached hereto (true and accurate copies of pictures of
those improvements taken in May of 2016) (LEEOO00I-00005).
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15)

As part of the development of the Willow Creek Ranch Estates, the Kemps
transferred Kemp Road to the HOA as a common area "owned by [Willow Creek
Ranch Estates] for the common use and enjoyment of the Owners." See September
24, 2014 Letter from C. Troupis (LEE0009-0013) (Attached as Exhibit D)
(explaining that "The Trust was the developer of Willow Creek Ranch Estates. It
transferred Kemp Lane to the HOA as part of the common area owned by the
Association.").

As explained by Mr. Troupis, "The Association [Willow Creek

HOA] is a successor in interest to the developer's legal title to the property that is
subject to the unrecorded easement because the Association did not acquire the
property by purchase. As such, it is not a bona fide purchaser for value." Id. at p.3
(LEE00ll).
16)

In 2005, at the time the Kemps transferred Kemp Road to the HOA, the board of

directors for the HOA was primarily controlled by the Kemps. See Mills Deel.,
Exhibit A.
17)

Mary Kemp, trustee of the Kemp Family Trust, and Alan Mills, the Kemps real estate
agent, served as the initial board members for the HOA. Mr. Mills was serving as the
president. Id.

18)

In 2005, Alan Mills, who was the realtor for the Kemps had knowledge of the

Agreement and of the provisions in the Agreement related to the access points as we
discussed them during the time of the transaction.
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19)

On or about June 11, 2015, Alan Mills provided a letter to our attorney wherein he
stated:
During the development of the Willow Creek Subdivision, I served
as one of the initial board of directors for the Willow Creek Ranch
Estates No. 2, Subdivision Homeowner's Association Inc. (the
"HOA") along with Mary Kemp, the trustee for the Kemp Family
Trust. As the developer of the Subdivision and who also
controlled the HOA, the Kemp Family Trust paid to have the three
driveway access constructed just as the parties agreed to do in the
Agreement for Sale of Property. As a former HOA board member,
I can say with a high degree of certainty that the HOA at the time
was aware of the Agreement and its terms regarding the three
driveway access.
See Mills Deel., Exhibit A.

20)

I know, because I had discussions with Alan Mills, at the time that Kemp Road was
transferred to the Willow Creek HOA in 2005, that the Willow Creek HOA Board of
Directors, had knowledge of the Agreement, including the Kemps' agreement to
provide us the access points.

Dated: June 17, 2016.
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FROM GALCO Leasing Company

06-13-1997 11:06AM

AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF REAL PROPERTY

TO

12085853016

P.01

!i
II

,I

This agreement entered in to this _,_ day of June, 1997, by and between Dale and Kath~J:ee,
husband and wife (hereafter referred to tts Sellers) and the Kemp Family Trust (hereafter ¥erred

l,

to as Buyer).

Whereas, Seller is the owner of 1.8 acres of real property described on Exhibit A attached rereto,
and whereas this real property is owned ft~ and clear of aU encumbrances, and
t

Whereas, Buyer desires to acquire this re~) property,

I

Now therefore, the Sell1'r and Buyer agree as follows:

i

I

PURCHASE PRICE, The purchase price for the real property shall be Nine Thousand Dopars,
payable in cash at closing.
I
CLOSING. Clc;,sing shall take place at Transnation Title Company on or before JULY 1, 1997.
CONVEYANCE. Title shall be conveyed by Warranty Deed, nee and clear of all encumbtances.
TITLE INSURANCE and SURVEY. Title insurance, closing cost and swvey cost shall b' paid by
the Buyer;
!
( ' F ~ DEVELOPMENT. Both Seller and Buyer Uc c()l1tempb¢ing future developmen oftheir
existing properties which adjoin each other. Seller and Buyer agree that future developm will not
be in conflict with the rural residential character of Willow Creek Ranch Estates. Seller a
that
homes will be constructed on site and will not be modular or mobile units. In the eventtha Buyer
constructs a recreational center for use by residents of wmow Creek Ranch Estates, Se:tU shall be
entil~ to use and shall also be subject to payment of dues. Seller shaJI also be entitled to 3/
driveway.. accesses from the gi.a~.el road to be constructed. by Buyer .adjoining Seller's p=Fv'y,
Such accesses shall be constructed at Sellers cost and subject to SeUer obtaining any n
sary
govenunent approvals.
STOCK WATER Seller shall be entitled. to water stock at the reservoir until suchtime as !Buyer

t

provides an alternative watering location.
.-EXISTIN.G.D.RAINA.GE. SelJer shall be entitled to ma.
·. in.tain the existin.
· · g drainage to the. ti servo.ir.
,.WATER RIGHTS. Seller desires to retain the existing watenigbts on the rea1 property so d to
Buyer. Seller understands that this transfer will have to be approved by Black Canyon Irri ation
District.

,EQUIPMENT and FENCING. Seller retains all irrigation equipment and fencing. Seller~{ill ,
remove the fence upon 30 days notice or Buyer may remove.
,
I
.-+BUILDING RESTRICTED. Buyer acknowledges that the real property is not intended to ~ea
building site, but will be included as part of what is identified as Lots 5 and 6 of Block 5, Willow
Creek Ranch Estates No. 2. ·· ·
RELOCATION OF SIPHON. All construction work for relocation ofthe siphon shall be
performed . ~uyer'~_P,I9.Perty.
.

SELLER: ._
Dale ·

:,_

i

•DY.

I

~
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TROUPIS LAW OFFICE,
CHiusT 1. TROUPIS
IJCENSED IN IDAHO, OREcoN, ·

<;:ALJfORNIA,

At,10

ArroRNEY AND COUNSl:I.OR

lWNOIS.

P.A.

x.r·uw

(208) 938-.5584

1299 E. IRON EAaE, SUITE UO
. P.O. Box 2408

FAX (208) 938-548l

ctroupjs@troupislaw.com

EAc;l.E, lDAHo·,83616

S ~ e r 22, 2014

Willow Creek Ranch Estates Board ofDirectors
c/c:, Rhonda Curry, President
9420 Kemp Road Meridian, ID 83644

Re:R~: W"dlow Creek-Ranch Estates obligati.on under Drivew9AccegAgreenumt
between 1>ale qndKatlw Lee (Setler) and Kgnp Fg,nlly Trlilt (Buper).

Dear Members of the Board:
You have provided m.e with a copy of a June, 1997 Agreement for the sale of real
property to the Kemp Family Tl'USt by Dale and Kathy Lee. The property is descn1Jed as
1.8 acres, being part of.Lots S and 6 of Block S, Willow Creek.~h Estates No. 2. The
Sale Agreement ·states that both parties are contmnpbrting future development oftheir
properties which adjoin each other. The provisiQD. of the agreement on which you have
~ me to offer an opinion is tJ;ds:
''Seller shall also be entitled to 3 driveway 8.QCC:S!les ftoni tb,e gravel read to be
,
constructed by Buyer adjoining Seller's propetty. Such accesses shall be -euui ev- f'("J\/id.o.c\
co~.at Selle,:'s cost and subject to Seller obtaining any necessmy ~~\JJ-W~ <l1,1ll/12/\;~1

government approvals."

1

~ { Y A ~ ~ ~cfv

,

~~.~\ \Jc., ¼.._":},~
The terms of this agreement grant an easement to the Sd}er t o · ~ and use three (3)

driveway accesses to the gravel road. The agreement does not state that there is an
" easemerit to use the gravel rt>acL but since it refers· to ·-accesses,:,, an easement actOSS the
gravel road is probably implied.

Easenu,nts are either "in gross" or "appurtenant." If they BJe ''in gross"~ the ·easement is
granted only to the named party and Jl()t to subsequent land11sers or ownms. Ifit is
''appurtenant", the. easement is attached to the land aru:l passes on to subsequent
landowners. The Court fust looks to tbe written terms oftlre ~ gnmtitselfto
determine what kind ofeasementhas been created. Onlyifthere is an ambiguity, will the
colltt look at other facts surr01mding creation of the easement to determine whethet it
attaches to the land. Here, the easement is granted only to the 4 Seller'"" It is not gl'81lted to

l ~..,.,.. & ovJ. <~ v1-te,V\ ·h•• ,,..,

.

11

'
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Willow Creek Ranch Estates Board of Directors
c/o RhQD.da Curry> President

September 24, 2014\
Page-2---

In this cas~ the Seiler (Pale and Kathy Lee) reserved an e~eni.ent across land they were

the

selling to
Buyer,.1he I<emp Family Trust. So, the Kemp Family Trust acquired
property encrunbered with an easement in favctt ofthe Lee$, alloWlllg thmn wconstru.et
the thtee dtj.veways m:tcl.ac~ the gravel road. The property the Kemp Family Trust
-.. acquired was snI?teQl;l.ently improved with a gravel road, which novv comprises a portion
of Kemp Lane. . '

,

The Trust was the developer of Willow Creek Ranch Estates. It 1ransferted Kemp Lane to
the HOA as part.of the common area owned bythe AsSQCiation. At the time ofthe
~ , a number of third pQtti~ ~ p•ased lots and unproved them witb:homes
· adjacvnt t~ the road. All of the members of the Association own an equitible interest in
the co:mmon areas owned by their Association. However, the A.$.soclation is a csu.ccessor .
in interest' to the Developer because the Association did not purchase the common areas.
The Developer transferred the common areas to the development, and transferred control
of the development to the Association.
·
You have advised me that the Sale Agreement was not recorded, ·and its existence and
tenns are not disclosed on the SobdivisiQn Pl• for Willow Creek Ran.ch Estates No. 2. .
r·
,
Moreoyer, the griv,my:avs were ueLet£0~and the ~,s property re~ft;-tuy-Q, ~~fltw!i!
undeveloped. It should also be notecltbat the Lee property 1s not landlocked. Alternative
access for vehicles i$ available, although at g,,-eater cost
Following this sale, the Kemp Family-Trust improved its property by platting .the Willow
Creek Ranch Estatea Subdivision. It ~Id all of the n,Side.ntfal-lots in the development,
which are now owned by third parties who acquired th.em wifllQutJmowledge of the
unrecorded claimed easement across a private road within the subdivision (Kemp Lane)
reserved by the Lees when the developer acquired some oftbe property now within the
subdivision. &Yl.A \M 07A. Ji\-yQ. a..._

.
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Willow Creek Ranch Estates Board of Directors
·

c/o Rhonda Curry, President
September 24, 2014

Page-3-

The developer transferred control of the subdivision to the Willow Creek Ranch Estates
Homeowners' Association in or about 2005. Kemp·Lane is described on the Plat as part
oftb.e "Common Areas,, which, under Article I{D) ofthe CCR?s,
"m.eans ali teal property, including easements or other interests less than fee title,
as well as the improvements thereon, owned by the Association for~ conunon
use and enjoygient of the Owners.''
ThB primary legal issue presented by these facts is whether the Homeowners'
Association, as a s-qccessor-in-interest of the Kemp Family Trust as developer of Willow
Creek Ranch Estates, is legally obligated to honor an uurecorded easement enmunbering
property transferred to it by the Kemp· Family Trost. There are ;no Idaho eases that
discuss this issue, and therefore, it is a legal question of first impression in Idaho. As a
reslllt I cannot give you a definitive answer to this legal question based on prior
decisions of the Idaho courts or Idaho statutes. H ~ , other general principles of law
in Idaho can provide guidance to the Association on ·this legal issue that I believe you .can.
reasonably rely upon. Understand however, that an Idaho court can always reach a
different conclusion, and it is impossible to predict how a specific case will be decided.
Based on the facts provided to me and general principles ofidaho law applicable to those
unreeor4ed easement against the
or any ofthe lot owners within
Associati~
Homeowners'
Estates
Ranch
Willow Creek

~ it is my opinion tbatthe Lees cannot enforce their

the ~bdivision.

My opinion is based on the f'Qllowing facts and law:
1. The Lee's easement is unrecorded and therefore unenforceable agajnst 1:1.ny
,, . ·. , ,
subsequent bona fide purc~er for value, who acquired it without nop.c~ of the
}::.v.liJl/1,1.11~ yo;; {)t, r!k-'. b, ! 1 tq
existence of the easement. ·
\1 J

2. The AssocWiqn is a successor in intere~ to the develo~~s legal title to the.
property that is subject to the unrecorded easement because the Association did
not acquire the property by pm-chase. As such, itis not a bona fide putclutser for
value. However, the beneficial interest in the property is owned by 1:he Lot
and maintain
Owners for whose sole USe and benefit the Association is to control
. .
the road. Therefore the Association holds bare legal title, while the beneficial
ownership is in the Lot Owners ofW'illow Creek Ranch Estates, who ·are the
members of the Association.

.

~.

:,,
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Willow Creek ~ h Estates Board of Directors
c/o Rhonda Curry, President

September24,2014
Page-4-

3. Idaho Code §55-606. CONCLUSIVENESS OF CONVEYANCE -BONA
FIDE PURCHAS!i:RS

Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is
conclU$ive against the grantor, also. against every one
subsequently claiming under him, except a purchaser or
encumbrancer, who in good faith, and for a valuable
consideration, acquires a title or lien by an instrument or
valid judgment lien that is first duly recotded.

4. Idaho Code§ 55-812. UNRECORDED CONVEYANCE VOID AGAJNS'l'
SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS
Every conveyance ofreal property other than a l~e for a

term. not exceeding one (1) year, is void as against any
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property,
or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable
consideration. whose conveyance is first duly recorded

s.

Every lot <>vvner in the ·wmow Creek Ranch ~tes Subdivision is a bQna fide
purchuer for val~ and entitled to rely upon the protection of ldahQ Code §SS812 against tnm'.iCtli:rJed. conveyances, inclll(ling Cl$ements.

6. A court of equity would likely rule that.the lot owners {bona. fide purchasers) as
the sole persons for whose benefit the Association controls and maintains Kemp
Lane, are entitled to protection against the um;ecorded easement.

· In i"uling against enforceability of the easement, a court would likely consider the
following facts to be signmeant. 1) the Lee's parcel is not landlocked; so they are not left
,\J
with a worthless property; 2) the Lees could have ptot.eoted their easement by recording it
whentheytransferredprope~tothe_KempFmnilyTtust. TheLeesw.ere~olely~.f<..P.N'V!f t,(/t!J. - ~ .
wt. O\N.. 0 \'"J/11\.1 respons1"ble for the failure to give- notice to subsequent lot pmchasers ~ Willow Creek .
\c:AiQ.Q '(U:5 VJ- Ranoh Estates Subdivision; 3) there is no provision in the Lee's reserved easement for ). VJ Q.. ~,q ;-!!.Q., ,t..OfJJ
contributing to maintenance of the private road; as a result, the burden of the additional .:, -t,.,. a,,J,/1,, ~a..JJ...ti..fl
·\-\.ct~. ·yi iJ.cd f +::ir
traffic would fall solely upon the homeowners in the subdivision; 4) the agreement
lfl/\o.i,.itWAAO.M. to_.
\.. tv NL contemplated d~velopment, but the Lee parcel was still unimproved bate land when the
·
of
notice
give
to
opportunity
l , , v . ~ v _· i sub~vision was platted. At that time, the Lees again had an
·
.
niA \A \r\,A!l 'Fv:-ure.
I

'
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c/o Rhonda Curry, President
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.
·~
uJ Q, v\Q).Nt-'f'· v.:JiJ.JJJ~ w.f\QtlA t1i.vvJ V\
. a rft~.ci '
\

.

.

. ..

their teserved easement, befote the Kemp Family Trust divested itself of control
.
in 2005; 5) the Kemp Family Trust did not give notice of a reserved easement to ~.
Vl
lot purchasers at the time .they acqldred their properties.
.
,,... } 1d' ,J. . . . , ,.
.
b tUJ1/l£~ vtatA.£

Tn-t

t

..
. . . .. . 11YfH\iJ·~-·f!il"t\ Ci
Based upon all of these facts and law,~ 1s re~nable to conclude that a court would
J'r\l\d

refuse to enforce the ~e ~ement against Willow Creek Ranch Estates HOA and/or the
lot owners within the subdivision.

/!, .1..,

k
· ·'
t\ Vi,.fy\l,J',

~1£1Christ T. Troupis
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Christ T. Troup is, ISB #4549
Troup is Law Office, P.A.
801 E. State Street, Suite 50,
P.O. Box 2408,
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 938-5584
Facsimile: (208) 938·5482
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Matthew C. Parks, ISB #7419
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384·5844
mcp@elamburke.com
Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates
No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband
and wife,
Case No. CV·l6·3425*C
Plaintiffs,
DEFENDANTS'
MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION
HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION,
INC., an Idaho corporation; and DOES
I - X, inclusive,
Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners'
Association, Inc. ("Willow Creek") hereby opposes Plaintiffs Dale Lee and Kathi
Lee's (the "Lees") motion for summary judgment. The Lees' motion for summary
judgment should be denied because as a matter of law they have no right or title to
the disputed property. Furthermore, the Lees have failed to establish facts
necessary to shift the burden to Willow Creek to demonstrate a material question of
fact concerning whether Willow Creek had notice of the agreement at the center of
this dispute.

I.

FACTS

This case concerns a land sale contract and subsequent deed between the
Lees and the Kemp Family Trust. The Lees claim they were granted an easement
over Kemp Road, which is a private road within the Willow Creek Estates
subdivision. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
('Plaintiffs' Memo."), p. 2·4. According to the Lees, the Kemp Family Trust granted
them an easement in the 1997 Agreement for the Sale of Real Property (the 1997
Agreement). Id ("By executing the Agreement, the Kemps granted the Lees an
express easement to construct the three access points and an implied easement to
use Kemp Road.")
The 1997 Agreement submitted to the Court does not have a valid legal
description of the purported easement. See Declaration ofDale Lee ("Lee Dec."), Ex.
B. In fact, the 1997 Agreement does not have any legal description at all - not of

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
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the property to be sold, not of the Lees' property that would be the dominant estate
for purposes of the easement, and not of the servient estate of the easement. Id.
On August 8, 1997, the Lees executed the deed contemplated by the 1997
Agreement. Affidavit ofMatthew C. Parks in Support ofMemorandum in

Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Parks Aff."), Ex. A. The
deed transferred property owned by the Lees to the Kemp Family Trust. Id. Per
the deed, the property was being transferred "free and clear from all encumbrances,
EXCEPT those to which this conveyance is expressly made subject ...." Id. The
deed did not contain any express reservations or exceptions. Id. The deed did not
reference or incorporate the terms of the 1997 Agreement. Id
On December 28, 1998, a plat of the Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 was
recorded. This subdivision contains Kemp Road. Id, Ex. B. The plat map does not
reference any easement or property right of the Lees with respect to Kemp Road.
On April 30, 1999, the Kemp Family Trust subsequently recorded the Willow
Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions
and Neighborhood Association (the "Declaration"). Id., Ex. C. The Declaration does
not contain any reference to the alleged easement or equitable servitude claimed by
the Lees over Kemp Road. Id.
The Kemp Family Trust transferred Kemp Road to Willow Creek via a
warranty deed which indicated Kemp Road was being transferred free from all
encumbrances except taxes and "covenants, conditions, restrictions, and easements
of record." Parks Aff., Ex. D.
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II.

SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENT

The Lees contend they have either an easement or equitable servitude over
Kemp Road pursuant to the 1997 Agreement. Plaintiffs' Memo., p. 6. As a matter
of law, the Lees are mistaken.
First, Willow Creek disagrees that its predecessor in interest (the Kemp
Family Trust) to Kemp Road ever granted any easement or servitude to the Lees.
At the time the Lees and the Kemp Family Trust executed the 1997 Agreement, the
Lees owned the subject property. The closing for the transfer was, per the 1997
Agreement, to take place on or before July 1, 1997. Lee Dec., Ex. B. Until closing,
the Lees owned the subject property. The Kemp Family Trust did not own the
property and did not have the power to grant the Lees any easement or servitude at
the time the parties executed the 1997 Agreement. A party cannot grant an
easement or servitude over property it does not own. See Capstar Radio Oper. Co.

v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 708, 152 P. 2d 575, 579 (2007). Likewise, a party
cannot grant itself an easement or servitude over its own property. Id.
Second, the Lees, after executing the 1997 Agreement subsequently executed
a deed transferring the property upon which they claim an easement to the Kemp
Family Trust. As a matter of law, the recitals and covenants in the 1997 Agreement
merged with the deed. See Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373,414 P.2d
879 (1966). The deed does not mention the alleged easement or servitude. The
Court may only look to the deed to determine the property rights that were
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transferred as a result of the 1997 land sale between the Lees and the Kemp Family
Trust.
Third, the 1997 Agreement does not have a legal description of any of the
properties involved and is, thus, unenforceable in law or in equity. See Ray v.

Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 200 P.3d 1174 (2009).
Fourth, Willow Creek disagrees that it had knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the 1997 Agreement. The Lees only evidence in support of the claim Willow
Creek had knowledge of the 1997 Agreement fails to establish the absence of a
question of fact concerning this point. According to the Lees, because Alan Mills,
the real estate agent for the Kemp Family Trust, knew about the 1997 Agreement
and Mills initially served as a board member of Willow Creek, the know ledge of the
Kemp Family Trust is imputed to Willow Creek. But, the Lees failed to offer any
evidence that Mills acquired any knowledge of the 1997 Agreement in his capacity

as a board member ofthe association, which is required in order to impute such
knowledge to Willow Creek. See Mason v. Tucker & Associates, 125 Idaho 429,433,
871 P.2d 846, 850 (Ct. App. 1994) ("Knowledge acquired by an agent during the

course of the agency relationship, and while the agent is not acting in an interest
adverse to that of the principal, is imputed to the principal; and notice to an agent
constitutes notice to the principal.") (emphasis added).
The records of the association contain no mention of the 1997 Agreement.
Ray Tschohl, became president of Willow Creek in 2005, and when he became
president, he did not have any knowledge of the 1997 Agreement. See Declaration
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Tschohl learned the Lees claimed they had an easement over

Kemp Road. Id. Tschohl searched the records of the association and found no
mention of the 1997 Agreement in any records of the association. Id. Willow Creek
did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the 1997 Agreement.
For these reasons, Willow Creek requests the Court deny the Lees' motion for
summary judgment. Willow Creek also requests the Court find that, as a matter of
law, the 1997 Agreement does not contain any grant of an easement, servitude, or
enforceable property right to the Lees.

III.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The Court must liberally construe all facts and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade

Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 238 (2005). If the record contains conflicting inferences upon
which reasonable minds could differ, summary judgment must not be granted.

Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830,833 (1990). This requirement is
a strict one. Clarke v. Prenger, 114 Idaho 766, 768 (1988).
The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times upon
the moving party. G&M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517 (1991). This
burden is onerous because even "circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue
of material fact, [and] all doubts are to be resolved against the moving party." Doe
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v. Durtschi: 110 Idaho 466,470 (1986). If the moving party meets this burden, the
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show a genuine issue of material fact does
exist. Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners' Assn. Inc., 152 Idaho
338, 343·44 (2012).
The adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but
must set forth by deposition, affidavit, or otherwise, specific facts showing there is a
genuine issue for trial. Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154
Idaho 99, 104 (2013). The nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory
assertions that an issue of material fact exists to withstand summary judgment.

Northwest Bee-Corp. v. Home Living Bery., 136 Idaho 835, 839 (2002). A mere
scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment. Jenkins, 141
Idaho at 238. However, "[tlhe burden of the plaintiff when faced with a motion for
summary judgment, is not to persuade the judge that an issue will be decided in his
favor at trial. Rather, he simply must present sufficient materials to show that
there is a triable issue." G&M Farms, 119 Idaho at 524 (emphasis in original).
"It is not the trial court's function to weigh the evidence, but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial." G&M Fanns, 119 Idaho at 517. "Facts
in dispute cease to be material facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a prima
facie case. In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue of material fact,' since
a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's
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case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Post Falls Trailer Park V.

Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634, 637 (1998).

IV.
A.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

The 1997 Agreement Does Not Grant an Express Easement or Servitude
The Lees failed to establish that the 1997 Agreement grants them an express

easement or express servitude over the subject property.
First the 1997 Agreement is merely an agreement to agree with respect to the
referenced "3 driveway accesses." The Kemp Family Trust did not own the subject
property at the time the 1997 Agreement was executed and, thus, could not have
granted any easements or servitudes.
Second, the 1997 Agreement merged with the subsequent deed (which
contains no mention of an access easement rights retained by the Lees). As a
matter of law, the Court is precluded from looking to the 1997 Agreement to
determine the rights of the parties with respect to the property transferred via the
deed.
Third, the 1997 Agreement does not contain a legal description of the
property and, thus, is unenforceable in law or in equity.
1.

The Kemp Family Trust Never Granted an Easement or Servitude

The Lees incorrectly contend that Willow Creek does not dispute the
assertion the 1997 Agreement creates an easement. See Plaintiffs' Memo., p. 7.
The Lees cite to a letter drafted by Willow Creek's counsel in support of their
position. First, the letter is hearsay and inadmissible. Second, the letter is only a
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letter and not binding precedent. The Lees failed to establish the 1997 Agreement
grants an easement or servitude. For that reason alone, the Lees' motion for
summary judgment should be denied.
The 1997 Agreement is not a grant of any property interest, but an
agreement by the Lees to transfer certain property to the Kemp Family Trust at the
closing, contingent on the payment of money by the Kemp Family Trust. Lee Dec.,
Ex. B. As a matter oflaw, the 1997 Agreement does not contain an enforceable
grant of any easement or servitude by the Kemp Family Trust to the Lees because
the Lees owned both the property being sold (the unspecified 1.8 acres) and the
property being retained by the Lees (and could not grant themselves an easement)
and the Kemp Family Trust did not own the subject property (and could not grant
the Lees an easement or servitude).
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled on whether a purchase and sale
agreement can be the source of the grant of an easement by the buyer to the seller
in Capstar Radio Oper. Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 152 P. 2d 575 (2007). In

Capstar, the Idaho Supreme Court explained how an express easement or servitude
can be created:
An easement is the right to use the land of another for a
specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general
use of the property by the owner. An express easement,
being an interest in real property, may only be created by
a written instrument. No particular forms or words of art
are necessary [to create an express easement]; it is
necessary only that the parties make clear their intention
to establish a servitude. An express easement may be
created by a written agreement between the owner of the
dominant estate and the owner of the servient estate. It
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may also be created by a deed from the owner of the
servient estate to the owner of the dominant estate.
Where the owner of the dominant estate is selling the
property to be subjected to the servitude, an express
easement may be created by reservation or by exception.
An express easement by reservation reserves to the
grantor some new right in the property being conveyed;
an express easement by exception operates by
withholding title to a portion of the conveyed property.

Id at 707, 152 P.3d at 578 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis
added).
The Caps tar case is very instructive and sets forth binding precedent directly
applicable to the dispute between the Lees and Willow Creek. The facts in Capstar
are remarkably similar to the facts in this case with respect to the sale agreement
and the subsequent deed. The Lawrences and Capstar owned adjacent parcels of
property. Id. at 706, 152 P. 3d at 577. Capstar alleged it had an easement over a
portion of the Lawrences' property by virtue of a sale agreement between the Funks
(who at one point owned both the Lawrences' property and Capstar's property) and
the Lawrences' predecessor in interest (Human Synergistics) that contained a
provision indicating the sale of the Lawrence property by the Funks was:
Subject to and including an ingress egress
easement over this and adjoining property in said sections
21 and 22 owned by the grantor and including an ingress
egress easement over portions of Section 21 heretofore
granted to the grantors. Said easement shall be over
existing roads until such time as all record owners shall
agree to the relocation, improvement and/or abandonment
of all or any portions of any roads. This easement is also
over similar lands in Section 15.

Capstar, 143 Idaho at 706, 152 P. 3d at 577.
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However, the deed transferring the property from the Funks to Human Synergistics
did not contain any language concerning the grant of any easements, though the
deed did reference the sale agreement generally. Id.
Capstar, like the Lees, argued that the sales agreement contained a grant of
an easement or servitude. The Court in Capstarnoted, "(t]here is nothing in the
sale agreement that indicates an immediate grant of easement rights." Id. at 708,
152 P.3d at 579. The Court held that the agreement was a "title retaining contract
where the grant of the Lawrence parcel (and the creation of any easement over it)
was contingent upon future fulfilment of the sale agreement." Id. Rather than an
immediate grant of any easement or servitude, the Court held the contract gave the
Funks the right to obtain an access easement in the future over the Lawrence
parcel for the benefit of another property (which was not specified) after the buyers
paid the purchase price at closing. Id In this situation (where a purchase and sale
agreement contains a provision concerning a right to obtain an easement once the
purchase price is paid), the Court held that there would be no grant of any
easement unless the deed itself contained language reserving or excepting an
easement or servitude. Id. ("The sale agreement therefore does not, by itself, create
any easement either by grant, reservation, or exception .... In order for an
_easement to be created, there needed to be language in the 1992 warranty deed
reserving or excepting an easement.''.)
The deed from the Funks to Human Synergistics, the Lawrences' predecessor
in interest, contained no such reservation or exception. Therefore, the Court held
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that the sale agreement did not create any easement or servitude. Id at 708·09,
152 P. 3d at 579·80.
The facts of this case parallel the facts in Capstar. The Lees, like Capstar,
point to a sales agreement as the source of the grant of the easement or servitude.
Though, the language in the sales agreement in Capstar is less ambiguous than the
language in the 1997 Agreement. Both sales agreements lack any indication that
there was an immediate grant of an easement. The Lees (like the Funks) owned
both the servient and dominant estates at the time they executed the 1997
Agreement and, thus, could not grant themselves an easement. See Capstarat 707,
152 P.3d at 578 (holding one way to create an express easement or servitude is an
agreement between the owner of the dominant estate and the owner of the servient
estate); see also W. Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 83, 106 P.3d
401, 409 (2005) (commenting that equitable servitudes arise in situations where the
"equity is attached to the property by the owner") (citing Streets v. J M Land &

Developing Co., 898 P.2d 377, 379 (Wyo.1995). These cases establish that, as a
matter of law, an owner of property cannot grant itself an easement or make a
promise to itself that could be considered an equitable servitude.
In this case, there never was any agreement between the owner of the
dominant estate and the owner of the servient estate that created an express
easement or servitude. At the time of the 1997 Agreement, the Lees Gust like the
Funks in Capstar) owned both the servient estate and the dominant estate.
Additionally, the Kemp Family Trust, like Human Synergistics, did not own the
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servient estate and thus could not have granted any easement or servitude at the
time the 1997 Agreement was executed. Therefore, pursuant to Idaho law, the 1997
Agreement did not create (and could not have created) an easement or servitude in
favor of the Lees.
The terms of the 1997 Agreement do not contain an express grant of any
easement or servitudes. Per the 1997 Agreement, the Lees would transfer title to
the property to the Kemp Family Trust, "free and clear of all encumbrances." Lee
Dec., Ex. B. The 1997 Agreement notes the Lees and the Kemp Family Trust were
"contemplating future development of their existing properties which adjoin each
other." Id In this "Future Development" section of the 1997 Agreement, the Lees
and Kemp Family Trust referenced a future potential for 3 driveway accesses in
unspecified locations along a road that the Kemp Family Trust was to construct in
the future. Id At most, the 1997 Agreement memorializes an intent to include an
easement in the warranty deed transferring the 1.8 acres to the Kemp Family
Trust. However, it should be pointed out that the 1997 Agreement also specifically
notes that the 1.8 acres will be transferred free and clear of all encumbrances with
no mention of any alleged driveway access easement. Id But, most importantly, as
in Capstar, the subsequent deed transferring the property failed to mention any
easement or servitude.
The case at hand is on all fours with the holding in Capstar. In the case
before this Court, we have a sales agreement that does not contain any express
grant of an easement or servitude, but rather provides for the Lees' right to obtain
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an easement in the future. Both the deed in this case and the deed in Capstar do
not contain any grant, reservation, or exception for an easement or servitude. The

Capstar holding is binding precedent. As a matter of law, the 1997 Agreement did
not create any easement or servitude in favor of the Lees.
Willow Creek requests the Court follow the precedent in Capstar and hold
the 1997 Agreement did not create an express easement or servitude. Willow Creek
requests the Court deny the Lees' motion for summary judgment and find that the
Lees do not have an easement or equitable servitude for the use of Kemp Road or
three driveway accesses from Kemp Road.

2.

The Language in the Deed Controls What Was Granted by the Lees,
Not the 1997 Agreement

The Lees delivered to the Kemp Family Trust a deed for the subject property
as performance of the 1997 Agreement. "When a deed is delivered and accepted as
performance of the contract to convey, the contract is merged in the deed. Though
the terms of the deed may vary from those contained in the contract, the deed alone

must be looked to to determine the rights of the parties . ..." Tower Asset Sub Inc.
v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 715-16, 152 P.3d 581, 586-87 (2007) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). The deed between the Lees and the Kemp Family Trust contains
no language that could be interpreted to reserve or except an easement for use of
and access to driveways from Kemp Road. The deed contains no easement
reservation or exception at all. See Parks Aff., Ex. A.
The Lees have not addressed the fact that the deed transferring the property
at issue contained no reference to any easement or servitudes. "Under the doctrine
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of merger, any recitals in the real estate contract were merged into the deed." 143
Idaho at 715-16, 152 P.3d at 586-87. As a matter oflaw, the court must look only
to the deed and must not review the 1997 Agreement to determine the rights of the
Lees and Willow Creek. The deed contains no mention of any easement or
servitude. The 1997 Agreement merged with the deed and did not and cannot, as a
matter of law, create any property rights for the Lees. The Lees do not have any
easement or servitude over the property at issue.
Willow Creek requests the Court find the 1997 Agreement merged with the
deed delivered by the Lees to the Kemp Family Trust, that the deed determines the
rights of the parties, not the 1997 Agreement, and that the deed does not convey
any easement or servitude to the Lees for the use of and access to Kemp Road.
Willow Creek requests the Court deny the Lees' motion for summary judgment and
dismiss the Lees' complaint.

3.

The 1997 Agreement Does Not Contain a Valid Legal Description

The 1997 Agreement does not have a valid legal description of any of the
parcels of real property involved in the transaction. There is no description of the
land being sold other than that it is 1.8 acres. Lee Dec., Ex. B. There is a reference
to adjoining lands owned by the Lees and the Kemp Family Trust, but there is no
description of these lands either. Id.
The statute of frauds renders an agreement for the
sale of real property invalid unless the agreement or some
note or memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed
by the party charged or his agent. LC.§ 9-505(4).
Agreements for the sale of real property that fail to
comply with the statute of frauds are unenforceable both
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 15

69

in an action at law for damages and in a suit in equity for
specific performance. Hoffman v. S V Co., Inc., 102 Idaho
187, 190, 628 P.2d 218, 221 (1981) (citing 72 Am.Jur.2d
Statute of Frauds§ 285 (1974); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statute of
Frauds§ 513 (1974)). An agreement for the sale of real
property must not only be in writing and subscribed by
the party to be charged, but the writing must also contain
a description of the property, either in terms or by
reference, so that the property can be identified without
resort to parol evidence. Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho
430, 435, 80 P.3d 1031, 1036 (2003).

Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 628, 200 P.3d 1174, 1177 (2009) (emphasis added).
The 1997 Agreement contains no legal descriptions of any of the involved properties
and, thus, cannot, as a matter oflaw, be enforced in law or in equity.
B.

Willow Creek Did Not Have Actual or Constructive Notice of the 1997
Agreement

It is undisputed that the 1997 Agreement was never recorded. There is no
evidence that Willow Creek ever knew about the 1997 Agreement. The only
argument offered by the Lees in support of the claim that Willow Creek had actual
notice of the 1997 Agreement is a statement by Alan Mills, a former board member,
that Willow Creek was aware of the 1997 Agreement. However, the Lees' argument
is flawed in several substantial respects.
First, in order to impute the knowledge of a board member to its principal
organization, the board member must have gained the knowledge in his or her
official capacity. See Sulik v. Cent. Valley Farms, Inc., 95 Idaho 826,828, 521 P.2d
144, 146 (1974). In other words, the Lees must demonstrate that Alan Mills
received the knowledge of the 1997 Agreement in his capacity as a board member of
the association. The record contains no such evidence. While not exactly clear, it
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can be assumed that Mills learned about the 1997 Agreement at the time it was
executed, as he writes in his letter that he"was the real estate agent for the Kemp
Family Trust ...." Declaration of Alan Mills, Ex. A. Mills learned about the 1997
Agreement while acting in his capacity as the agent of the Kemp Family Trust, not
Willow Creek. Willow Creek did not exist when the 1997 Agreement was executed.
Parks Aff., Ex. E (Willow Creek Articles of Incorporation).
The record contains no evidence to support a finding that the knowledge of
Mills (or Mary Kemp) can be imputed to Willow Creek. Mills may have known
about the 1997 Agreement, but there is no evidence in the record that Willow Creek,
in 2005, when the Kemp Family Trust transferred Kemp Road to Willow Creek,
knew about the 1997 Agreement. The knowledge ofrealtor Alan Mills cannot be
imputed to Willow Creek.
The same argument applies with respect to Mary Kemp, the trustee of the
Kemp Family Trust, who, according to Mills, also served as an initial board member
of Willow Creek. First, Mary Kemp has not submitted any affidavit or statement,
so any reliance on the allegation that Mary Kemp knew about the 1997 Agreement
and her knowledge may be imputed to Willow Creek fails for lack of evidentiary
support. But, in any event the argument would fail because Mary Kemp learned of
the 1997 Agreement in her capacity as the trustee of the Kemp Family Trust at the
time of the execution of the 1997 Agreement.
Second, as a matter of public policy, the Court should not impute the
knowledge of the initial board members to the subsequent innocent home buyers in
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the subdivision. The initial board members were acting in their own interests while
serving on the board, as they were developing the land and hoping to make a profit.
The developer never told the purchasers about the alleged agreement to provide
access to the Lees. Innocent people purchased the lots in the subdivisions to
construct homes without any knowledge of the 1997 Agreement. The equities favor
not forcing these innocent home owners who own homes within the Willow Creek
s~bdivision to open up the private road they maintain for the Lees. The Lees
neglected to include the easement or servitude in the deed. The Kemp Family Trust
neglected to include the easements in the plat for the Willow Creek subdivision or
mention the alleged covenant in the declarations for the subdivision. These failures
by the Lees and the Kemp Family Trust should not result in an adverse ruling
against innocent home owners in the Willow Creek subdivision.

V.

CONCLUSION

The Lees' motion for summary judgment is based upon the faulty assumption
that the 1997 Agreement contains an enforceable grant of an easement or equitable
servitude. Idaho law is clear that a title retaining sale agreement (like the 1997
Agreement) cannot create an easement or servitude without the exception or
reservation being included in the subsequent deed. The deed from the Lees to the
Kemp Family Trust did not provide for an easement or servitude to the Lees.
Because the deed did not mention the easement or servitude, and the 1997
Agreement merged with the deed, as a matter of law, the Lees do not have an
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easement or servitude over Kemp Road. Willow Creek requests the Court deny the
Lees' motion for summary judgment and dismiss the Lees' complaint.
DATED this_!/__ day of August, 2016.

ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:~/li.

Matthew C. Parks, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek
Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision
Homeowners' Association, Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

_J__

day of August, 2016, I caused a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Daniel W. Bower
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS, PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83713

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
['-'t'Via Facsimile 345·4461

Honorable Christopher S. Nye
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany St
Caldwell, ID 83605

~.S.Mail
[~Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Facsimile
[vt"'Email clerk copy acahill@canyonco.org

Matthew C. Parks
4841·0019·7941, v. 1
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB #4549
Troupis Law Office, P.A.
801 E. State Street, Suite 50,
P.O. Box 2408,
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 938·5584
Facsimile: (208) 938·5482

AUG

o~· lo1s

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
K BRONSON, 0EMY

Matthew C. Parks, ISB #7419
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343·5454
Facsimile: (208) 384· 5844
mcp@elamburke.com
Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates
No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband
and wife,
Case No. CV·16·3425*C
Plaintiffs,
AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW C.
PARKS IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.

WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION
HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION,
INC., an Idaho corporation; and DOES
I - X, inclusive,
Defendants.
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STATE OF IDAHO
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County of Ada

)

MATTHEW C. PARKS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am an attorney with the firm of Elam & Burke, P.A., and am one of

the attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates Subdivision No. 2
Homeowner's Association, in the above entitled action.
2.

I am familiar with the files generated in this action and have

knowledge of the contents thereof and make this affidavit based upon my personal
knowledge.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a Warranty

Deed, Canyon County Recorder's Office Instrument No. 9725936.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the

subdivision plat for the Willow Creek Ranch Estates Subdivision No. 2, Canyon
County Recorder's Office Instrument No. 9847975.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Willow

Creek Ranch Estates Subdivision No. 2 Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and
Restrictions and Neighborhood Association, Canyon County Recorder's Office
9916906.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of a Warranty

Deed, Canyon County Recorder's Office Instrument No. 200517952.
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Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of the Articles

7.

of Incorporation for Willow Creek Ranch Estates Subdivision No. 2 on file with the
Idaho Secretary of State.

Matthew C. Parks

,~- -su:::~-~ ;;z;;~t~;_;.;ugust,
SWORN

KIMBRA S KLrnE
Notary Public
State of Idaho

Notary Public for Idaho ~
Residing at (2/7(.4J .
My Commission Expir~s

=tit.

2016.

oI J

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

_!/!!_

1day of August, 2016, I caused a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:

Daniel W. Bower
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS, PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83713

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
[~Via Facsimile 345·4461

Honorable Christopher S. Nye
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany St
Caldwell, ID 83605

[~U.S. Mail
~ Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Facsimile
[ vf"Email clerk copyacahill@canyonco.org

Matthew C. Parks
4823·7668·3062,

V.

1
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The ·~r~ntees herein have read and approved the f-ng:
TitleFileNo.:TN97-U37

qnd '\'3C, WARRANTY
5

DEED

FOR VALUE RECEIVED
• ,t.1,,,

Dale Lee and Katin•.: Lee, husband & wife

GRANTOR(s), does(do) hereby GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL and CONVEY unto: J. Robert Kemp, trustee
of the Kemp Family Trust
GRANTEES(s), whose cutrent address is: P O BOX 2724 BOISE ID 83701
the following described real property in Canyon
County, State of Idaho,
more particularly described as follows, to wit:
see attached exhibit "A"

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances unto the said Grantee(s), and Grantee(s)
heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor(s) does(do) hereby covenant to and with the said Grantee(s), that
Grantor(s) is/are the owner(s) in fee simple of said premises; that said premises are free from all encumbrances,
EXCEPT those to which this convey~ is expressly made subject and those made, suffered or done by the
Grantee(s); and subject to reservations, restrictions, dedications, easements, rights of Wf!Y and agreements,(if any)
of record, and general taxes and assessments, (including irrigation and utility assessments, if any) for the current
year, which are not yet due and payable, and that Grantoi'(s) will warrant and defend the same from all lawful
claims whatsoever,

>

Katb1,Lee
,<....

STATE OF . ID , County ojCanyon , ss.
On this 8th day ofAugustin the year of
1997
1997, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and
for said State, personally appeared
,.I(.'-'

Dale Lee and Kathi

Lee

Signatu,......_---=~~""'"'les=~=-....,.,,_,,.,__,,_;_
Name: ~~~Q.'.j
Residing at: Caldwell
My commission expires: 1/28/2003

Transnation Title & Escrow, Inc.
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EXHIBIT
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EXHIBIT •A"
This parcel is a portion.of.the Southwest quarter southeast quarter of Section 28,
Township 5 North, Range 2· west of the Boise Meridian, and is more pa~ticularly dt:_scribed
as follows:
COMMENCING at the · southeast corner of said Southwest quarter Southeast quarter; thence.
North o• 05' . 13" west along the East):>oUlldary of said So~thwest .quarter Southeast quarter
a distance of 1046.73 fee't'.to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; theuce
North 76° 49' 56" West a distance of 342.25 feet; thence
North o• 05' 13" West parallel with said East boundary a distance of 196.36 feet tc a
point on the North boundary of said ,Southwest quarter Southeast quarter; thence
South 89° 54' 59" East along said North boundary a distance of 333.13 fee~ to the
Northeast corner of said Southwest quarter Southeast quarter; thence
south o• 05' 13" East along the Bast boundary of said Southwest quarter Southeast quarter
a distance of 273.84; feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.
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Oomel• ond Pouf({,e Oontolc-. htnband
and wife. O'l"ld Copelto Caporolion, an Idaho co,porotiot'i, btri'19 r.,..,, ·duly :rworn
dep0$e ond t1t:Y we. ore ,he OW11ft"S of MU.OW CR££K F'UNCH EST.- TES Ho. 2 0.1
Stwi,~IM

th.nee HorUI 64 ' 18' 21'" Casi o dlslonce of 57.J7 {eel;
th.,,c• South 74' 17' JO" £'1Sf o dls!oncl!' of 28J.8& ftC"l;

mortt porlkulo ly described .;, lh• le9"1 deseripllon bo/<1111, :stote thot it is 04/f
infltnfion to in :Jud• .aid property tn thlS' .subdhU(on plot. The eo,cmcnls .shO'ltn on
this plot ore h•tffldt-d only for tho rii,hl and purpo11e:s •11t forth Ofld no stn.efur.s
olher thon !tic,e for Utility. ln1goUon or OrOD09'0 pu,pon., o,e to be erecl~ wi(hti
rflfflit• of the eJS"emuib. Al~a. •• hereby certify t"4>t this ad,.;;"'~ ,,_rn C()l'l'tpliance
*1th porogroph I, section 50- f J.J.4 of O,e Idaho Code.

,o·

cu,.,.

thence 'norfh•ct(&rly 47. 12 tut olM9 thit Of'C of o cur~ to lhlf' l•ff hQ'Mg o
c1tntt'ol ongltt o• Pt,. oo• oo·, o radius of .J0.00 fHt. O(\t/ o· Jong chord _,,ich
b1tol"I' Nor(h ""' 59' 50" W•&t a d1'stance of ,f2.4.J f•-et;

:<r

ocr ,o ..

thence South 48' 50' 2.f'"

Wnl a di1lonu of 79.P9 fe•I;

ar

,,Of'lh•Hlerly 1/l.<fO feot ol0n9 lh• ore of o curw lo the rlflhl hovin9 a cMtrc4
on~, of .JI" 19' J2", o radius of .Jf5.J.1 loet, ond a long chord which b.-or.s
Worlh 7 4• 20' OJ" Wut a dist.one• ol 170.26 foe:I:

lhl!U'•cn.

flt,.,

t

svrwy 1,r:·Jff the dlr~t:tOOII of
fu,tf}cr cel'Ufy (llot I ml1de
(ht 01WJCII" l h ~ f ond lhol th• NrVe.y ;s i: conformity wirh tl'lt>
Stole of Idaho CodU relotit'tg lo plots 011d subd.iiwf•rMS.

~

U.11nco north•o$lerly 9,f,2S feet Olon9 the ore of a curw to th• right hov<ng a
00". o rodiu• of 120.00 fe.t. ond a lcfi9 chord llrl'tich
c_.1,o1 ongl'e of .f5'
30' IO• Coal a di.stance of 9f.84 feet
NOi$ North

oo·

s1·

82

PPROVAL OF CANYON COUN "Y COMMISSIONERS

fheoce Socith s9• 59• SO" Cast o di•ltJnU of 79,99 f•rt;

~j~

thmce 1N11""Utieosl..-ty 47.12 •feet ofOl'lg th~ arc of o ,cwva to the l1tft
having o euttr.ol Ot'l9le of 90" 00' 00"'.. a·.rodJus of .JO.DO feet. ond
· a long chord trhldl be'Of1 N«th . ,. (JI)' ,er £01t o dlstonc:e of 42.4J feet;

Wot o dist°""° .of 224.40 feet;

APPROVAL Of CA~;;;.icouJry

1·: ~ : 1~~6
lor,g chord which be~ Soulh 44· 55' ,f7"' f<JSt o &,fonce of .f2.46 f4et;
0

then~ Sovth · sg· 54' 5P'" COJ1t o dl•fMC* of 80,00 ft,ef;

0

.

.

Oat•

LANNING AND ZoNING

:.:·

h~-4t-

.•

.

.'H?r:qi

fltb.,J::.~~-

tMnco SouU! 0- 00' 10· WuC a dist0tteo: of 120.00 fNt to the OJtnAt..
POIN1, eottloillfng 14.92 acre$. ,nor. or lo.ta.

a~~·is~. t:•,::u. ~? j//1;; ::at:,,~~

.i~:,c; ~:~

I, Greg l.. Sl-O'lnar dD hereby certify thal I .,,,, o Profnsiortal
LOl'ld S..-tt.'4!'y« OcerrHd by lh• St-ate ,:,f ldt: lO, Ofld that this
plol of \Kl'low Cred Ronch £aloltt Ho. 2 ,-s descrtt,~ .w, 1/)•
~ certllleote ond tl'le al toelre,d p4ot, •• ·s dNJ•n from on
oetuol #Ul'V*y mad• by ,,,. and oa;v,o,-,y "eprn•nts the pohh

o dista11ee of 480.51 ,.. r;

t/uinee Nor.fh -45" 00' 10" £a,t o G7stonce of JJ7.57 feet;

t}r(N"lc• south~C'.Jluly , ,.f.94 fr,d olong the arc. of o wr- fa tit~ 1#/t trowig
. o cent,ot Qt)9/• ti 41" 06' oa'", a radius of 24.J.8& fHt 0,1d o /0119
chtK'd which ~eo, r South 20" JS' 30· Well o dlst®ce of IJJ.21 feef;

]J' 2&'"

,a· £a•!

•s·

o dlstortc• of 481.JJ lttl:

thence Soutli 41· 09' J.-1" West a dlstonce of 181.92 feet;

o·

.fO'

thence r,orfheo$tot1y 47.12 lcttt Df0tt9 !he ore of o c::urve to the le/I
00' GO";. o l'odiul of 60.00 feet. ond o
1'101N19 o cenlrol ongl.l of
long dlord 1'hlch l>aorl' North a,• Jo' ,o• ca,t a distonee of 4S.9l fut.;

!hence .sout~west..,ly ,t.98 /ur along lh• are of o etrrw- to the l•fl having o
cMtrol an~ of 80' ,ct a,r. o rodlu.s of .J0.00 f«11et ' and o long d\<lt'd
•hktr beOf"S So.,·h 81' 14• ~ - West a d!ttonc, of .JIJ.6J fHt;

th~e South

sa·

(hence ~oulheostaly IJ9.59 feel atot,g the ere -of o c11rw fo th~ /elf haWlg o
ttntral Mgle of .Jr r9• 32 .., o rodius of 2"5.,J2 fNl. o,d o lon9 dtord wfildl
t,ea,s South 74' 20' Of .. Cost o didonce of rJ1.06 feet;
thettee South 89" 59" .so· £a•t o dlstonc• of $51.74 feat;

North 89' 59' 5?'" tvuf o distonco ot Mr. 76 feel;

,s· W••t

Doto

SURVE:YOR'S CERnFICATE

b..,,.•

tht1tcc Sout,i

°''~

-

-3...1...V,,1 l'f'IY

lheoc, sourh~1,rty 52.27 fut o1on9 lhe Ol"C of a wr-.. lo lhe I.rt hoW'lg
o ce11tn,I ongle of 9g· .f9' 52". o l"Odit,-s of .JO.OD fl'l!'t. and o long chord
South 8" .f.5' 21· Co•t o c'stonc• of 45.9t f«t;
"hich

WNt a _d,.,lonc. of t.J"l.S7 teer;

tl'lenee Nor1h 5!" .fO'

fa.sf a 41,:tonce of 60.00 feel:

thence South ,ff' 09" J,f. WQI a di•tmoe of 48.71 feet;

to lho r'9hf ho"'119 a c.,itrol
south11re1l~ly g 1.25 feot aJonp lhe ar, of a
00", a radius of 1.20.00 febl. ond d Iona chorrt wtiich bears
0t19'e ot 45·
J(J' , ., .. We.st o distone1t of 9f.B.f f•et;
SCNth

oo·

Jh• HlghWQy Dlatrlcl has no rnponsibiJlly tor Ui• •free!.s sho""'
0t1 lhis plal, llf'lleu on,d 11nUI o Pflilion h 1s Onn r'IUiwtd ond
approved topitfher wllh de<f/catlon (}f I ~ a-of... Yloy and •wfd.,,.,ce
lhot _p,tjd .strfflS '.Jll!IOf aw,ant Oi,v,'et •I- -ndorf'h for Con•trucn,n.

(11.nc~ Horth 41' 09' J,f• £osf o ' d"dio,Ce of 352.42 feel;

southwest.,-ty "'1. 12 feet along the ore o, o cww to th'. l•ft howl9 a central
0,,9/e of 45' OC ' 00", o rodlus of 60.00 feet, and a lon9 dtord 1'¥1'1/ch beors
South 67' JO' ;o" Wut o drsto,,,cc, of 45.92 fttt;
South 45·

APPROVAL OF' CANYON HIGHWA y ·
DISTRICT No. 4

to lhe rigiht
thence 11orthco$l«rly 217.98 fut olong· the or~ of o
ho'fing o cer,frol angle of 4f' 06' 08•, o rodiu• of JOJ.86 feet, ond
o long chord wh(elr beor:t North 20' .J6' . JO" £ast q · dlsto,,tce of
2fl.JJ fHI;
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WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES NO. 2
DECLARATION OF

COVENAN'tS, coNDmONS AND RESTRici'IONS
AND
NEIGHBORBOO:D ASSOCIATION
THIS DECLARATION OF- COVENANTS, ''CONDITIONS ANDW RESTRICTIONS
AND NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCL\.'TION (hereinafter Declaration), executed on the date
following her signature, is made by Mary Kemp, Trustee of the Kemp Family Trust
(hereinafter Declarant) and is based on the following facts:

RECITAIS
A.
Declarant is the owner of certain real property in Canyon County, Idaho, commonly
known as Willow Creek Ranch Estates, and as more particularly described in Exhibit 1
(hereinafter Willow Creek Raiich Estates or Property).
·

B.
Declarant previously developed real property contiguous to the Property as Willow
Creek Ranch Estates. This ·was intended to be the fll'St phase of development of Willow Creek
Ranch Estates (hereinafter Phase No. i). Phase No. 1, more fully described in Exhibit 2, has
been fully developed and all lots therein sold. Phase No. 1 is the subject of Declarations of
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Willow Creek Ranch Estates recorded in the
records of Canyon-County as Instrument Nos. 9318476 and 9616562. Those Declaratf~~s a~
intended to apply only to the lots in Phase 1.
C.
Phase 2 is commonly lmown as Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision
(hereinafter Phase No.2), as shown in the Plat recorded as Instrument No. 9847975, Book 26 of
Plats, Page 2Z, recorded December 28,.1998. This Declaration as set forth herein or amended
by the Declarant, is intended to apply to Phase No. 2 and subsequent phases (hereinafter
Willow CreekE&tates).
·
·
··

D.
Declarant desires to establisb on the Property, an exclusive residential community
which is designed to maximize the use of available land and which contains residential
dwelling units thereon, with open space and walkways, created for the benefit of said
community through the granting of specific rights, privileges and easements of enjoyment
which may be shared and enjoyed by all of the residents thereof.
E.
Declarant desires to assure the attractiveness of the individual lots and community
Areas within the Property; to prevent future impairments thereof; to prevent nuisances; to
preserve, protect and enhance the values and amenities of the Property; and to provide for the
maintenance of the open spaces, walkways and other community capital improvements.
NOW THEREFORE, Declarant hereby declares that all of the properties above
Declatation of Covenants, Conditlons and Restrictions
Pagel
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described, with the exception of Phase No. 1, shall be. beld, sold and conveyed upon and subject
to the easements, conditions, covenants, restrictions and reservations hereinafter set forth, each
of which shall run with the properties and shall be binding on all parties now or hereafter
having_ any right, title or interest therein or to any part thereof, and shall inure to the benefit of
each owner thereof. Declarant reserves the right to amend this Declaration to set forth the
easements, conditions, covenants, restrictions and reservations applicable to unsold lots in any
phase and the lots to be developed in subsequent phases, nor shall the Declarant be required to
obtain approval of the Architectural Control Committee for any activities or structures on lots
owned by Declarant

ARTICLE I
Definitions
A.

"Architectural Control Con'ioilttee" (hereinafter Committee) means the Committee
charged with approval of any construction, erection, alteration or repair of any
improvements on any Lot in the Property as hereinafter provided.

B.

"Association" means Willow Creek Estates Subdivision Homeowners' Association. a
non-profit corporation org~~ under the ~ws of the State ofldaho, or·aoy successor
or assign of the Association.

C.

"Board of Directors" means the Board of Directors of the Association.

D.

"Common areas" means all real property, including easements or other interests less
than fee title, as well as the improvements thereon, owned by the Association for the
common use and enjoyment of the Owners.

E.

"Dwelling Unit" means that portion or part of any structure intended to be occupied by
one family as a dwdling unit, together with the vehicular parking garage next thereto,
and all projections therefrom.
·

F.

"Household" means all persons residing in a Dwelling Unit.

G.

"Lease" means any a~ent for the leasing or rental of a dwelling unit, including a
month-to-month rental agreement. All such leases shall be. in writing.

H.

"Lot" means all lots within and shown upon the Plat.

L

"Owner" means the owner of record, whether one or more persons or entities, of a fee
simple title to any Lot, but excluding those having an interest merely as security for the
performance of an obligation.

J.

"PJat" mean~ the official :recorded plat of Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2
Subdivision or any amendments or additions thereto.
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K.

"Private Road System" means the private roads serving Lots in the Subdivision.

L.

"Project" means the Property and all contemplated improvements thereto.

M.

"Property" means the real property described in Paragraph A above of the RECITAlS
and any additions thereto, as may be made subject to this Declaration or otherwise
broughtwithin the jurisdiction of the Association.
··

N.

Single Family" means any one or more individuals, doing their own cooking and living
on the premises as a separate housekeeping unit ~ a domestic relationship as
distinguished from a group occupying a boarding house, lodging house, dub, fraternity
or hotel
0

ARTICLEil
General Restrictions

said

A.
Covenant: __The Dec~rant hereby covenants for all of
property. Each Owner,
whether by ratification of this Declaration or by acceptance of a deed or contract of purchase,
whether or not these covenants, conditions and restrictions are expressly set forth in any such
deed or other conveyance or agreement for conveyance is deemed to covenant and agrees to
comply with and abide by these covenants, conditions and restrictions and agrees for the Owner ·
or Owners, the Owner(s)' heirs, administrators, delegees or assigns to be personally bound by
each of these covenants, restrictions, reservations and servitudes, and as may be amended from
time to time, jointly, separately and severally.

B.
Enforcement of Restrictions: The Declarant, Committee, Association or any Owner
shall have the right to enforce, whether at law or in equity, all restrictions, conditions,
covenants, reservations, liens, and charges now or h~er imposed by the provisions of this
Declaration or the Articles, Bylaws or Rules of the Association. Not less than ten (10) days prior
to bringing an action of enforcement, the offending party shall be served with written notice
setting fortf! ~ith specificity the covenant, r_estrictii:,n, condition, reservation, lien or charge that
the person is charged with failing t~ comply with. Failure to enforce any the foregoing shall in
no event be deemed a waiver of the right to do so thereafter. These covenants, conditions and
restrictions are cumulative and all remedies provided herein for breach are in addition to any
rights and remedies provided by local or state laws and not in lieu thereof.
C.
Judgment and Attorneys' Fees: Whether an action is prosecuted to judgment, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. In the event of
judgment against_any person, the court may award injunction against any person for violation,
require compliance as the court deems necessary, award such damages, reasonable attorneys'
fees, costs and expenses as well as such other or further relief as may be deemed just and
equitable.
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•
D.
Mortgages or Deeds of Trust Not Invalidated: The breach of any of these covenants,
conditions, restrictions or any repurchase by reason of such breach, shall not defeat or render
invalid the lien of any mortgag~ or deed of trust made in go~r" faJth for value as to any Lot or
Lots or portions of Lots in such premises, but shall be binding upon and effective against any
such mortgagee or trustee or Owner thereof, whose title is or was acquired by foreclosure,
trustee's sale, or otherwise.

·-

ARTICLEill
Construction Restrictions
Antennae and Satellite "Dishes": No radio and or television anten~ae or satellite
receiving equipment (dish) shall be permitted outside of a building without prior written
consent of the Architectural Committee. In no event shall such equipment be iostaUed outside a
building unless ?tdequately screened from tbe street view. No ·energy production devices,
including but not limited to, generators of any kind and solar devices, shall be constructed and
maintained upon any lot without the prior written approval of the Committee.

A.

B.
Basements, Swimming Pools and Subsurface Structures. Basements, swimming pools .
and other subsurface structures shall be approved in writing by the Committee prior to
construction. The approval of such improvements shall not constitute an endorsement or
certification of viability. Each owner proposing such structure shall be responsible to obtain
appropriate engineering for such structure, taking fnto account t;he water ~ble underlying the
Property.
C.
Building Location and Value: The value of any dwelling unit~ including the cost of the
real property, shall be not Jess than One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000) based on

August 1998 values.
D.
Building Type Restrictions: No buildings shall be constructed on any Lot other than
one (1) detached single-family dwelling a~d attached garage, containing at least the mini11J.um
floor area relevant to the height of the dwelling. No. h~mes manufactured or built elsewhere and
moved into the Property shall be permitted unless prior written authorization is obtained from
the Committee. The size, location, configuration, style, and finish of each proposed building or
structure on each lot shall be subject to architectllral and aesthetic control by the Committee.
No building, fence or oth~ structure shall be commenced, placed, erected, or maintained on
any lot, nor sbaJI any exterior alteration or change of any building or other strµcture be made,
obtained, or allowed except upon approval of the Committee.
E.
Coriimencernent and .Completion of Construction Maintenance of Vacant Lots:
Construction of any dwelling unit shall be commenc~ not later than two· (2) years after the
original purchase of a Lot. Provided, however, the Committee may grant reasonable ex~ensions
for good cause. Construction shall be diligently pursued after commencement and shall be
completed not later than nine (9) months after commencing construction, unless prevented by
causes beyond the control of the owner or builder and only for such time as that cause
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrlctions
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continues. From the date of purchase, through_ the completion of landscaping, all l,.ots shall be
kept free of rubbish and garbage, reasonably clean and weed free. The Committee shall have
the right to ent~r upon any vacant lot for the purpose of burning or removing weeds, brush,
growth, or refuse.
F.
Construction :Equipment and Material Storage: No rnach.inery, building equipment, or
matelial shall be stored on site until the Builder is ready and able to immediately commence
construction. Such building materiaJs must be kept within the property line of the Lot on
which the dwelling unit or structure is to be constructed.
G.
Damage to Improvements: It is the responsibility of the Builder of any structure in the
Property to leave roads, fences, ditches, tiled irrigation lines or other improvements, if any, as
well as utility facilities, free of damage and in good and sound condition at the conclusion of the
construction period. It shall be conclusively presumed that all such improvements are in gQod
sound condition at the time construction commences on each Lot. The builder is responsible for
notification of the contrary, in writing to the Committee at the time construction commences.
H.
Driveways: All driveways sltall be paved with either asphalt or concrete. Driveways
shall extend from the edge of the road tQ the entry to the garage. Any driveway constructed on
any of the Lots shall have a pipe or conduit or culvert (hereinafter collectively pipes) thereunder
at least twelve (12) inches in diameter, near the street line of the Lot and at any point where the
driveway crosses any ditch or pipe or drainage area so as to permit the movement of inigation
waters or for drainage. The pipes may be made of tJ1e, concrete, iron or steel, or any other
substance of permanent nature. AD pipe installations made within a dedicated right-of-way
shall be made only after plans have been submitted to and approved by the appropriate
highway district or city authority having jurisdiction over the roadways. All parking areas and
driveways shall be constructed and maintained as approved in writing by the Committee.
L
Easements: In addition to the easements shown on the Plat, an easement is further
reserved, ten (10) feet on each side of all Lot lines for installation and maintenance of utilities,
inigatio~., and drainage equipment and facilities; Within these easements, no structure,
planting, or other material shall be placed or permitted to remain which may damage or
interfere with the installation or maintenance of the utilities or drainage, or which may change
the direction of the Row of water through drainage channels in the easements. The easement
area of each Lot, and all improvements in the Lot, shall be maintained continuously by the
Owner of the Lot, except for those improvements for which a public entity or authority is
responsible.
;Eiterior Finishts and Roofs: .Ml. dwe,llings shall be constructed of frame, stone, or brick
construction. In all cases, th_e bu~der shall su~mit samples for a particular dwelling unit to the
Committee for approval prior to application of any exterior finishes. The Committee shall have
the right t~ approve texture,. design and color scheme of the outside walls, fences, roofs and
patio roofs of all structures erected upon lots and to require front landscaping. The owner shall
not repaint the outside walls of any structure or fence without first obtaining approval of the

J.
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Committee as to color. All patio roofs shall be of unifonn design and color; metal, fiberglass
sheets, and similar roofmg materials are prohibited.
Exterior Lights: No exterior lighting shall be installed or maintained on any Lot that
L.
interferes with the use and enjoyment of adjacent Lots.
Fences and Other Boundaries: Fences, hedges, high plantings, obstructiom or barriers
M.
shall be so situated as not to unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment and use of neighboring
Lots and roads or constitute an undesirable nuisance or noxious use. The determination of the
Committee is binding on all parties. Fences shall meet tlie following requirements unless an
exemption is approved in writing by the Committee prior to construction:
No fence or boundary wall may exceed six (6) feet in height and may not in any
1.
event interfere with sight lines to or from the road or pose a hazard to safe entry onto such
roadways;
Fences shall be of good quality and workmanship and shall be properly
2.
maintained. Materials and design _shall be approved by the Committee.
Plantings shall meet the following requirements unless an exemption is approved in
writing by the Committee prior to planting:
No hedge or shrub_ planting with an elevation above three (3) feet shall be
1.
permitted in the set-back areas in the front of the dwelling.
No hedge, shrub or tree shall be permitted or maintained which shall interfere
2.
with sight lines.
Landscaping. :Prior .to the beginning of construction of the dweUing on any lot, the
N.
owner or the owner's agent shall subm•t !l landscaping plan to the Committee for approval. ·
Such plan shall include at least one (1) tree in the front yard and shaU be completed one
hundred twenty (120) days after occupancy of the dwelling. The owner of any lot shall
maintabt and provide adequate water to all landscaping, specifically the trees located on the lot
from the date of purchase by the owner.
Minimum Floor Area: Floor area shail be exclusive of eaves, steps, porches, entrances
0.
patios and garages•. The floor area of.all dwellings shall have at least one thousand eight
hundred fifty (1,850) square feet. With the exception of barns, no outbuildings, including
storage _she~ play houses and play equipment consisting of walls and a roof, shall exceed a
height of fifteen (15) feet unless approved by the Committee.
Outbuildings: ~ outbuildings shall be constructed of quality building matetjals,
P.
complet.ely finished and painted on the outside and shall be of quality and character that will be
m harmony with the other buildings on said properties. No outbuilding shall be constructed
Declaration of Covenants; C.ondltions arid Restrii."tions
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without prior written approval by the Committee.

Q.
~ 1'Jie roads serving the Property are separately platted lots which shall be
conveyed to the Association not later than the time at which all phases are substantially
completed.
R.
Roofs: Roof$ shall be of at least "5 in 12" pitch. No gravel roofs shall be pennitted.
Bay windows, broken roof lines, gables, hip roofs, etc. a~ encouraged to provide architectural
variety. Shingles shall be, at minimum, twenty-five (25) year architectural. Roofmg samples
shall be submitted to the Committee for approval prior to application of finish roofing_
materials.

a

S.
Setbacks: No improvements may be constructed or maintairieci on Lot closer than
thirty (30) feet from the front property line, twenty (20) feet from the rear property line, ten (10)
feet from the interior side property lines, or twenty (20) feet from an exterior side property line.
T.
Sewage Disposal/Sewtt Locations: No sewage ..isposal system is provided· by Declarant.
Each Lot shall IJe served by individual sewage disposal systems to be designed, located and
constructed in accordance with the requirements, standards and recommendations of the
Southwest District Health Department. Approval of such system as installed shall be obtained
from the jurisdiction and the entire system shall be paid for by the Lot Owner. All bathroom,
sink and toilet facilities shall be located inside the dweUing unit and not contained within "any
accessory structure or outbuilding.
U.
Solar Access:. No bun~ing or structure shall be placed on said properties so as to
obstruct the windows or light of any adjoining property owner.
V.
Storm Water Retention Pond Maintenance: The Owners of the following Lots are
specifically required to maintain surface area of the storm water retention ponds constructed on
the respective Lots by the Declarant. The Lots shall be maintained in such a manner that all
storm water is retained in the ponds and no structures are placed or constructed, or plants are
planted in such areas which would interfere in any manner with the retention of water as
originally constructed by Declarant. Provided, however, the Association is responsible for all
subsurface maintenance of the storm water retention ponds. All Lot owners are required to
maintain the barrow pits on their 1·espective Lots in such a manntt that there is no interference
with the collection and disbursal of waste water either from irrigation or storm water retention.
W.
Temporary Buildings: No house. trailer, tent, shack, unattached garage, barn or othe,r
outbuilding or structure shall be used at any time for a residence, temporarily or permanently,·
nor shall any residence of a temporary character be pennitted. No building o( any kind shall be
erected or maintained on a lot prior to the construction of the dwelling, except that a small
building or mobile unit may be ttecte.d fort.he purpose ·o f storing tools and other articles during
the construction of a permanent dwellin~ subject to such limitations as may be imposed by the
Committee.
Declaration of Coven.ants, Condllions and Restrktions
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X.
l'fater Supply.. There is ~o domestic water supply provided for any Lot. Lot Owners
shall be responsible for the drilling_s,f their. o~ dom~c wells. Declarant makes no warranties .
as to the Lot Owner's ability to obtain a well permit. Any Lot Owner must first obtain the
written approval for a domestic well permit from the State of Idaho, Department of Water
Resources.
ARTICLEIV
Property Rights
A.
Common Areas. The c.ommon areas shall be owned by the Association upon transfer to
the Association by the Dedarant. The common areas are as illustrated on the plats pertaining
to the Property. The Owners of Lots on which easements for drainage or collection of storm
water are located shall maintain the surface of the easements continuously and shall not erect
any structure within the easements. Provided, however, fences may be erected that do not
interfere with the drainage and which are approved in writing by the Committee prior to
construction. The Association may maintain such easements if the Lot Owner fails to do so. In
all events, the Association may:

l.

Charge assessments for the maintenance of the common areas;

2.
Suspend the voting rights as well as right to the use of the common_ ~reas, of an
Owner for any perfod-during which any assessment against the Owner's Lot remains unpaid;
3.
Dedicate or transfer all or any part of the common areas to any public agency,
authority, or utility for such purposes and subject to such cond_itions as may be agreed to by the
Association. No such dedication or transfer shall be effective unless an instrument agreeing to ....
such dedication or transfer signed by two-thirds (2/3) of each class of members has been
recorded.

B.
Right of Use of Areas: The right to use the common areas is appurtenant to the Lots
and shall be available to any tenant, lessee or Owner so long as all assessments are paid and any
respective easements are maintained.

ARTICLEV
Property Use Restrictions
A.
Agricultural Activities and Animals: The subdivision is located in an agricultural area.
Agricultural activities including li~est~~k, cattle feeding and fanning take place in adjoining
areas. These activities may produce odors, dust, insects, and include nighttime operations. It is
contemplated that owners may maintain livestock on their respective lots. The livestock shall be
limited to the lot owners personal use and enjoyment and not for commercial purposes. No
nuisance animals shall be kept. Not more than two (2) head of large livestock, horses or cows,
Dedaralion of Covenants. Conditions and Restr:lc:tions
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shall be kept on any lot. The only other animals allowed on or within any Lot shall be limited to
the following number of animals per acre: two (2) sheep; or, two (2) lamas; and, six (6)
chickens. Jf any Lot is less than one (1) acre, then said Lot shall be considered to an acre for the
purposes of this subsection only. Provided, however that no roosters shall be allowed and,
except that two dogs, cats or other household pets may be kept within a dwelling unit or within
a fenced area in the backyard. Any animals outside a dwelling unit or fenced area must be on
leashes or otherwise under physical control and the Owner or custodian o( the animal shall be
responsible for the bnmediate cleanup of the animal's droppings • .iµ1 animals s~)! be fed and
cared for. Fenced areas shall be screened from the street view and shall be constructed of
materials adequate to keep the animal(s) from annoying or trespassing on the property of
others.
B.
Businesses: No business shall be conducted on any Lot that except completely within
the dwelling unit and only as permitted by applicable state or local law, rule or ordinance. No
signs shall be installed to advertise the business. No oil exploration or development of any
nnture or kind, including mining exploration, development or structure shall be permitted on
any Lot or Common areas. Except that during co_nstruction the Dedarant or its agents may
conduct sales and construction business outside of a dwelling unit as provided above and
hereinafter.
C.
Garbage and Refuse Disposal: No part of any Lot shall be used or .maintained as a
dumping ground for rubbish, trash or other waste. No garbage, trash or other :waste shall be
kept or maintained on any part of any Lot except in a sanitary container. No incinerators shall
be permitted. Any equipment for the storage or disposal of such material must not violate
setback restrictions and must be enclosed with an aesthetic screen or fence and shall be kept in
a clean and sanitary condition.
D.
Excavation and Mineral Extraction. No ~cantii>n for_stone, sand, gravel, earth _o r
minerals shall occur on any lot unless such excavation is necessary for construction of an
approved structure thereon.
E.
Leasing Restrictions: Any lease between and Owner and tenant shall provide that the
terms of the lease shall be subject in all respects to the provisions contained in this Declaration,
the Association's Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and rules and that any failure by the tenant
to comply with the terms of such documents shall be a default under such lease.
F.
Nuisances: Nothing of an offensive, dangerous, odorous, or noisy endeavor shall be
conducted or carried on any Lot, nor shall anything be done or permitted on the Property
which may be or becomt an annoyance or nuisance to other individuals or Owners. Weeds
shall be cut to at least four (4) inches except on steep terrain which shall be reasonably
maintained. No basketball courts or backboards shall be allowed in the front yard area of any
residence. No lumber, firewood, grass, shrubs
clippings or scrap, refuse or trash shall be ..
kept, stored, or allowed to accumulate on any lot unless screened as approved in writing by the
Committee.

or tree
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G.
Residing in Other than Dwelling Units: ~o trailer, truc.k camper, tent, g;.arage, barn,
shack or other outbuilding shall at !!DY time be used as a residence temporarily or permanently
on any Lot. However, during the construction period, Dedarant or its agent(s) may utilize a
construction/sales office of a temporary nature as provided above.

H.
Sight Distance at Intersections: No fence, wall, hedge or shrub planting 'Yhich obstructs
sight lines at elevations between three (3) feet and eight (8) feet above the roadways shall be
placed or permitted to remain on any comer Lot within the triangular area fonned by the street
property lines and an imaginary line connecting them at a point thirty (30) feet from the
intenection of the street lines. In the case of a rounded property comer, from the intersection
of the street property lines extended. The same sightwline limitations shall apply on any Lot
within ten (10) feet from the intersection of a s1reet property line with the edge of a driveway or
alley pavement.
L
Signs:. No sign of any kind shall be displayed to public view on any Lot except a
professionally designed and constructed sign of DC?!_ gi.~re than (5) .squ_?,::e .feet advertising the
property for sale or rent by an Owner, or to advertise the property during the construction sales
period. If a property is sold or rented, any sign relating thereto shall be removed immediately.
Except that the Declarant and its agent(s) may post a "Sold" sign for a reaso11J1ble period
following the sale. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, signs of any and all sizes and
dimensions may be displayed by the Declarant without limitation, on Lots owned by the
Declarant. The Association may maintain subdivision identification signs, and appropriate
informational signs of a size and design approved by the Committee.

J.

Storage of Vehicles and Equipment: Recreational vehicles, except those owned or leased
and enjoyed by the Lot Owner for personal use or enjoyment shall not be kept or stored on any
Lot unless screened from view as approved in writing by the Committee. No non~working or
commercial vehicles larger than one (1) ton and no junk cars shall be parked on any lot. Such
vehicles or equipment shall not be parked on the street or between the front plane of the
dwelling an~ .the road. Such vehicles or eq',lipm~rit as permitted ~ereundeJ'.' shall be screen~ ..
from street view such as within the confmes of an enclosed garage or other enclosure such as a
fence, approved in writing by the Committee and no portion of same may project behind· the
enclosed area. Woodpiles, compost piles and facilities for handing, drying or a~g clothing
shall be screened from view.

ARTICLE VI
Architectural Control Committee
A.
Initial Members: The initial me.mbers.ofthe Q>mmittee are appointed by and serve at
the discretion of the Declarant. The initial members shall be Alan Mills and Susan Wildwood.
These individuals serve at the discretion of the Declarant who may increase the number of
Committee members but may not decrease the numbers beyond three (3 ).
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In the event of death or resignation of a member, the remaining memiJers shall have full
authority to· act, and within a reasonable time after the occurrence of such vacancy, the
Dedarant, of if after the completion of the last dwelling unit, the Board of Directors of the
Association shall appoint a replacement.
B.
Action by Quorum and Majority: A majority of the Committee shall constitute a
quorum. All action by the Committee shall be by majority vote of those members in attendance
so long as a quorum is present at a meeting.

C.
Liability for Committee Action: All Owners agree that the Committee and its successors
shall incur no liability for any omissions or acts under this Declaration.
D.
Duties: The duties of the Committee are to review, approve, deny or condition approval
of all construction on such terms and conditions as the Committee shall deem appropriate. Its
determination is binding o~ all parties. The Committee is further charged with enforcement of
this Declaration until the Board of Directors takes over the responsibilities of tile Committee
pursuant to Paragraph B below. The Committee may, with -the consent of the i>eclarant,
appoint a sub-committee to enforce all areas of this Declaration not pertaining to new
construction.
E.
Duties of Sub-Committee: In tJte event. that a Sub-Committee is appointed, its duties
shall be to enforce, control and review for approval, non-approval or conditional approval, all
areas encompassed by this Declaration not pertaining to new ~nstruction. However, upon
completion of the last dwelling house, the sub-committee shall take over all duties of the
Committee and its members will then be appointed by the Board of Directors·· of the ·
Association. All Owners agree that the Sub-Committee and its successors ·shall incur no liability
for any omissions or acts under this Declaration. In the event of death or resignation of I\
member, the remaining members shall have full authority to act, and within a reasonable time·
after the occurrence of such vacancy, the Committee and Declarant, of if after the completion of
the last dwelling unit, the Board of Directors of the Association shall appoint a replacement.
F.
Submission of Plans and Specifications: Prior to any construction, erection repair or
alteration, including di~er~nt color or materials, of structures, fences, outbuildings, etc., as
herein provided, there shall be submitted to the Committee, one set of detailed plans and
specifications.
G.
Approval by Committee: NQ building or other structure shall be erected, placed, altered
or maintained on any Lot until the construction plans and specifiqtions and a plan showing the
location of the structure have been approved by the Committee as to quality of workmanship
and materials, harmony of external design. with ~iog structures, and compliance with
specific material type requirements.
The Committee shall liave fifteen (15) days to review the plans, drawings and
specifications. The Committee· shall indicate its approvaf of the proposal by the dating and
Oedatatlon of C'.oveNlllls, Conditions and Rest:rirt!ons
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signing of the plans _b y a designate~ m~ber . of the Conuni~e. _Such apJ;lroval shall be
construed as full compliance with this Declaration. Approval shall be transmitted to the
applicant by letter. No proposal shall be deemed approved without the authorized signature of
a Committee member. The Committee shall have the sole discretion to determine what is
substantial or full compliance with this Declaration and may grant variances from the
requirements herein. The Committee shall have the right to retain the plans and specifications.

H.

Release of Initial Committee and Sub-Committee: Upon the sale of the last Lot in _the
Property, the work of the initial Committee and Sub-Committee shall be deemed completed,
and said members shall then be automatically released from all responsibilities thereto. If the
Association has been formed, then at the sale of the last Lot and not before, the then seated
Board of Directors of the Association shall automatically become the Committee. Amending this
Declaration shall not affect this provision.
ARTICLEVIl
Homeowners' Association
All the provisions of this Declaration shall be
A.
Incorporation of Declaration:
incorporated into the Articles of Corporation of the Homeowner's Association as if fully set
forth therein. If there is a conflict between the Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or rules of the
Association and this Declaration, the provisions of this Declaration shall control

B,
Establishment of Association: Not later than the sale of the last Lot in Phase 2, the
Declarant shall form the Association through filing of ArticlPS of Incorporation as a nonprofit
Idaho Corporation with the Idaho Secretary or State.
C.
Membership: Everj, Owner of Lot shall be a member of the Association. Membership
shall be appurtenant to and may not be separated from ownership of any Lot.

D.

Membership Classes: Th~ A.$sociation shall have two (2) classes of voting membership:
1.
The Class A niemoers shall all be Owners, with the exception of the Declarant,
during the period when the Declarant is a Oass B member. Each Oass A member shall
be entitled to one (1) vote for each Lot owned. When more than one (1) person holds an
interest in any Lot, all such persons shall be members. The vote for such Lot shall be
exercised as such Owners determine. However, there shall not be more than one (I) vote
cast per Lot; fractional votes shall not be permitted. The vote applicable to any Lot
being sold under contract of purchase shall be exercised by the contract seller, unless the
contract expressly provides otherwise.
2.
The sole Class .B member shall be the Declarant, which shall retain 51% voting
control until the last available Lot in the entire subdivision is sold. In that event,
Declarant shall become a Class A member to the extent and under the same conditions
as other Owners ofLots.
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E.
Officers and Directors: At an annual meeting called pursuant to written notice as herein
provided for the establishment of annual assessments, a Board of Directors of the Association
shall be elected by ballot of a majority of those attending said meeting or voting by proxy. The
Board shall consist of three (3) Directors dected to serve for a period of one year. One member
shall serve as' the Chairperson of the Board, elected by majority vote. One person shall serve as
Secretary to the Board.
F.
Assessments: Each Owner of any Lot, by acceptance of a deed therefore, whether or not
expressed in such deed, is deemed to covenant and agrees to pay to the Association for the
maintenance, repair, and improvement of t~e private roads and other common areas:
I.
An initial assessment of one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for each Lot, payable at
closing.

2.
Reguhlr ann_ual or ot~_e r regular periodic assessments or charges including
operation and maintenance of the private roads. The initial regular annual assessment
shall be one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00) per Lot.
3.
Special as.sessments for capital improvements, including repair or alteration of
existing improvements or new improvements. Such special assessments to be fixed,
established and collected from time to tbne as hereinafter provided.
No Owner may waive or otherwise escape liability for the assessments provided for
herein by nonuse of the common areas or abandonment of the Owner's Lot.
G.
Property Exempt from ·Assessments: 'lµe f~Ifowing property subject to this Declaration
shall be exempt from the assessments created herein:
1.

Properties expressly dedicated to and accepted by a local public authority;

2.

Lots or common areas owned by the Association.

H.
Due Date of Assessments: The annu~l assessments shall i:ommence as to each Lot not
later than the first day of the month following the recordation _of this Declru,1tion. The first
annual assessment shall be adjusted according to the number of months remaining in the
calendar year. The Board of Directors, or the Committee prior to the establishment of the
Association, shall fix the amount of the annual assessment against each Lot at least thirty (30)
days in advance of each annual assessment period. Written notice of the annual assessment
shall be sent to every Owner subject thereto. The due dates shall be established by the Board of
Directors or the Committee prior to establishment of the Association. The Association shall,
upon demand, and for a reasonable charge furnish a certificate by an officer of the Association
setting forth whether the assessments on the specified Lot have been paid. A properly executed
certificate of the Association as to the status of assessments on a Lot is binding upon the
o.daratlon ofC.ovenants, ConditianSand Reslxidlons
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Association as of the date of its issuance.
I.
Unpaid Assessments: Any assessment not paid within thirty (30) days after the due date
shall bear interest from the due date at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum or at such
other interest rate as may be established annually by the Board of Directors. The lien of the
assessments shall be subordinate to the lien of any first mortgage· provided that such first
mortgage is held by. a_ person or entity unrelated to the Lot Owner. However, the sale or
transfer of any Lot pursuant to mortgage foreclosure or any proceeding in lieu thereof shall
extinguish the lien of such assessments as to payments which became due prior to such sale or
transfer. No sale or transfer shall relieve such Lot from liability for any assessments fhereafter
becoming due or from the lien th~reof.

J.
Use of Assessments: The as_sessments levied by the Association shall be used exclusively
for the improvement and maintenance of the common areas including but not limited to the
maintenance, improvement and repair of the common areas and private roads serving the
subdivision.

K.
Increase in Assessment Amounts: From and after January l of the year immediately
following the conveyance of the iirst Lot to an Owner, the maximum annual assessment may be
increased each year not more than 5% above the maximum assessment for the previous year
without a vote of the membership. It may be increased above 5% only by a vote of two-thirds
(2/3) of each class of members who are voting in person or by proxy at a meeting duly called for
this purpose as set forth below.
L.
Assessments a Charge Against the Lot: The regular and special assessments, together
with interest, costs of collection arid reasonable attorneys fees shall be a charge on any Lot and
shall be a continuing lien on the . Lot against which such ~ssessment is made. Each such
assessment, together with interest, costs of collection and reasonable attorney's fees, shall also be
the person obligation of the Owner of such Lot at the time when the assessment fell due. The
obligation .shall .remain a lien on the Lot until paid or foreclosed, but shall not be a personal
obligation of successors in title, unless expressly assumed.

M.

.Notice and Quorum for Meetings: Written notice of any meeting called for the purpose
of taking any action authorized under Paragraphs F and G shall be sent to all members not less
than thirty-'(30) days nor more than sixty (60) days in advance of the meeting. At socf:! meeting
the presence of Owners or of proxies entided to cast fifty percent (50%) of all the votes of each
class of membership shall constitute a quorum. If the required quorum is not present, the
meeting shall be adjourned and rescheduled for a time and place not less than ten (10) days and
not more than thirty (30) days subsequent. Written notice of the rescheduled meeting shall be
mailed to all members not less than five (5) days in advance of the rescheduled meeting ~ate.
The required quorum at the subsequent meeting shall be satisfied by those present in person or
by proxy oftwenty-flve percent (25%) for each class of membership.
N.

Common Area Matters: The Association shall have the right to dedicate or transfer all
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or any part of the common areas to any public agency authority, or utility for such purposes
and subject to such conditions as may be agreed to by the members. No such condition or
transfer shall be effective unless authorized by members entitled to cast two-thirds (2/3) of the
majority of the votes at a special or general member's meeting and an instrument signed by the
Chairperson and Secretary has been recorded in the appropriate county deed records, agreeing
to such dedication or transfer. Written notice of the proposed action and meeting at which
action is intended to be taken shall be sent to every member of the Association not less than ten
(10) days nor more than fifty (50) days prior to such dedication or transfer.

0.

Association Duties: The ~~~iation is a_utborized to, bot not limited, to the fo~owing:

. .•... -.-.

l.
Prepare an annual budget which shall indicate anticipated management,
operating, maintenance, repair and other common expenses for the Association's next
fJScal year and which shall be sufficient to pay all estimated expenses and outlays of the
Association for the next calendar year which grow out of or are in connection with the
maintenance and operation of common areas and improvements. This budget may
include, but is not limited to the cost of maintenance, management, special assessments,
insurance (fare, casualty and public liability, etc.), repairs, wages, water charges, legal
and accounting fees, management fees, ~e~es _a nd . l?h~i~~ ~curred by the
Association from a previous period, and the creation of any reasonable contingency or
other reserve fund.
2.
Perfonn or have performed the repairs, upkeep and maintenance, normal
servicing, development of rules for use, care and safety of common areas, payment of
bills and related expenses for any common areas.
·
3.
Any other responsibilities not inconsistent with this Declaration set forth in the
Association's Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or rules.

ARTICLEVJil
Insurance and Bond
A.
Multi-Peril Insurance: The Association may obtain and keep in full force and effect at
all times a multi-peril type policy covering any common area improvements, providing as a
minimum, f"lre and extended coverage and all other coverage in the kinds and amounts
commonly obtained by investors for projects similar in construction, location and use, on a
replacement cost basis in an amount not less than one hundred percent (100%) of the insurable
value (based on replacement cost).

B.
Comprehensive Public Liability Insurance: . The Ass9ciatio"· shall, .if available a.t. a, .
r~onable cost, have a comprehensive policy of public liability insurance covering all of the
common areas. Such insurance policy shall contain a severability of interest endorsement which
shall preclude the insurer from denying the claim of an owner because of negligent acts of the
the
Association or other Owners. The scope of coverage must include all other coverage

ill
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kinds and amounts required by private institutional mortgage investoi:s for projects similar in
construction, location and use.
Contribution: .Insurance .~ecured and maintained by the' Association shall not be
brought int_o contribution with insurance held by the individual Owners or their mortgage
holders.

C.

D.
Subrogation Waiver: Each. policy of insurance obtained by the Association shall where
possible provide:

1.

A waiver of the insurer's subrogation rights with respect to the Association, its
officers, the Owners and their respective servants, agents and guests.

2.
A Proviiion that the policy cannot be canceled, suspended or invalidated due to
the conduct of any agent, o_ffiu,r or ernP.,loyee of the Association without a prior written
demand that the defect be cured.
That any "no other insurance" clause therein shall not apply with respect to
3.
insurance held individually by the Owners.

•

E.

Idaho Insurers: All policies shall be written by a company licensed to write insurance in
the State of Idaho and all hazard insurance policies shall be written by a hazard insurance
carrier holding financial rating by Best's Insurance Reports of Class VI or better.
F.
FHLMC/FHMA Requirements: ~otw1tbstanding an_ything herein co_ntain~d. to the
contrary~ insurance coverage must be in such amounts and meet other requirements of the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Co~oration (FHLMC) ·a·n d Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMA)
G.
Workerrs Compensation: Th.e Association shaH purchase workmen's compensation and
employer's liability insurance and all other similar insurance with respect to employees of the
Association in the amounts and in the forms now or hereafter required by law.
H.
Miscellaneous: The A~ociation may obtain insurance against sue~. other risks, of a
similar or dissimilar na~re, as it_sbaH deem appropriate with respect to the properties,
including any personal property of the Association located thereon. The provisions of this
Article shall not be construed to limit the power or authority of the Association to obtain and
maintain insurance coverage, in addition to any insurance coverage required hereunder, in
such amounts and in such forms as the Association may deem appropriate from time to time.
ARTICLEIX
Miscellaneous
A.

Common Area Title and Improvements Transfer to Association: The common areas
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located within easements shown on the Plat or the lnigation_Drainage Plan shall be considered
conveyed to the Association upon the sale of the last Lot by the Declarant. Declarant shall
retain the right to _continuing access to the common areas to complete such improvements
thereon or thereto as Declarant intends to construct.
Severability: Invalidation of any one of these covenants or restrictions f;,y judgment or
court order shall not invalidate or affect· any other provisions hereof, which shall remain in full
force and effect.

B.

Amendment: This Dec.4trati1;m, except the easements herein granted, may be amended
C.
by the Declarant at any time prior to the sale of the last Lot within the Property. After the sale
of the last Lot, this Declaration may be amended only by an instrument signed by not less than
sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of the then Lot Owners. Any amendment must be
recorded.
Assignment by Declarant: . Any or all ,rights, powers and reservations of Declarant
herein contained may be assigned to the Association or to any other corporation or association ·· ·
which is now organized or which may hereafter be organized which will assume the specific . rights, powers and duties ofDeclarant hereunder, evidencing its intent in writing to accept such
assignment. All rights of Declarant hereunder resenred or created shall be held and exercised
by Declarant alone, so long as Decla,rant_owns any interest in any portion of the Property.

D.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Trustee for Declarant
the date following her signature below.

Dated:

has executed this instrument on

~'f/<;:l'f

IDAHO )
)ss.
COUNTY OF C.,,,11/1~)

.

.

On this.l'ltiy of April, 1999, b.efore ~e, the undersigned, a Notary Public .in and for,~e .·. ·State ofldaho, personally appeared Mary,M. Kemp, known to me to be the person'whose'n.it1yf · ;'.
1,.·.:
is subscribed to the within instrument and_ acknowledged to me that she
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7 j'·
Notary Public for the Stateofi~~
lO
V
~\.
··,,
Residing at /111D111.1:r,,r1·
•/'.._
-.
.,
My Commission Expires:
......
••. ' .........~ ,,.
~ -~~-.~'-H•
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TYD£ED
This deed transfers common lots from the developer to the homeowners' association.
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the Kemp Family Trust, Mary M. Kemp, Trustee,
docs hereby grant, convey, release to the Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2
Homeowners' Association, Inc., an Idaho corporation, whose legal representative's
address is S18 Meadow Ct., Middleton, Idaho, 83644, the following-described premises
with all appurtenances and subject to all existing easements and rights-of-way of record
or implied:
Block I Lot 9 of Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 as found in Book 26 on Page
22 of plats in Canyon County, Idaho and recorded as Instrument No. 9847975; and
Block 2 Lots I, 5, and 15 of Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 3 as found in Book
33 on Page 42, of plats in Canyon County, Idaho and recorded as Instrument No.
200410757.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the premises, with their appurtenances unto the
Grantee, and its successors and assigns. Grantor does hereby covenant to and with the
Grantee, that it is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that said premises are free .
from all encumbrances; except for generabtaxes and assessments for the year 2004 and
subsequent years, and for covenants, conditions, restrictions and easements of record.
Grantor will warrant and defend the said premises from all lawful claims.
DATED:

March

U

,200S.

GRANTOR, Kemp Family Trust
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
STATE OF ARIZONA

)

County of Maricopa

)

S.S.

z.g

On thls
day of Mareh, in the year of 200S, before me, a notary public in and for
the State of Arizona, penonally appeared MARY M. KEMP, known by me, or proved to me on
the basis of satisfactory evi.deaee, to i,, the persoJl whose name is subscn'bed to the within
instrument u the Trustee of the Kemp Family Trust, and adcnowledpd to mo that she executed
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My Commission
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Article 1: The name of the corporation shall be:
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Article 3: The street address of the (egistered office is:
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The undersigned, in order to fonn a Non·Profit Corporation under the
provisions of Title 30, Chapter 3, Idaho Code, submits the following
articles of incorporation to the Secretary of State.
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Article 4: The board of directors shall consist of no fewer than three (3) people. The names and addresses of the
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Article 6: The mailing address of the corporation shall be:
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Daniel W. Bower, ISB #7204
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive. Suite 100
Boise. Idaho 83713
Telephone: (208) 345-3333
Fax No.: (208) 345-4461
dbower@stm-law.com

CANYON COUNTY CLERK

T.PETERSON,DEPUTY

Attorneys /01· Plaintijf.t

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,

Case No. CV 16-3425
Plaintiffs,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and DOES I -X, inclusive,
Defendants.

their attorneys. of
••Lees"), by and through
Plaintiffs, Dale and Kathi Lee (collectively
.
.
record, submit this reply memorandum in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
and in opposition to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary

Judament ("Opposition Memo.").
INTRODUCTION

The Lees. move for summary judgment on the basis that certain real property owned by
the Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc. ("Willow
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Creel, HOA"

P.003/012

oi· "HOA',) is subject to valid encumbrances, conditions, servitudes and/or

restrictions that allow the Lees to utilize already defined and improved access points to their
adjoining real property.

As explained in the opening memorandum, the Lees• argument is

simple. It is uncontroverted fact that the HOA' s predecessor in interest, the Kemp Family Trust,
entered into an agreement whereby it promised to give the Lees access from Kemp Road:
Seller [Lees] shall also be entitled to 3 driveway access from the gravel road
[Kemp Road] to be constructed by Buyer [Kemps] adjoining Seller's [Lees']
property. Such access shall be constructed at Seller•s [Lees'] cost and subject to
Seller [Lees] obtaining any necessary governmental approvals.
In light of this agreement, the legal issue here is simple. Under Idaho law, is Willow Creel,
HOA obligated to honor that promise where it is incontrovertible fact that Willow Creek HOA
had actual and constructive notice of the se1vitude at the time· Willow Creek HOA received an
interest in the subject real property.
RECONCILLED STATEMENT OF RELEVANT UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

In the summer of 1997, Dale Lee was approached by the Kemps about a possible

real estate transaction. See June 17, 2016 Declaration of Dale Lee ("Lee Deel.,,), 1 2.

Response: This statement is uncontroverted.
2.

To develop the "Kemp propei1y" the Kemps needed approximately 1.8 acres of

real pi-operty ovmed by the Lees. The Lees were willing to sell them the 1.8 acres needed, but
required as a condition of that sale. that they be given access to the road that was to be
constructed by the Kemps. See Lee Deel., 14.

. Response: This statement is uncontroverted.
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That road referenced above. presently known as Kemp Road, was to be

constructed by the Kemps and was to run alo11g the soi.them border of the Kemp prope11y
("Kemp Road''). See Lee Deel., ,r 6.
Response: This statement is uncontroverted.

6.

It was access to Kemp Road, that the Lees conditioned the sale of their 1.8 acre

parcel. See Lee Deel., ,r 7.
Response: This statement is uncontroverted.

7.

On June 1, 1997, the Lees and the Kemps executed an Agreement for Sale of Real

Property ("Agreement"). See Lee Deel., Exhibit B.

Response: This statement is unconttoverted.
8.

In that Agreement the Lees agreed to sell to the Kemps the 1.8 acres of real

property that the Kemps needed to develop their property into the presen~ day subdivision. Id.

Response: This statement is uncontroverted.
10.

The Agreement also made clear that the parties agreed to provide the Lees access

to the road:
Seller [Lees] shall also be entitled to 3 driveway access from the gravel road
[Kemp Road) to be constructed by Buyer [Kemps] adjoining Seller's [Lees']
propeliy. Such access shall be constructed at Seller's [Lees'] cost and subject to
Seller [Lees] obtaining any necessary governmental approvals.

Response: This statement is uncontroverted.

11.

Accordingly, the Lees sold the Kemps the property and the Kemps began

developing the subdivision that is now Willow Creek Ranch Estates #2. See Lee Deel., 112.

Response: This statement is uncontroverted.
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By executing the Agreement, the Kemps granted the Lees an express easement to

consti·uct the three access points and an implied easement to use Kemp Road.

Response: This statement is disputed.
13.

In 2000, at the time that Kemp Road was constructed, consistent with the

Agreement, the Kemps paid to have the three driveway access points constnicted giving the
Lees' property adjacent to Kemp Road access to Kemp Road. See Lee Deel., 113.

Response: This statement is uncontroverted.
14.

This construction included the creation of three access points, including 24 foot

culverts, and gravel extending from Kemp Road to the Lees' property. Around that same time,
wood fencing and metal gates corresponding to the three access points, were constructed along
the property giving the Lees' property cleai- and obvious access to Kemp Road. See Lee Deel.,

,r 14, Exhibit C.
Response: This statement is uncontroverted.

15.

As part of the development of the Willow Creek Ranch Estates, the Kemps

transfe1Ted Kemp Road to the HOA as a common ai-ea owned by the HOA. See Lee Deel.,

Exhibit D ('The Trust was the developer of Willow Creek Ranch Estates. It transfen·ed Kemp
Lane to the HOA as pa11 of the common area owned by the Association.") (LEE00lO).

Response: This statement is uncontroverted.
16.

In 2005, at the time the Kemps transfened Kemp Road to the HOA, the board of

dh'ectors for the HOA was pdmarlly controlled by the Kemps. See Mills Deel., Exhibit A.
Response; This statement is uncontroverted.
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Mary Kemp, trustee of the Kemps, and Alan Mills, the Kemps' real estate agent,

served as the initial board members for the HOA. Mr. Mills served as president. Id.

Response: This statement is uncontroverted.
18.

Alan Mills has admitted that he had knowledge of the Kemps' agreement to

provide access points along Kemp Road to the Lees. Id.

Response: This statement is uncontrove1ted.
19.

On or about June 11, 2015, Alan Mills, the former real estate agent for the Kemps

and a fo1mer member of the HOA board of directors at the time the Kemps transferred Kemp
Road to the HOA, provided a letter wherein he stated:
During the development of the Willow Creek Subdivision, I served as one of the
initial board of directors for the Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2, Subdivision
Homeowner's Association foe. (the "HOA") along with Mary Kemp, the trustee
for the Kemp Family Trust. As the developer of the Subdivision and who also
controlled the HOA, the Kemp Family Trust paid to have the three driveway
access constructed just as the parties agreed to do in the Agreement For Sale of
Property. As a former HOA board member, I can say with a high degree of
certainty that the HOA at the time was aww:e of the Agreement and its terms
regarding the three driveway access.

See Mills Deel., Exhibit A; see also Lee Deel., Exhibit D.
Response: This statement is uncontroverted.
20.

[A]t the time that Kemp Road was transfen-ed to the Willow Creek HOA in 2005,

the Wi11ow Creek HOA Board of Directors, had knowledge of the Agreement, including the
Kemps' agreement to provide the Lees the three access points. See Lee Deel., ,i 20.

Response: This statement is wicontroverted.
21.

Furtbennore, the subsequent actions of the Lees, Kemps and the HOA, includi11g

the construction of the three access points, including culvert construction, gravel work, fencing
and gates, evidence the promise found in the Aare,ement. See Lee Deel., ,i,r 13 and 14.
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Response: This statement is uncontroverted.
RESPONSNE ARGUMENT

In response to the Lees' position in favor of stunmary judgment, the HOA asserts a
number of faulty responsive arguments hoph1g to create a genuine issue of fact to preclude
summary judgment.

The HOA's arguments can be summed up as follows:

1) the 1997

Agreement is not a legally enforceable agreement; 2) the 1997 Agreement merged with the
August 8, 1997 deed and, consequently, there is no legally enforceable easement; and
3) regardless of Mr. Mills' testimony, the HOA did not have "knowledge, actual or constructive"
of the 1997 Agreement. Significantly, the HOA focus on the legalities of what is an enforceable
easement and ignores the question of whether an equitable servitude exists and is presently
enforceable. 1
Regardless of any claim by the HOA that there was no enforceable "easement," the
incontrove1tible facts establish an equitable servitude that provides the Lees with legal access.
As explained (although the HOA fails to appreciate this point), an equitable servitude is not an
easement. See Birdwood subdivision Homeowner 's Ass 'n, Inc. v. Bulotti Const., Inc., 145 Idaho
17, 23, 175 P.3d 179. 185 (2007). It concerns a promise of the landowner to use his land in a
certain way. See, e.g., Idaho Power Co. v. State; By & Through Dep'i of Water Res., 104 Idaho
575, 587, 661 P.2d 741, 753 (1983) (''l'estrictive covenants and equitable servitudes" relate to
"[a]greements not to assert ownership rights.") Significantly, here, as explained in the opening

This Reply Memorandum focuses exclusively on the Lees• second argument~-an argwnent
completely ignored in the Opposition Memo.--that separate and apart from any easement running
with the land, an equitable servitude exists and is enforceable. As for its· first assertion, that an
easement exists and that the HOA had knowledge of it regardless of whether it was recorded, the
Lees l'est on their Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
1
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brief, there was unquestionably a promise to not assert ownership rights that is reflected in both
written agreement and by the actions of the parties: the 1997 Agreement and the uncontrovertcd
subsequent construction of the access points at the time that Kemp Road was constructed. See
e.g., West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75 9 849 106 P.3d 401,410 (2005); see also

Birdwood, 14S Idaho at 23, 175 P.3d at 185 (quoting 20 Am.Jur.2d, Covenants, Etc., § lSS
(2005) (an equitable servitude arises "by implication from the language of the deeds or the
conduct of the parties.")).

As explained in the openin& brief. the test is simple. Whether a "promise regarding the
use of land runs against a successor in interest of the original promisor is 1) whether or not the

party claiming the enforceable interest actually has an interest against the original promisor; and
2) if such right exists, whether it is enforceable against the subsequent purchaser.'' West Wood

Investments, 141 Idaho at 84, 106 P.3d at 410 (citing Middlekauff v. Lake Cascade, Inc,t
103 Idaho 832 9 834,654 P.2d 1385, 1387 (1982) (Middlelcaujfl)). 2

Here,
those questions are
testimony:
.
. plainly answered by. Mr. Mills, uncontroverted
.
During the development of the Willow Creek Subdivision, I served as one of the
initial board of directors for the Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2, Subdivision
Homeowner's Association Inc. (the "HOA'') along with Mary Kemp, the trustee

. for the Kemp Famil:y Trust. As the developer of the Subdivision and who also
controlled the HOA, the Kemp Family Trust paid to have the three driveway
access constructedJust as the parties a1reed to do in the Agreement For Sale of
Property. As a former HOA board member, I can say with a high degree of
certainty that the HOA at the time was aware of the Agreement and its terms
regarding the three driveway access.

As explained in the opening brief, if the underlying agreement is oral, the tenns of the
agreement can be a question of fact. See id.; see also Birdwood, 145 Idaho at 23, 175 P.3d at
185. Here, where the terms w:e contained in the 1997 Agreement~ there is no question of fact.

2
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See Mills Deel., Exhibit A; see also Lee Deel., Exhibit D (Emphasis added). The HOA has not
disputed Mr. Mills' testimony. Mr. Mills establishes that I) there was

ai1

agreement to provide

access; 2) the HOA was aware of the agreement; 3) the HOA was initially controlled by the
Kemp Family Trust; and 4) construction, access points, culve1ts, gravel, and fencing, evidencing
and consistent with the agreement were constructed and paid for by the Kemp Family Trust "just
as the parties agree to do in the Agreement .... " Id. 3
Thus, here, the equitable servitude arose when the Kemp Family Trust promised the Lees
that they would have access to Kemp Road and then consistent with that agreement acted
consistent with that agreement by paying for the construction of the access points under the
direction ai1d with the involvement of the HOA.
And, also explained by Mr. Mills, the HOA had notice. "Whether a successor in interest
takes the interest subject to the equitable servitude is a question of notice." Id. at 85, 106 P.3d at
411. Facts which may establish actual notice include whether a buyer has actual knowledge of
agreements creating the servitude, or has actua] lmowledge of the use of the servitude at the time
.

'

.

'

of purchase. See West Wood Investments, 141 Idaho at 85-86, 106 P.3d at 411-12. A pmchaser
who has notice of the servitude is not a bona fide purchaser. Id. (citing MiddlekauffI).

Here, it is incontrovertible that Willow Creek HOA had actual notice of the Agi~eement.
Mr. Mills, who is not a pa1'ty to this action, establishes this plain and undisputed fact in his
It is important to note that an "equitable servitude" is an "equitable" doctrine, thus, it is
enforced by courts to ensure fairness. See City of Meridian "· Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 438,
299 P.3d 232, 245 (2013) ("In its broadest and most general signification, equity denotes the
·spirit 8.lld habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing wbich would reg\.tlate the intercourse of
men.") (Internal quotations and citations omitted). Courts are instructed to enforce a land use
1·estriction in equity when the conduct of one patty is such that fairness and justice so require.
Here, given the actions of the parties, fairness and justice dictate allowing the Lees the access
they were promised when they agreed to sell their property to the Kemps,
3
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June 11, 2015 letter. Fuithermore, it is indisputable that Willow Creek HOA had constructive
knowledge of the servitude as the improvements--the gravel road extensions at the access points,
the culverts and fencing with gates--are plain and obvious and are being used to this very day.

See Lee Deel., Exhibit D (picture of access point). Thus, here, as illustrated above and as
asserted in the opening brief, notice cannot be meaningfully contested.
Indeed, Idaho case law is on point. In the Middlekauff cases, persons purchased property
in a subdivision, with the representation that an adjacent property would be used as a common
area for recreational activities. In Middlekauff I, the seller had entered bankruptcy and a pa.rt of
the common area was conveyed to another party. While the property remained common for a
while, eventually the new owner prohibited access to the property, which ultimately resulted in

litigation. Tue trial court dismissed based because of a failure to meet the statute of limitation
for filing an action. However, on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court remanded for a determination
as to -:whether it was possible that the owners of subdivision property could have acquired an
interest
in the common . area based on the seller's
representation and the time any statute
of
.
.
.
limitation began run11ing needed to be determined. The Court indicated the necessary inquiry
was whether the owner acquired an interest enforceable against the original promisor and
whether such right should be enforceable· against a subsequent pu1·chaser.

Middlekauff I,

103 Idaho at 834-35, 654 P.2d at 1387-88. On remand, the district court found and the appellate
court affirmed that the subsequent purchasers were not bona fide purchasers because they had
notice of the common ai·ea use at the time they made their purchase. Middlekauff JI, 110 Idaho at

916,719 P.2d at 1176.
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Thus, here, Mr. Mills establishes the fact that at the time of the transfer, the HOA like the
purchasers in Middlekauff/had notice of the agreement and use of the access points. Moteover,
here, the actions of the parties involved, the Kemps, the HOA and the Lees evidenced knowledge
of that agreement through the construction of the three access points, including the construction
and use of the three access points. See Uncontroverted Fact No. 13 (Lee Deel., 113.) e4~1n 2000,
at the time that Kemp Road was constructed, consistent with the Agreement, the Kemps paid to
have the three driveway access points constructed giving the Lees' property adjacent to Kemp
Road access to Kemp Road."). These improvements and construction are open and notorious to
anyone driving on Kemp Road. In short, there can be no meaningful dispute that the HOA bad
and continues to have notice of the agreement--an agreement that is enforceable against the HOA

and that provides the Lees access to Kemp Road.

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Lees respectfully request that the Court grant summary
judgment finding that Kemp Road, owned by the Willow Creek HOA, is subject to an equitable
servitude that allows the Lees to move forward with their designs to utilize the three access
points ah'eady designated and improved.

DATED: September 8, 2016.
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
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Christ T. Troupis
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251 East Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
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Boise, Idaho 83701
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Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates
No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV-16-3425*C
Plaintiffs,
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES NO.
2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation;
and DOES I - X, inclusive,
Defendants.

Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association,
Inc. ("Willow Creek"), by and through its attorneys, Elam & Burke, P.A., and pursuant to Rule
56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, moves this Court for an order granting summary
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judgment in its favor as to all of the plaintiffs' claims against it. This motion is made on the
ground that no genuine issue of material fact exists upon which liability can be found against the
defendant, and the case against defendant should be dismissed as a matter of law.
This motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment filed contemporaneously herewith, and the pleadings and materials in the
record in this case.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.
DATED this

/8

day of May, 2017.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:fr\~(/~
Matthew C. Parks, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek
Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision
Homeowners' Association, Inc.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

DALE LEE and KA THI LEE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV-16-3425*C
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES NO.
2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation;
and DOES I - X, inclusive,
Defendants.

Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association,
Inc. ("Willow Creek"), submits this Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for
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Summary Judgment. Willow Creek requests the Court hold that the Plaintiffs (the "Lees") do
not have an enforceable easement or equitable servitude over the property in dispute in this case,
Kemp Road.

I.

FACTS

This case concerns a land sale contract and subsequent deed between the Lees and the
Kemp Family Trust. The Lees claim they were granted an easement over Kemp Road, which is
a private road within the Willow Creek Estates subdivision. The Lees do not own any property
within the Willow Creek Estates subdivision, but own property adjacent to the subdivision. See
Declaration of Dale Lee, filed June 20, 2016 ("Lee Dec."), pp 2-3. According to the Lees, the
Kemp Family Trust granted them an easement in the 1997 Agreement for the Sale of Real
Property (the "1997 Agreement"). Id.
The 1997 Agreement does not contain a valid legal description of the purported
easement. Id, Ex. B. 1 In fact, the 1997 Agreement does not have any legal description at all not of the property to be sold, not of the Lees' property that would be the dominant estate for
purposes of the easement, and not of the servient estate of the easement. Id.
The 1997 Agreement is not notarized and the record contains no evidence that can
establish the Kemp Family Trust executed the 1997 Agreement. Id. The Lees have not
identified any representative of the Kemp Family Trust to testify that the person that signed the
1997 Agreement was properly authorized by the Kemp Family Trust to execute documents on its
behalf. Nor have the Lees identified the person that signed the 1997 Agreement purportedly on
behalf of the Kemp Family Trust as a witness. The 1997 Agreement appears to have been signed

1

A copy of the 1997 Agreement is attached hereto for reference.
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by J.M. Steele. Id. There is no evidence in the record as to who this person is and that he was
authorized to sign the 1997 Agreement by the Kemp Family Trust.

II.

SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENT

The Lees have only asked the Court to hold they are entitled to an equitable servitude
over Kemp Road in their Complaint. See Complaint, p. 6 (requesting the Court determine the
Lees are entitled to an equitable servitude over Kemp Road). If the Court finds the Lees are not
entitled to an equitable servitude, the Court should dismiss the Complaint since the Lees have not
asked for any additional relief.
The Lees are not entitled to an equitable servitude because the elements of establishing an
equitable servitude cannot be established. Furthermore, the Lees are asking the Court to find
they are entitled to an affirmative right to use Kemp Road. Since an equitable servitude is a
negative covenant and not an affirmative property right (as discussed in detail below), the Lees'
request for an equitable servitude fails as a matter of law.
In prior briefing, the Lees have not addressed the fact that the 1997 Agreement cannot
grant the Lees an easement and appear to concede that it does not grant an easement. However,
if the Court determines the Complaint is broad enough to encompass a request for relief in the
form of an easement, as a matter of law that request should be denied since the 1997 Agreement
is not signed by the Kemp Family Trust and contains no legal descriptions of any property.
Since the 1997 Agreement does not comply with the statute of frauds, it cannot be the legal basis
for an easement. To the extent the Lees have asked this Court to determine they have an
easement over Kemp Road, that request should be denied.
For the reasons set forth herein and in the prior briefing, Willow Creek requests the Court
find the 1997 Agreement is unenforceable and that the Lees are not entitled to an easement or
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equitable servitude over Kemp Road. Willow Creek requests the Court dismiss the Complaint
and grant summary judgment to Willow Creek.

III.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The Court
must liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233,238 (2005). If the record contains
conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds could differ, summary judgment must not be
granted. Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830,833 (1990). This requirement is a
strict one. Clarke v. Prenger, 114 Idaho 766, 768 (1988).
The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the moving
party. G&M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517 (1991). This burden is onerous
because even "circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact, [and] all
doubts are to be resolved against the moving party." Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,470 (1986).
If the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show a

genuine issue of material fact does exist. Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners'
Assn. Inc., 152 Idaho 338, 343-44 (2012).

The adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth
by deposition, affidavit, or otherwise, specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.
Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 104 (2013). The nonmoving

party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to
withstand summary judgment. Northwest Bee-Corp. v. Home Living Sery., 136 Idaho 835, 839
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(2002). A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create
a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment. Jenkins, 141 Idaho at
238.
"When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court as the trier of
fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence
properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting
inferences. The test for reviewing the inferences drawn by the trial court is whether the record
reasonably supports the inferences." Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354,
360-61, 93 P.3d 685, 691-92 (2004) (citations and quotations omitted).

IV.
A.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

The Lees' Claim for an Equitable Servitude Should be Dismissed
The Lees have asked this Court to grant them an equitable servitude over the road owned

by Willow Creek. However, the Lees have misunderstood the nature of the property right
entailed in an equitable servitude and confuse a negative restrictive covenant (or an equitable
servitude) with an affirmative right to use property for a specified use (an easement). The Lees'
claim for an equitable servitude should be dismissed since the Lees mistakenly contend an
equitable servitude will provide them an affirmative right to use Kemp Road. Furthermore, the
Lees cannot establish the required elements of an equitable servitude. For these reasons, the
Court should grant summary judgment in favor of Willow Creek and find the Lees are not
entitled to an equitable servitude that would provide a right to use Kemp Road.
As a preliminary matter, we must identify what property right the Lees seek. To do so,
we must distinguish between an easement and an equitable servitude. There are fundamental
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differences between an easement and an equitable servitude and the property rights involved
with each, differences the Lees have failed to address thus far in this litigation.
An equitable servitude is another name used for a
restrictive covenant. Restrictive covenants, as to the use ofland or
the location or character of buildings or other structures located
thereon, are said to create rights in the nature of easements. A
"negative easement" restrains a landowner from making certain use
of his or her land which he or she might otherwise have lawfully
done but for that restriction. In addition to using the term negative
easement, the courts have referred to building and use restrictions
by such terms as equitable easements, amenities, or servitudes, or
reciprocal negative easements, or mutual, reciprocal, equitable
easements of the nature of servitudes. However, although
restrictive covenants are commonly classified as negative
easements because they restrain landowners from making
otherwise lawful uses of their property, a negative easement is not
a true easement, which, by contrast, entitles the owner of land to
use the land of another for some purpose.

Negative easements in the nature of restrictions on the use of land
or buildings constructed thereon may be created in a number of
different ways. Although ordinarily created by deed, they may
also be created by contract not involving the transfer of title to land
and by implication.

A negative easement may also arise by implication from the
language of the deeds or from the conduct of the parties. Courts
have given to implied restrictions such descriptive names as
"reciprocal negative easements," "equitable servitudes," and the
like.
62 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 1 (Originally published in 2001) (emphasis added).
Real covenants, contractual agreements regarding the use
of land, and easements overlap at certain points. Indeed, some
commentators have advocated that because of their similarities,
these two categories of rights be merged under the label
"servitudes." The Restatement (Third) of Property-Servitudes
takes this tack. Such an approach, however, is subject to criticism
on several counts. Wholesale combination of these historically
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distinct, but related fields of property law may obliterate helpful
distinctions, introduce uncertainty into relatively well-settled areas
of easement law, and add an unnecessary layer of legal doctrine at
certain points.
Notwithstanding the efforts of the drafters of the
Restatement (Third) of Property-Servitudes and others to unify
the law of easements and real covenants, this is not likely to occur
in the near future. Thus, it remains necessary to differentiate
between these real property interests.
How can one tell easements and real covenants apart?
Usually, this is not difficult. Most easements are affirmative in
character, authorizing use of another's land. Many real covenants
are negative or restrictive in nature, prohibiting certain use of land.

Several important legal ramifications flow from the
easement/real covenant distinction:
l. Easements as interests in land must meet the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds; opinion is divided as to
whether real covenants are property interests covered by the
Statute.
2. Easements may be created by implication in all
jurisdictions;2 implied real covenants are not recognized in some
states.
3. Easements in gross are permitted in this country; real
covenants in gross generally are not.
4. The holder of an easement terminated by condemnation
is entitled to just compensation; the beneficiary of a real covenant
taken by eminent domain does not receive compensation in some
states on the theory that a real covenant does not constitute
property.
THE LA w OF EASEMENTS & LICENSES IN LAND § 1:29 (West 2017) (emphasis added).
Idaho recognizes the distinction between easements and real covenants. The Idaho
Supreme Court acknowledged that an easement is not a restrictive covenant. See Thomas v.

Campbell, 107 Idaho 398,404 n.2, 690 P.2d 333,339 n.2 (1984) ("Although given the
appellation of a 'scenic easement,' the document in question more closely resembles a restrictive

2 Idaho recognizes the implied easement by necessity doctrine. See Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212,220,280 P.3d
715, 723 (2012). The Lees have not asserted they are entitled to an implied easement by necessity.
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covenant than it does an easement. A restrictive covenant is defined as a "[p]rovision in a deed
limiting the use of the property and prohibiting certain uses," BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY, p.
1182 (5th Ed.1979), whereas an easement is defined as a "right of use over the property of
another." Id. at 457."). Washington courts also recognize the distinction. See Dickson v. Kates,
133 P.3d 498, 502 (Wash. App. 2006), as amended (Dec. 12, 2006) ("Further, an easement is a
right, distinct from ownership, to use in some way the land of another, without compensation. A
restrictive covenant limits the manner in which one may use his or her land. The distinction
between the two is that an easement allows its holder to go upon the land possessed by another
and a covenant imposes upon the possessor restrictions on how he or she may use the land.")
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
The Lees are not seeking to limit Willow Creek's use of Kemp Road (which would be a
restrictive covenant). Rather, they are seeking a right of use over Kemp Road (which is an
affirmative easement). Because the Lees are not seeking a restrictive covenant, which may be
created by conduct, but rather they are seeking an affirmative right to use the land of Willow
Creek, in order to prevail at trial they must provide a written agreement complying with the
statute of frauds.
Each of the cases cited by the Lees in support of the contention that they do not have to
establish that they have an agreement to use Kemp Road that complies with the statute of frauds
deals with negative easements, restrictive covenants, or equitable servitudes. The Lees have
provided no authority for the proposition that an affirmative right to cross another's property for
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access is considered an equitable servitude and may be created without a written agreement
complying with the statute of frauds. 3
The question of whether an interest in property is an easement or a restrictive covenant is
a question oflaw. See, e.g., Dickson v. Kates, 133 P.3d at 502. This Court should find that the
interest in land sought by the Lees (the affirmative right to use Kemp Road) is an easement, not
an equitable servitude or restrictive covenant and dismiss the Lees claim for an equitable
servitude.
B.

The Lees' Reliance on Middlekauf, West Wood, and Birdwood is Flawed

If the Court does not dismiss the claim for an equitable servitude based on the fact that
the Lees are seeking an affirmative right to use Kemp Road (which is not an equitable servitude),
the Court should dismiss the claim for an equitable servitude because the Lees cannot
demonstrate they have met the requirements to establish a right to an equitable servitude.
The Lees, whose property is not located within the Willow Creek subdivision, want an
access right through that subdivision. Because a subdivision is involved, the Lees have
throughout this litigation cited to Idaho cases involving equitable servitudes in the context of
planned unit developments. But, the Lees' reliance is misplaced as their property is not
contained within the Willow Creek subdivision.
It is undisputed the Lees property is not within the Willow Creek subdivision. The Lees
claim an equitable servitude based on what the developer of the subdivision purportedly agreed
to grant in the 1997 Agreement and "conduct" of the parties. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Pre-trial

Statement, pp. 7-9. Middlekauf, West Wood, and Birdwood (cases cited by the Lees in support of

"An easement may be created by implication. An easement by implication is one which the law imposes by
inferring the parties to a transaction intended that result although they did not express it. The common law
recognizes two types of implied easements: easements by necessity and easements implied from prior use."
25 AM. JUR. 2d Easements and Licenses § 18.
3
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the claim for an equitable servitude in their Pre-Trial Statement) have nothing to do with an
alleged right to access (i.e., an easement) across an adjacent property not contained within a
planned unit development or subdivision.
Before proceeding to review the facts and holdings of those cases relied upon by the
Lees, it is necessary to review how the common development line of cases fit within the legal
framework of equitable servitudes. Reviewing these cases makes it clear that the Lees are
calling the right they seek an equitable servitude (or implied reciprocal negative easement or
restrictive covenant) when in fact it is an easement.
The doctrine of implied reciprocal negative easements applies
when an owner of real property subdivides the property into lots
and sells a substantial number of those lots with restrictive
covenants designed to further the owner's general plan or scheme
of development. Evans v. Pollock, 796 S.W.2d 465,466
(Tex.1990). When the owner of a tract of land subdivides it into
lots according to a general scheme or plan, and sells those lots by
deeds containing substantially uniform restrictions, the grantees
acquire by implication an equitable right to enforce similar
restrictions against any lots retained by the grantor or sold by the
grantor without such restrictions to a purchaser with actual or
constructive notice of the restrictions. Id. (citing Minner v. City of
Lynchburg, 204 Va. 180, 129 S.E.2d 673,679 (1963)). This
implied right is variously called an implied reciprocal negative
easement or an implied equitable servitude. Id.
HH Holloway Trust v. Outpost Estates Civic Club Inc., 135 S.W.3d 751, 756 (Tex. Ct. App.
2004) (emphasis added).
"An easement is a right, distinct from ownership, to use in some
way the land of another, without compensation", whereas a
restrictive covenant limits the manner in which one may use his or
her own land. Restrictive covenants are frequently described as
negative easements, often in the context of tax cases. Halpin v.
Poushter, 59 N.Y.S.2d 338, 341 (1945) ("A tax foreclosure cannot
be used to cut off restrictive covenants because the latter are
easements."); see Alamogordo Imp. Co. v. Prendergast, 43 N.M.
245,254, 91 P.2d 428, 122 A.L.R. 1277 (1939); Northwestern Imp.
Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289, 302, 66 P.2d 792, 110 A.L.R. 605
(1937). For example, Annot., Easement or Servitude or Restrictive
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Covenant as Affected by Sale for Taxes, 168 A.L.R. 529, 536
(194 7), states:
That restrictive covenants as to the use of land or
the location or character of buildings or other
structures thereon create easements, frequently
described as negative easements, has been held or
stated in a number of cases.
A negative easement has been defined as one the effect of which is
to preclude the owner of the land subject to the easement from
doing that which, if no easement existed, he would be entitled to
do, or one which curtails the owner of the servient tenement in the
exercise of some of his rights in respect of his estate in favor of the
owner of the dominant tenement or tenements.
In PUDs [planned unit developments], restrictive covenants are the
same as negative easements because they curtail the rights of the
owner of the servient tenement in favor of the owners of all of the
dominant tenements.
The objectives of a PUD include a more efficient and desirable use
of open land, and flexibility and variety in the physical
development pattern, in order to provide a more desirable living
environment than would be possible through a strict application of
zoning ordinance requirements. Wiggers v. Skagit Cy., 23
Wash.App. 207, 213-14, 596 P.2d 1345 (1979); Frankland v. Lake
Oswego, 267 Ore. 452,517 P.2d 1042 (1973). Restrictive
covenants are imposed as part of a common plan of
development to benefit all of the grantees of the developer. See
generally Chimney Hill Owners' Ass 'n v. Antignani, 136 Vt. 446,
392 A.2d 423 (1978). The ability of homeowners in a PUD to
enforce restrictive covenants against original and subsequent
property owners helps ensure that the community will be able to
maintain its planned character and provide the lifestyle sought by
its residents in making their homes there. See generally 6 P.
Rohan, Homeowner Ass'ns and Planned Unit Devs., § 8.01 (1986).

City a/Olympia v. Patzer, 728 P.2d 135 (Wash. 1986) (emphasis added).
Connecticut, like Washington and Texas (and as shown below Idaho), recognizes that the
common development scheme, if it is to give rise to a right to enforce a restrictive covenant,
must involve a common grantor, an element that is undisputedly missing from this case.
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Restrictive covenants should be enforced when they are reflective
of a common plan of development. See Marion Road Assn. v.
Harlow, l Conn.App. 329, 333, 472 A.2d 785 (1984). The factors
that help to establish the existence of an intent by a grantor to
develop a common plan are: (1) a common grantor sells or
expresses an intent to put an entire tract on the market subject to
the plan; (2) a map of the entire tract exists at the time of the sale
of one of the parcels; (3) actual development according to the plan
has occurred; and (4) substantial uniformity exists in the
restrictions imposed in the deeds executed by the grantor. Contegni
v. Payne, supra, 18 Conn. App. at 53, 557 A.2d 122; 9 R. Powell,
Real Property (1999) § 60.03[6], p. 60-29.
DaSilva v. Barone, 849 A.2d 902, 907 (Conn. 2004) (emphasis added).
More precisely, a reciprocal negative easement is created when a
common owner ofrelated parcels ofland includes in each of the
various deeds of the lots conveyed some restriction for the benefit
of the land retained, evidencing a scheme or intent that the entire
tract should be similarly treated, so that once the plan is effectively
placed into operation, the burden is placed upon the land conveyed
and by operation of law reciprocally placed upon the land retained
by the grantor. Ordinarily, four elements must be established to
prove the existence of a reciprocal negative easement applicable to
lots in subdivision tract:

l. There must be a common grantor;
2. There must be a designation of the land or tract subject
to restrictions;
3. There must be a general plan or scheme of restriction in
existence for the designated land or tract; and
4. The restrictions must run with the land.
62 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 1 (Originally published in 2001) (emphasis added).
The Lees did not acquire any lots in the Willow Creek subdivision and have no right to
enforce any equitable servitude or restrictive covenant with respect to the property contained
within the subdivision. There is no common grantor of the properties at issue here, or any
allegation that the Lees want to include their property within the Willow Creek subdivision. The
Lees have not articulated any restrictive covenants that they want to place on Kemp Road (unless
they attempt to argue that they want to restrict Willow Creek from prohibiting their use of Kemp
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Road - which is not really a restrictive covenant, but actually an argument they have an
affirmative right to use the road).
The Lees want an access right and assert that right is available under the line of cases
discussing restrictive covenants. The Lees are mistaken. The cases cited by the Lees all involve
the rights of property owners that purchased lots within a planned unit development based upon
statements or conduct that the court found established an equitable right to restrict the developer
of the planned unit development from taking certain actions with respect to other property
contained within that development. In other words, when a developer markets properties in a
planned development by making promises about the amenities that will be provided and the
character of the homes or units permitted in the development, persons induced to purchase lots
within the development have enforceable implied restrictive covenants - or equitable servitudes .
. . . [the Idaho Supreme Court], in Middlekauff v. Lake Cascade,
Inc., 103 Idaho 832, 654 P.2d 1385 (1982), stated that the statute
of frauds did not preclude plaintiffs from introducing oral
testimony in order to establish an equitable interest in adjoining
land. In Middlekauff, the plaintiffs alleged that they were induced
to purchase land pursuant to representations made by Lake
Cascade, Inc., that the property adjacent to their property would be
used as a common area for recreational activities.

Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398,403, 690 P.2d 333,338 (1984).
Similarly, in Ute Park Summer Homes Ass'n v. Maxwell Land Gr.
Co., the court found an implied restriction for the land's continuing
use as a golf course. Although this case is not directly on point
because it involved a suit by lot owners directly against the
developer and not his successor, the court, in its decision, focused
on the representations made to prospective purchasers and the
materials used in the sales of the lots. When the developer in Ute
Park Summer Homes Ass'n sold subdivided lots, he had distributed
maps which pictured an area marked "golf course." After selling
these lots, the developer tried to sell the golf course without any
restrictions on its use. Even though the maps had not been
recorded and none of the deeds contained any reference to the map
or to any interest in the golf course, the court concluded that the lot
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owners had a legal right to use the area as a golf course. The court
concluded that when a map or plat showing a park or other like
open area is used to sell property, "the purchaser acquires a private
right, generally referred to as an easement, that such area shall be
used in the manner designated. As stated, this is a private right, and
it is not dependent on a proper making and recording of a plat for
purposes of dedication." Further, the court noted: The rationale of
the rule is that a grantor, who induces purchasers, by use of a plat,
to believe that streets, squares, courts, parks, or other open areas
shown on the plat will be kept open for their use and benefit, and
the purchasers have acted upon such inducement, is required by
common honesty to do that which he represented he would do. It is
the use made of the plat in inducing the purchasers, which gives
rise to the legally enforceable right in the individual purchasers,
and such is not dependent upon a dedication to public use, or upon
the filing or recording of the plat.

Skyline Woods Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Broekemeier, 276 Neb. 792, 808-09, 758 N.W.2d 376,
389-90 (2008).
The Birdwood case also concerned restrictive covenants in a planned community. "This
is an appeal from a summary judgment holding that recorded restrictive covenants which were
not signed by the owner of a platted subdivision, or the owner's agent, do not bind the subsequent
purchaser of a lot in the subdivision." Birdwood Subdivision Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Bulotti

Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 17, 19, 175 P.3d 179, 181 (2007). The plaintiff wanted to restrict the
defendant from subdividing a lot within the subdivision into 4 separate lots, which would be a
restrictive covenant (not an affirmative easement). Id. The Court discussed the creation of
implied reciprocal negative easements (or equitable servitudes) in the context of a lot owner in a
subdivision attempting to enforce such restrictive covenants on other lots within the subdivision.
"Generally speaking, a restrictive covenant may arise by
implication from the language of the deeds, or from the conduct of
the parties. Implied covenants are not favored, however, so that in
order for a restriction to be thus created, the implication must be
plain and unmistakable, or necessary." 20 AM. JUR. 2d, Covenants,
Etc., § 155 (2005). The problem with the Plaintiffs' argument
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regarding an equitable servitude is that there are no facts
supporting it.
The Plaintiffs rely upon cases holding that if the common
grantor of property develops land for sale in lots and includes
substantially similar restrictions, conditions, and covenants against
the use of the property in the deeds conveying various lots, the
purchasers of those lots may enforce similar restrictions against the
residential lot or lots retained by the grantor or the lots
subsequently sold by the grantor without those restrictions. In this
case, Bird did not include any restrictions, conditions, or covenants
in the deeds conveying any of the lots in the Subdivision.
Therefore, there is no factual basis for inferring reciprocal
restrictions on the land she retained.
Birdwood Subdivision Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Bulotti Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 17, 23, 175

P.3d 179, 185 (2007).
In Birdwood, the Court found the plaintiffs were not entitled to equitable servitudes
because there was no evidence the developer sold lots in a planned unit development with
restrictions that could be imposed by other purchasers of lots. Birdwood also provides that
equitable servitudes are only available when a common grantor of property is involved. In the
case between the Lees and Willow Creek, there is no common grantor of the properties involved.
West Wood also involved a planned unit development and the enforcement of a restrictive

covenant by one of the unit owners. "This case addresses whether common area allegedly
created by a developer/mortgagor may establish an equitable interest in persons who purchase a
unit in the project, and whether such interests are enforceable against the mortgagee's successor
in interest." West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 83, 106 P.3d 401,409 (2005).
The cases cited to in West Wood concerning equitable servitudes also dealt with equitable
servitudes in the context of planned unit subdivisions. Id. At 84, 106 P. 3d at 409 ("The Sun
Valley cases stem from the development of a residential subdivision.").
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The Lees have no evidence that they purchased a lot in a planned unit development from
the Kemp Family Trust (or that there is some other common grantor of property) and they are not
contending they have a right to impose negative restrictions on the use of Kemp Road. In the
instant case, the Lees have no legal basis to claim they are entitled to an equitable servitude.
Willow Creek requests the Court find that as a matter of law the Lees are not entitled to an
equitable servitude to use Kemp Road.
C.

The Lees Have Not Requested an Easement and Are Not Entitled to One
The Lees have not asked the Court to enter an order finding they have an easement over

Kemp Road in their Complaint. See generally Complaint, filed April 11, 2016. They only
requested a finding that they have an equitable servitude. Id The Lees have never moved to
amend the Complaint to seek an easement. If the Court grants summary judgment on the claim
for an equitable servitude, the Court should dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.
Even if the Court determines the Lees have requested an easement in this case, Willow
Creek is entitled to summary judgment on that claim based on the statute of frauds. The 1997
Agreement does not have a valid legal description of any of the parcels of real property involved
in the transaction and is not signed by the Kemp Family Trust.
The statute of frauds renders an agreement for the sale of
real property invalid unless the agreement or some note or
memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party
charged or his agent. LC. § 9-505(4). Agreements for the sale of
real property that fail to comply with the statute of frauds are
unenforceable both in an action at law for damages and in a
suit in equity for specific performance. Hoffman v. S V Co., Inc.,
102 Idaho 187,190,628 P.2d 218,221 (1981) (citing 72
Am.Jur.2d Statute of Frauds§ 285 (1974); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statute of
Frauds § 513 (1974)). An agreement for the sale ofreal property
must not only be in writing and subscribed by the party to be
charged, but the writing must also contain a description of the
property, either in terms or by reference, so that the property can
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be identified without resort to parol evidence. Garner v. Bartschi,
139 Idaho 430,435, 80 P.3d 1031, 1036 (2003).

Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625,628,200 P.3d 1174, 1177 (2009) (emphasis added).
"An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not

inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner. An express easement, being an
interest in real property, may only be created by a written instrument." Capstar Radio Oper. Co.

v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 707, 152 P. 2d 575,578 (2007). "For over 100 years, this Court has
held that a contract for the sale of real property must speak for itself and that a court may not
admit parol evidence to supply any of the terms of the contract, including the description of the
property." Ray, 146 Idaho at 628,200 P.3d at 1177, citing Kurdy v. Rogers, 10 Idaho 416,423,
79 P. 195, 196 (1904). "The parol evidence rule provides that when a contract has been reduced
to a writing that the parties intend to be a final statement of their agreement, evidence of any
prior or contemporaneous agreements or understandings which relate to the same subject matter
is not admissible to vary, contradict, or enlarge the terms of the written contract." Simons v.

Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 828, 11 P.3d 20, 24 (2000), citing Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho
37, 44, 740 P.2d 1022, 1029 (1987); Chapman v. Haney Seed Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 26,624 P.2d
408 (1981).
The 1997 Agreement contains no legal descriptions of any of the involved properties and,
thus, cannot, as a matter oflaw, be enforced in law or in equity. Ray, 146 Idaho at 628,200 P.3d
at 1177. Additionally, there is no evidence in the record to establish that the 1997 Agreement
was signed by the Kemp Family Trust. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-508, the 1997 Agreement
cannot be enforced. See Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145
Idaho 208,215, 177 P.3d 955, 962 (2008) (finding agreement not signed by property owner or its
legal, appointed and duly qualified representative could not be enforced).
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The 1997 Agreement was not notarized, so there is no notary jurat to assist in identifying
the name of the person that purportedly signed the agreement on behalf of the Kemp Family
Trust. The Lees, to the extent they are claiming the 1997 Agreement granted them an easement
over Kemp Road, have the burden of establishing the 1997 Agreement complies with the statute
of frauds. The Lees have the burden of establishing that the 1997 Agreement was signed by the
Kemp Family Trust or a duly qualified representative of the trust. There is no evidence in the
record that would establish that a duly authorized representative of the trust signed the
agreement. If the Court determines that the Lees properly asked the Court find they are entitled
to an easement to use Kemp Road, Willow Creek requests the Court grant its summary judgment
and dismiss the Complaint.

V.

CONCLUSION

Willow Creek respectfully requests the Court dismiss the Lees' Complaint in its entirety
with prejudice.
DATED t h i s ~ day of May, 2017.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:fV'l~~
Matthew C. Parks, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant
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12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83713

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
VJ Via Facsimile 345-4461

Honorable Christopher S. Nye
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany St
Caldwell, ID 83605

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Facsimile
1/'.i Email clerk copy acahill@canyonco.on!

Matthew C. Parks
4839-1923-8728,v.2
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P.O. Box 2408,
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Eagle, Idaho 83616

Telephone: (208) 938-5584
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482
Matthew C. Parks, ISB #7419
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-S4S4
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
mcp@clamburke.com

Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates
No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIIlRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OP CANYON
DALE LEE and KATiiI LEE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV-16-342S*C
Plaintiffs,

vs.

WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES NO.
2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation;
and DOES I - X, inclusive,

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSmON TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO STRIKE OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, POSTPONE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners* Association,
Inc. (HWillow Creek"), by and through its attorneys, Elam & Burke, P.A., and hereby opposes
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Plaintiff's Motion to Strike or in the Alternative, Postpone Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The Lees request the Court strike or postpone Willow Creek's Motion for Summary
Judgment for two reasons: (1) the Lees claim the Court's Pre-trial Order dated June 3. 2016, is
still in effect and prohibits the Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2) the Lees want additional
time to file their own dispositive motion. Both reasons have no merit.
At the hearing on February 16, 2017, the Court vacated the trial that was to take place

February 28 and March 1, 2017, at the request of the parties based on the health of Mr. Lee.
Also during the Febnwy 16, 2017, hearing, the Court scheduled a status conference to take place
on June 15, 2017. The Court also instructed the parties that if settlement negotiations were not
successful, the parties could file dipositive motions to be heard on that date. Following this
Court's instructions, Willow Creek filed its Motion for Summary Judgment in a timely manner
to be heard on June 15, 2017.

Since the trial was vacated and has not been rescheduled, there currently are no deadlines
for filing dispositive motions. The parties entered into a stipulation regarding deadlines to file
summary judgment motions and agreed such motions would be filed 91 days prior to trial. See
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning filed June 17, 2016. Since no trial date has been set,
there are no deadlines at this time to file motions for summary jud&ment.
The Lees' second reason for striking the Motion for Summary Judgment or vacating the

hearina is also with.out merit. The Lees have not cited any rule or case law supporting their
request to strike the Motion for Summary Juda:ment or vacate the hearing on the motion. The
Lees have not sought relief under I.R.C.P. 56(t), which is arguably the only potential avenue to
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..
postpone the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Lees' Motion to Strike or in the Alternative,
Postpone Defendant's Motion for Swnmary Judgment is not supported by the facts or the law.
Willow Creek respectfully requests the Court deny the Lees' Motion to Strike or in the
Alternative, Postpone Defendant 1s Motion for Summary Judgment.

DATED this 1,.Z. day of May~ 2017.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:nll~P~
Matthew C. Parks, of the f1ttn.
Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek
Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision
Homeowners' Association, Inc.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the t.t day of May, 2017, I caused a true and correct
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Daniel W. Bower
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STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS, PLLC
125S0 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83713

[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Federal Express

Honorable Christopher S. Nye
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany St
Caldwell, ID 83605

[ ] U.S. Mail

[ '1'Via Facsimile 345-4461
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Facsimile
[1/J Email clerk copy acahill@canyonco.org

Matthew C. Parks
4842·2784-1705,v.2
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Daniel W. Bower, ISB #7204
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone: (208) 345-3333
Fax No.: (208) 345-4461
dbower@stm-law.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV 16-3425

Plaintiffst

vs.

wn..ww CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC .• an Idaho

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MO'l10N TO STRIKE OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, POSTPONE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

corporation, and DOES 1-X, inclusive,
Defendants.
On May 18, 2017 Dale and Kathi Lee (collectively 0 Lees'')t by and through their

attorneys of record, filed a Motion to Strike or in the Alternative, Postpone Dcfendant1 s Motion
for Summary Judgment. The basis for that motion was to seek clarification from the Court

regarding the procedural posture of the case, because, as not.ed, at the time of Mr. Lee's accident,
all discovery and dispositive motion practice had been concluded. And, as further noted by the
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Lees, no order has been entered modifying the June 3, 2016 Order Setting Pretrial Confe1·ence
and Jury Trial. In response to the Lee's motion; the defendant, Willow Creek Ranch Estates No.

2 Subdivision Homeowncr's ASBOCiation, Inc.'s (11Defendant" or "Willow Creek HOAn or
..HOA,.), argues that "at the hearing on February 16, 2017, the Court vacated the trial that was to
take place .... at the request of the parties based on the health of Mr. Lee ... [and] instructed the
parties that if settlement negotiations were not successful, the parties could file· dipositive [sic]
motions to be heard on that date."

Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's

Motion to Strike or in the Alternative, Postpone Defendant's Motion for Swnmary Judgment,

p.2.
The HOA's representation that this Court '*instructed the parties" to file dispositive
motions on June I 5. 2017 is not accurate and not reflected in any docwnent, The Court did not
so instruct and that directive is incontJ:overtibly not reflected in any order or memorandum ruling

that has been issued by this Court. Moreover, the HOA apparently claims that at this time there
"currently are no deadlines" and that the HOA canjust reset this entire case. Id. That approach
makes no sense given the fact that at the time of Mr. Lee's accident, discovery and dispositive
motion briefing had concluded and the parties were preparing .for trial. The fact that the Court
vacated the trial date from the bench does not somehow give the HOA the opportunity to
relitigate this case. A new trial date should be set and the parties should be left in the same
position as they were in at the time the trial date was vacated. Indeed, it is the Lees' position that
this is what the co·urt intended on February 16, 2017 and that this is the reason why no ''new0
order has been entered modifying and/or replacing the June 3, 2016 Order.
MOTION TO STRIKE OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, POSTPONE DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2
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DATED: May 30, 2017.
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
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CBRTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 30, 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile:
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

Christ T. Troupis

TR.oUPIS LAW 0FFICB, P.A.
801 E. State Street, Ste. 50

P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch
Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners'
Association, Inc.

Matthew C. Parks

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered

ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
Email: mcp@elamburk.e.com

251 East Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box. 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701

Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch
E.stats.s No. 2 Subdivi&ion Homeowners'
Association, Inc.
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Daniel W. Bower, ISB #7204
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,

Case No. CV 16-3425

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and DOES 1-X, inclusive,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, Dale and Kathi Lee (collectively "Lees"), by and through their attorneys of
record, submit this brief in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
INTRODUCTION
The Lees' opposition to the motion for summary judgment submitted by Willow Creek
Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc. ("HOA" or "Willow Creek
HOA") is not complicated. The HOA's request for summary judgment is dependent on this

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Court finding that "the 1997 Agreement [June 1, 1997 Agreement for Sale of Real Estate
(referred to herein and in the briefing as "1997 Agreement" or "Agreement")] 1 is unenforceable
and that the Lees are not entitled to an easement or equitable servitude over Kemp Road." See
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's
Summary Judgment Memo."), p.3. And, indeed, the HOA submits that the statute of frauds
precludes this Court from finding that the 1997 Agreement is enforceable as an interest. See
Defendant's Summary Judgment Memo., p.16 ("Willow Creek [HOA] is entitled to summary
judgment on that claim based on the statute of frauds."). The HOA also submits that it is entitled
to summary judgment on the issue of equitable servitude because the HOA claims that the Lees
are "seeking an affirmative right" as opposed to a restrictive covenant that, the HOA claims, can
only be created by a written document that satisfies the statute of frauds.

See Defendant's

Summary Judgment Memo., p.8 (The Lees have provided no authority for the proposition that an
affirmative right to cross another's property for access is considered an equitable servitude and
may be created without a written agreement complying with the statue of frauds.").
Thus, as a threshold matter, if the Lees can establish a basis for overcoming the statute of
frauds, regardless of any other argument, the HOA's motion for summary judgment fails. To be
clear, that is precisely what the Lees have alleged and that is exactly what the undisputed facts
show--that the 1997 Agreement has been partially performed and consequently can be enforced
regardless of statute of fraud issues. As explained more fully below, the partial performance of
an agreement, here the 1997 Agreement, allows the Court to enforce the agreement regardless of
1

A copy of that agreement is attached to the June 17, 2016 Declaration of Dale Lee ("Lee
Deel."), Ex. B.
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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statute of frauds concerns. See Hoke v. Neyada, Inc., 161 Idaho 450, 387 P.3d 118, 121 (2016),

reh'g denied (Jan. 23, 2017) (citing Idaho Code§ 9-504) ("[u]nder the doctrine of part
performance, when an agreement to convey real property fails to meet the requirements of the
Statute of Frauds, the agreement may nevertheless be specifically enforced" if the agreement is
partially performed.). Accordingly, on this basis alone, the HOA's summary judgment motion
should be denied. Furthermore, as explained more fully below, the HOA's legal arguments
related to equitable servitudes is not consistent with Idaho law.

Idaho takes a much more

expansive approach to equitable servitudes than other jurisdictions. Accordingly, even if there
was no partial performance of the 1997 Agreement, there is a factual and legal basis for this
Court to conclude that an equitable servitude has been created and should be enforced.

BACKGROUND
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment begins with two (2) faulty assumptions that
need to be addressed up front. The first faulty assumption is that the Lees have limited the legal
basis for the relief they are seeking--that [t]he Lees have only asked the Court to hold that they
are entitled to an equitable servitude over Kemp Road in their Complaint." See Memorandum in
Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment Memo."), p. 3. This contention is incorrect and misconstrues the facts leading up to
the dispute and the relief sought by the Lees.
The Lees from the beginning of this case have made clear that the relief they seek is
based on two (2) legal theories: 1) that the 1997 Agreement is enforceable (regardless of statute
of frauds issues) and 2) that even if there is no valid agreement, the acts of the parties involved,
constitute an equitable servitude.

See, e.g., June 20, 2016, Memorandum in Support of

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p.2 ("The legal issue here is simple--whether the
defendant, Willow Creek HOA, is obligated to honor an easement agreement and/or equitable
servitude encumbering property, as a successor in interest, to the Kemp Family Trust ("Kemps),
where it is incontrovertible fact that Willow Creek HOA had actual and constructive notice of
the servitude at the time Willow Creek HOA received an interest in the subject real property.")
(Emphasis added.).
Perhaps the most significant evidence is the pleading itself. The Complaint, a declaratory
action, does not limit relief to just equitable servitude, but focuses primarily on the enforceability
of the terms of the 1997 Agreement. See, e.g., Complaint,

1 XVI, p.5 ("The Lees have relied

upon the terms, conditions and agreements in the Sale Agreement, to provide them access points
to Kemp Road, and are entitled to the benefit of those terms conditions and agreements."); 1 XX,
p.6 ("Willow Creek HOA should be compelled by this Court to set forth what claim it has to
preclude the Lees from moving forward with their planned development including allowing
access to Kemp Road, consistent with the Sale Agreement; the Court should rule that there is no
merit to such claim.") (Emphasis added.).
And, indeed, in the Complaint's "Prayer for Relief," the Lees further make clear that the
relief requested is not just limited to equitable servitude. The HOA cites the Lee's prayer in its
supporting memorandum, but conveniently omits the entirety of what is requested focusing
entirely on "equitable servitude" and ignoring the fact that the HOA references the "conditions
and restrictions as set forth in the Sale [1997] Agreement." For full clarity, the relevant portion
of the Prayer for Relief is provided as follows in its entirety:

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-4

146

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, the Lees, pray that judgment be entered in their favor
as follows:
1.
That the Court make a final determination that the Kemp
Development Property, including Kemp Road, is encumbered by equitable
servitudes, conditions and restrictions that allow for access by the Lees as set
forth in the Sale Agreement; and

See Complaint, Prayer for Relief, p.6. Thus, the idea that the Lees are limiting their relief to a

finding by this Court of an "equitable servitude" is false. The Lees first argument is that the
conditions and restrictions in the 1997 Agreement are enforceable and alternatively if they are
not enforceable the equities involved justify the imposition of an equitable servitude.
The second faulty assumption that must be addressed at the outset is the HOA's apparent
belief that the Lees submit that the 1997 Agreement, by itself, creates an enforceable easement
agreement. To be clear, this is not what the Lees are submitting to this Court. The Lees position
is that the 1997 Agreement along with the partial performance of the terms of the agreement
relating to access to Kemp Road constitutes an enforceable agreement regardless of any statute
of frauds issues. Indeed, a review of the "FACTS" section illustrates the HOA's reliance on this
faulty assumption. The HOA takes issue with the fact that the 1997 Agreement did not provide a
valid property description or otherwise comply with other statute of frauds requirements. See
Defendant's Summary Judgment Memo., p.2. As addressed above and as explained below, none
of these facts matter, and as a matter of law, do not make the 1997 Agreement unenforceable.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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As set forth below, the partial performance of an agreement, here the 1997 Agreement,
allows the Court to enforce the agreement. See Hoke., 161 Idaho at 453, 387 P.3d at 121. In
Hoke, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that "[u]nder the doctrine of part performance, when

an agreement to convey real property fails to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, the
agreement may nevertheless be specifically enforced" if the agreement is "partially performed."
Id. Thus, here, the Lees are not claiming, as alluded to by the HOA, that the 1997 Agreement

without more is enforceable.

Quite the contrary, it is the 1997 Agreement plus partial

performance that provide the basis for the Lees' claim that the conditions and restrictions
contained therein must be enforced.
LEGAL STANDARD
The legal standard is not in dispute.

Summary judgment shall be granted if the

"pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." See Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). A nonmoving party's failure to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, on which
the party bears the burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment in favor of
the moving party. See Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 955-56, 842 P.2d 288, 291-92 (Ct. App.
1992).
Here, the HOA has not met their burden. A review of the undisputed facts show that the
HOA's claims regarding the statute of frauds and the enforceability of the partially performed
1997 Agreement does not entitled the HOA to summary judgment. Moreover, their legal
arguments regarding equitable servitude are misplaced and are not accepted in Idaho where the
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Idaho Supreme Court has taken a more liberal approach to equitable servitudes than in other
jurisdictions.
The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the moving
party, here, the HOA. See G&M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517 (1991). Indeed, as
recognized by the HOA, their burden is "onerous" because even "circumstantial evidence can
create a genuine issue of material fact, [and] all doubts are to be resolved against the moving
party." See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Memo., p.4 (citing Doe v. Durtschi, 110
Idaho 466, 470 (1986)). Here, the HOA has not met that onerous burden and, therefore, their
motion should be denied.
DISCUSSION
I.

The HOA Is Not Entitled To Summary Judgment Because Of The Partial Performance Of
The 1997 Agreement.

It is well-established law that "[o]ne who purchases land expressly subject to an
easement, or with notice, actual or constructive, that it is burdened with an existing easement,
takes the land subject to the easement." Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 152 P.2d 585,
587 (1944) (emphasis added).

Here, there is no factual basis to dispute that there was an

agreement between the Lees and the Kemp Family Trust to allow the Lees to access their
property via Kemp Lane. This is reflected not only in the 1997 Agreement, but also in Mr. Lee
and Mr. Mills' declaration (as well as the affidavit of former HOA member Richard Hom). See
June 20, 2016 Declaration of Alan Mills ("Mills Deel."), Ex. A ("As part of that agreement the
Kemp Family Trust agreed to provide three (3) driveway accesses from a gravel road. That
gravel road now known as Kemp Road runs through Phase 2 of the Willow Creek
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Subdivision."); June 20, 2016 Declaration of Dale Lee ("Lee Deel."), 111 ("The Agreement also
made clear that the Kemps agreed to give us, the Lees, access to the road .... "); July 13, 2017
Affidavit of Richard Horn ("Horn Aff."), ')[3 ("At the closing of our purchase of the lot, I became
aware of an easement agreement between the Kemp Family Trust and the Lees that gave the
Lees the right to access their property from Kemp Road."). Accordingly, regardless of
enforceability, it is uncontroverted fact that there was an agreement.
Indeed, as alluded to above, the only basis the HOA takes with regard to the 1997
Agreement is that it "cannot grant the Lees an easement" as a matter of law "since the 1997
Agreement is not signed by the Kemp Family Trust and contains no legal descriptions of any
property" and consequently, does "not comply with the statute of frauds."

See HOA's

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p.3. The HOA's
arguments are short cited and fail to appreciate all the circumstances of this case.
Indeed, as set forth above, as a threshold matter, the HOA fails to appreciate that Idaho
Code § 9-504 provides that the statute of frauds "must not be construed to ... abridge the power of
any court to compel the specific performance of an agreement, in case of part performance
thereof." See Hoke., 161 Idaho at 453, 387 P.3d at 121 (2016), reh'g denied (Jan. 23, 2017)
(citing Idaho Code§ 9-504). Per Hoke, "[u]nder the doctrine of part performance, when an
agreement to convey real property fails to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, the
agreement may nevertheless be specifically enforced" if the agreement is partially performed. In
Hoke, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that issues like an adequate property description

could be remedied so long as the "[a]cts constituting part performance" were "specifically
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referable to the alleged agreement." Id. (citing Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 827, 11 P.3d
20, 23 (2000). Here, there can be no real debate that terms of the 1997 Agreement were partially
performed.
The agreement in this case, the 1997 Agreement, has been performed--at least in part.
The uncontroverted facts establish that the Lees have been given access to Kemp Road as the
1997 Agreement contemplated. It is uncontroverted fact that culverts and entries have been
constructed.

See Lee Deel., <J[ 13 ("In 2000, at the time the Kemp Road was constructed,

consistent with the Agreement, the Kemp Family Trust paid to have the three driveway access
points constructed giving the Lee' property adjacent to Kemp Road access to Kemp Road.").
Gates and culverts providing access to Kemp Road from the Lees property are in place and the
Lees have been accessing their property via these provided access points. Id. at

<J[

14. Apply

these uncontroverted facts to the law, it is uncontroverted fact that terms referenced in the 1997
Agreement have been performed and, accordingly, that the well-established doctrine of partial
performance is applicable and defeats the HOA's claim that they are entitled, as a matter of law,
to the argument that the 1997 Agreement is unenforceable. And, indeed, as set forth in the Lee's
simultaneously filed motion for summary judgment, it is the partial performance of the 1997
Agreement, coupled with the HOA's actual and construction notice of the 1997 Agreement and
the performance of that agreement, that entitles the Lees to the relief they seek as a matter of law.
For purposes of opposing the HOA's motion for summary judgment, these facts
conclusively preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of the HOA.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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II.

The HOA Is Not Entitled To Summary Judgment Because The Conduct Of The Parties
Created An Enforceable Equitable Interest.
Even if there was no enforceable easement, the incontrovertible facts establish a legal

basis for an equitable interest that precludes summary judgment.

See generally, Birdwood

Subdivision Homeowner 's Ass 'n, Inc. v. Bulotti Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 17, 23, 175 P.3d 179, 185
(2007).

An equitable interest arises "because of the actions of the parties, such as oral

representations." West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 84, 106 P.3d 401, 410
(2005); see also Birdwood, 145 Idaho at 23, 175 P.3d at 185 (quoting 20 Am.Jur.2d, Covenants,
Etc., § 155 (2005) (an equitable servitude arises "by implication from the language of the deeds
or the conduct of the parties."). Here, the conduct of the parties per Idaho law clearly creates an
equitable interest for the Lees.
The HOA's arguments are misplaced because they attempt to impose a more narrow
doctrine than what has been recognized in Idaho courts. A review of West Wood illustrates the
HOA's folly.
In West Wood the plaintiffs were a group of owners and associations that asserted an
equitable interest in certain real property--the claim, much like the claim here, was that they were
entitled to use or have access to a common area. See West Wood Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho 75,
83, 106 P.3d 401,409 (2005) ("the interest asserted by the Owners [that they had a right to use a
common area] was an equitable interest ... "). This is significant because a primary argument
asserted by the HOA is that the Lees claims are precluded because they assert an affirmative
right to use property instead of a negative restrictive covenant. See Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment Memo., pp.5-6 (The Lees are not seeking to limit Willow Creek's use of
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Kemp Road (which would be a restrictive covenant). Rather, they are seeking a right of use over
Kemp Road (which is an affirmative easement). Because the Lees are not seeking a restrictive
covenant, which may be created by conduct, but rather they are seeking an affirmative right to
use the land of Willow Creek, in order to prevail at trial they must provide a written agreement
complying with the statute of frauds.)
Again, to be clear, the plaintiffs in West Wood were asserting an affirmative right to use a
common area, just as here, the Lees are asserting the existence of an affirmative right to access
and use Kemp Lane. The basis for that right is an agreement, the 1997 Agreement, of which, the
Lees claim the HOA had actual and constructive notice.
This is inconsistent with what the Idaho Supreme Court recognized in West Wood. The
Lees' appreciate that other jurisdictions and the common law may make a different distinctionhowever, this is clearly not the law in Idaho. Indeed, notwithstanding the long legal treatise
provided by the HOA regarding the development of equitable servitudes, it cannot and has not
identified any case that precludes this Court from recognizing the Lees' equitable interest in the
enforcement of an agreement regarding a right to use land, of which the HOA had actual and
constructive notice.
The HOA also claims that the equitable interest claimed by the Lees is precluded by their
assertion that there is no "common grantor of the properties at issue .... " Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, p.15-16 ("The Lees have no evidence that they purchased a lot in a planned
unit development from the Kemp Family Trust (or that there is some other common grantor of
property) and they are not contending they have a right to impose negative restrictions on the use
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of Kemp Road.). Again, the HOA attempts to impose a test and a limitation that is not adopted
in Idaho. Clearly, a "planned unit development" can be the basis for imposing an equitable
interest in that it can be enforced based on actual or constructive notice. However, so can other
equitable circumstances. Indeed, the limitation suggested by the HOA would clearly cut against
the "equitable" nature of an "equitable" remedy and is contrary to the broad directives of the
Idaho Supreme Court. As explained by the high court in West Wood, "[e]quitable interests may
arise because of the actions of the parties" even including "oral representations." West Wood
Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 84, 106 P.3d at 410. Clearly, if this is the case, the Idaho

Supreme is not limiting "equitable interests" to only equitable interests that develop from
circumstances involving "planned unit development"--this would eliminate the concept of an
equitable remedy all together.
In sum, the Lees submit that they have an equitable interest created by the 1997
Agreement and the partial performance of that agreement. There is no case law in Idaho that
precludes this claim as a matter of law. Indeed, it is just the opposite. Idaho law recognizes that
equitable interest can be created, not just by a written document, but by the conduct and even
oral representations of parties. Accordingly, here, there is no basis for the HOA's demand for
summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Lees respectfully request that the Court deny Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. The uncontroverted partial performance of the 1997 Agreement
preclude the statute of frauds as a basis for concluding that the 1997 Agreement is invalid as
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argued by the HOA. Furthermore, there is no accepted Idaho law that precludes this Court from
determining that the Lees have an equitable interest in the enforcement of the 1997 Agreement.
DATED: July 21, 2017.
SIBWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV 16-3425
Plaintiffs,
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR
ALTERNATIVELY PARTIAL
SUMMERY JUDGMENT ON ISSUE OF
PARTIAL PERFORMANCE

vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation; and DOES I - X, inclusive,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, Dale and Kathi Lee (collectively "Lees"), by and through their attorneys of
record, Stewart Taylor & Morris PLLC, hereby move this Court for summary judgment under
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) finding in Lees' favor and declaring pursuant to the relief
requested in the Complaint that certain real property owned by the Willow Creek Ranch Estates
No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc. is subject to valid encumbrances, conditions,
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servitudes and/or restrictions that allow the Lees to utilize already defined and improved access
points to their adjoining real property.
Alternatively, to the extent issues of act remain regarding notice of encumbrances,
conditions, servitudes and/or restrictions, the Lees would request partial summary judgment on
the issue of whether the Agreement for Sale of Real Property (referred to in the briefing as "1997
Agreement" or "Agreement") was partially performed.
This motion is based upon the supporting memorandum, pnor declarations and an
affidavit filed concurrently herewith as well as all pleadings and other papers on file in this
action, and such other matters as may be presented to the Court at the time of the hearing.
DATED: July 21, 2017.
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
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Telephone: (208) 345-3333
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,

Case No. CV 16-3425

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR
ALTERNATIVELY PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ISSUE OF
PARTIAL PERFORMANCE

vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and DOES I -X, inclusive,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, Dale and Kathi Lee (collectively "Lees"), by and through their attorneys of
record, submit this brief in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and
Alternatively Partial Summary Judgment On Issue Of Partial Performance.
INTRODUCTION
The legal issue here is simple--whether this Court can rule, as a matter of law, that Kemp
Road is encumbered by an agreement that has been partially performed and that Willow Creek

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT- I

160

..

------------

•

•

Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc. ("HOA" or "Willow Creek
HOA") had both actual and construction knowledge. Alternatively, to the extent that this Court
determines that the issue of actual or constructive knowledge is a disputed fact, the Lees would
submit that they are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of that the agreement at issue was
partially performed. 1
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

In the summer of 1997, Dale Lee was approached by the Kemps about a possible

real estate transaction. See June 17, 2016 Declaration of Dale Lee ("Lee Deel."),~ 2.
2.

The Kemps and the Lees both owned real property north of Purple Sage Road in

Middleton, Idaho. See Lee Deel., Ex. A (Exhibit A is a map of the property reflecting ownership
of the land in 1997).
3.

To develop the "Kemp property" the Kemps needed approximately 1.8 acres of

real property owned by the Lees. The Lees were willing to sell them the 1.8 acres needed, but
required as a condition of that sale, that they be given access to the road constructed by the
Kemps on the Kemps property. See Lee Deel.,~ 4.
4.

Significantly, the real estate agent involved in the transaction was Alan Mills. See

Lee Deel.,~ 5; see also June 14, 2015 Declaration of Alan Mills ("Mills Deel."), Exhibit A.
1 The Lees appreciate that the HOA is trying to comer them into an "equitable servitude or
nothing" position. However, this is inconsistent with the pleadings and the Lee's briefing to the
Court. The Complaint clearly requests that the "equitable servitudes, conditions and restrictions
allowing for access by the Lees as set forth in the Sale Agreement" be enforced. See Complaint,
Prayer for Relief, ~1; see also Plaintiffs' Pre-Trial Statement, p.1 ("this issue is simply whether
certain land, a roa_d way, is encumbered either by an express easement or an equitable
servitude."). This issue is more fully addressed in the Lees' Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary judgment and is incorporated herein by reference.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-2

161

5.

That road referenced above, presently known as Kemp Road, runs along the south

border of the Kemp property ("Kemp Road"). See Lee Deel., ,r 6.
6.

The Lees conditioned the sale of their 1.8 acre parcel on access to Kemp Road.

See Lee Deel., ,r 7.

7.

On June 1, 1997, the Lees and the Kemps executed an Agreement for Sale of Real

Property ("1997 Agreement" or "Agreement"). See Lee Deel., Exhibit B.
8.

In the 1997Agreement the Lees agreed to sell to the Kemps the 1.8 acres of real

property that the Kemps needed to develop their property into the present day subdivision and
the Lees were given access to Kemp Road. Id.
9.

The 1997 Agreement also explained that the Kemps and the Lees were planning

- future development of their adjoining properties--both the Kemp property and the Lee property.
Id.

10.

Recognizing future development by the Lees, the 1997 Agreement expressly gave

the Lees three access points to the road:
Seller [Lees] shall also be entitled to 3 driveway access from the gravel road
[Kemp Road] to be constructed by Buyer [Kemps] adjoining Seller's [Lees']
property. Such access shall be constructed at Seller's [Lees'] cost and subject to
Seller [Lees] obtaining any necessary governmental approvals.
Id.

11.

Accordingly, the Lees sold the Kemps the property and the Kemps began

developing the subdivision that is now Willow Creek Ranch Estates #2. See Lee Deel., ,r 12.
12.

In 1999, Richard Horn, who purchased Lot 2 of Block 1 in the Willow Creek

Ranch Estates #2 subdivision, was made aware of the agreement between the Kemp Family
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Trust and the Lees that gave the Lees the right to access Kemp Road from their property. See
July 12, 2017 Affidavit of Richard Hom, 13 ("Hom Aff.").
13.

Mr. Hom was made aware of the Agreement at the closing of his purchase of his

14.

In 2000, at the time that Kemp Road was asphalted, consistent with and in

lot. Id.

performance of the 1997 Agreement, three driveway access points were constructed giving the
Lees' property adjacent to Kemp Road three access points to Kemp Road. See Lee Deel., 113.
16.

The construction of the access points constituted partial performance of the

Agreement.
17.

This construction included the creation of three access points, including twenty-

four foot culverts, and gravel extending from Kemp Road to the Lees' property. Around that
same time, wood fencing and metal gates corresponding to the three access points, were
constructed along the property giving the Lees' property clear and obvious access to Kemp
Road. See Lee Deel., 1 14, Exhibit C.
16.

One of the access points constructed was on the edge of the lot purchased by Mr.

Hom. See Hom Aff., 16.
17.

According to Mr. Hom, a member of the HOA, because of the gates, it was

obvious to him and to the other HOA members living in the subdivision, that the Lees accessed
their property through Kemp Road. See Hom Aff., 17 ("It was obvious to me and anyone living
in the subdivision, that the Lees accessed their property from Kemp Road.").
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18.

In 2005, as part of the continued development of the Willow Creek Ranch Estates,

the Kemps transferred Kemp Road to the HOA as a common area owned by the HOA. See Lee
Deel., Exhibit D (LEE00l0) ("The Trust was the developer of Willow Creek Ranch Estates. The
Kemps transferred Kemp Lane to the HOA as part of the common area owned by the
Association.").
19.

Significantly, the "Warranty Deed" provided to the HOA from the Kemps, did not

convey Kemp Road free from all encumbrances, but rather excepted from the conveyance "all
existing easements and rights-of-ways of record or implied." See August 4, 2016 Affidavit of
Matthew C. Parks in Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Aug. 4, 2016 Parks Aff."), Exhibit D.
19.

From its inception until 2005 the HOA and the board of directions for the HOA

was primarily controlled by the Kemps. See Mills Deel., Exhibit A.
20.

Mary Kemp, trustee of the Kemps, and Alan Mills, the Kemps' real estate agent,

served as the initial board members for the HOA. Mr. Mills served as president. Id.
21.

Alan Mills has admitted that he had knowledge of the Kemps' agreement to

provide access points along Kemp Road to the Lees. Id.
22.

On or about June 11, 2015, Alan Mills, the former real estate agent for the Kemps

and a former member of the HOA board of directors at the time the Kemps transferred Kemp
Road to the HOA, provided a letter wherein he stated:
During the development of the Willow Creek Subdivision, I served as one of the
initial board of directors for the Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2, Subdivision
Homeowner's Association Inc. (the "HOA") along with Mary Kemp, the trustee
for the Kemp Family Trust. As the developer of the Subdivision and who also
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controlled the HOA, the Kemp Family Trust paid to have the three driveway
access constructed just as the parties agreed to do in the Agreement For Sale of
Property. As a former HOA board member, I can say with a high degree of
certainty that the HOA at the time was aware of the Agreement and its terms
regarding the three driveway access.
See Mills Deel., Exhibit A; see also Lee Deel., Exhibit D (emphasis added).

23.

Thus, at the time that Kemp Road was transferred to the Willow Creek HOA in

2005, the Willow Creek HOA Board of Directors had actual knowledge of the Agreement,
including the Kemps' agreement to provide the Lees the three access points. See Lee Deel., ,r 20.
24.

Furthermore, due to the construction of the three access points, including culvert

construction, gravel work, fencing and gates (i.e., the partial performance of the Agreement), the
HOA and its members had constructive notice of an agreement whereby the Lees could use
Kemp Road to access their property through those three access points.
LEGAL STANDARD
The legal standard is not in dispute.

Summary judgment shall be granted if the

"pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." See Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). A nonmoving party's failure to make a
. showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, on which
the party bears the burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment in favor of
the moving party. See Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 955-56, 842 P.2d 288, 291-92 (Ct. App.
1992).
Here, the Lees are entitled to suinmary judgment on their claims. The statement of
undisputed facts is incontrovertible. Furthermore, as set forth below, the legal doctrines are
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sound and, as applied to the incontrovertible facts, justify summary judgment in favor of the
Lees.
DISCUSSION
The Lees are entitled to summary judgment for two reasons. First, the 1997 Agreement
(after it was partially performed) became an enforceable agreement regardless of the statute of
frauds issues that have been proffered by the HOA. Furthermore, the 1997 Agreement was
enforceable as to the HOA because it is uncontroverted fact that the HOA Board had knowledge
of the 1997 Agreement and of its performance--i. e., the construction of the three access points.
The HOA ignores the above-presented statements of undisputed facts. It is incontrovertible that
the access points were constructed. This is not controverted and at no time has been disputed by
the HOA. Moreover, a former member of the HOA board of directors, Mr. Mills, has testified
with a high degree of certainty that the HOA board of directors knew of the 1997 Agreement.
Again, this is an uncontroverted fact.

Also, even if the 1997 Agreement is not somehow

unenforceable in law as a partially performed easement agreement, there can be little doubt that
acts of the parties created an equitable interest that under Idaho law is enforceable.
Alternatively, the Lees would submit that if the question of notice constitutes a question
of fact that precludes summary judgment as to the enforceability of the 1997 Agreement in law
or in equity, the Lees at the very least are entitled to partial summary judgment as to the question
of whether the 1997 Agreement has been partially performed.
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The Agreement Constitutes An Enforceable Easement Because The 1997 Agreement
Was Partially Performed And Because Willow Creek HOA Had Actual And Constructive
Notice Of The Agreement
Here, there is no factual basis to dispute that there was an agreement between the Lees

and the Kemp Family Trust to allow the Lees to access their property via Kemp Lane. This is
reflected in Mr. Lee and Mr. Mills' declaration as well as the affidavit of former HOA member
Richard Horn. See Mills Deel., Ex. A ("As part of that agreement the Kemp Family Trust agreed
to provide 3 driveway accesses from a gravel road. That gravel road in now known as Kemp
Road runs through Phase 2 of the Willow Creek Subdivision."); Lee Deel., ifl 1 ("The Agreement
also made clear that the Kemps agreed to give us, the Lees, access to the road .... "); Horn Aff., if3
("At the closing of our purchase of the lot, I became aware of an easement agreement between
the Kemp Family Trust and the Lees that gave the Lees the right to access their property from
Kemp Road.").
Indeed, the only basis the HOA takes with regard to the 1997 Agreement is that it
"cannot grant the Lees an easement" as a matter of law "since the 1997 Agreement is not signed
by the Kemp Family Trust and contains no legal descriptions of any property" and consequently,
does "not comply with the statute of frauds."

See HOA's Memorandum in Support of

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p.3.
The HOA fails to appreciate Idaho Code § 9-504. Section 9-504 provides that the statute
of frauds "must not be construed to ... abridge the power of any court to compel the specific
performance of an agreement, in case of part performance thereof." See Hoke v. Neyada, Inc.,
161 Idaho 450, 387 P.3d 118, 121 (2016), reh'g denied (Jan. 23, 2017) (citing Idaho Code§ 9504).

As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hoke, "[u]nder the doctrine of part
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performance, when an agreement to convey real property fails to meet the requirements of the
State of Frauds, the agreement may nevertheless be specifically enforced" if the agreement is
partially performed. Here, consistent with the directives in Hoke, it is incontrovertible fact that
the 1997 Agreement has been partially performed. And, admittedly, the 1997 Agreement has
statute of frauds issues.
However, as explained by the Idaho high court, statute of fraud issues, such as an
inadequate property description, could be remedied so long as the "[a]cts constituting part
performance" were "specifically referable to the alleged agreement." Id. (citing Simons v.
Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 827, 11 P.3d 20, 23 (2000). Thus, here, where there may be statute of

fraud issues, but where there is also no dispute that the terms of the 1997 Agreement were
partially performed--this Court can rule as a matter of law that the 1997 Agreement is
enforceable and valid.
Accordingly, because the Agreement is valid, to the extent that the HOA took the land
"with notice, actual or constructive" the HOA is subject to the encumbrance. Thus, here, the
only factual question is whether Willow Creek HOA had notice, actual or constructive, of the
existing easement. And, as admitted by Allan Mills, the HOA had actual notice of the 1997
Agreement.
As a former HOA board member, I can say with a high degree of certainty that
the HOA at the time was aware of the Agreement and its terms regarding the three
driveway access.
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See Mills Deel., Exhibit A (emphasis added). To be clear, there is no qualification on this sworn

statement--the HOA was aware of the 1997 Agreement.2 And, significantly, the HOA has
proffered no testimony or affidavit that contradicts Mr. Mills statement--again, the statement of a
former "HOA board member" that the HOA was aware of the 1997 Agreement. Indeed, the
HOA did not even depose Mr. Mills. Accordingly, regardless of whether the encumbrance or
interest was recorded, the 1997 Agreement is enforceable against the HOA as a matter of law
because the HOA had actual notice of the 1997 Agreement. See Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho
715, 152 P.2d 585, 587 (1944) (emphasis added) ("It is well-established law that "[o]ne who
purchases land expressly subject to an easement, or with notice, actual or constructive, that it is
burdened with an existing easement, takes the land subject to the easement.") (Emphasis added.).

Here, the only evidence in the record establishes that at the time of the transfer of the
property from the Kemps to the HOA in 2005, that the HOA already had knowledge of the 1997
Agreement.
In addition to having "actual" knowledge of the 1997 Agreement, it is also
incontrovertible fact that the HOA had constructive knowledge of the 1997 Agreement. Again,
to state the obvious, the 1997 Agreement was performed (at least in part). The access points
were created and the Lees were provided access. This performance constitutes "constructive"
notice that the agreement existed and, accordingly, that the HOA was not some "bona fide
Lees certainly appreciate that the HOA is arguing that regardless of the HOA's knowledge
of the agreement at the time the HOA was initially created in 1999 and 2000, that the HOA
Board at the time of the transfer in 2005 was no longer aware. While the Lees' appreciate this
argument, there is no law supporting the novel argument that ~ organization once it obtains
actual knowledge of an agreement, can somehow operationally loose that knowledge, and then
escape the consequence resulting from that knowledge.
2 The
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purchaser" that unknowingly purchased property without knowledge that the Lees had access to
Kemp Road.
II.

The Conduct Of The Parties Creates An Equitable Servitude And/Or Interest That Allows
The Lees To Enforce The 1997 Agreement
Even if there was no enforceable easement, the incontrovertible facts establish an

equitable interest that provides the Lees with legal and enforceable access. 3 Significantly, that
interest arises "by implication from the language of the deeds or the conduct of the parties." See

Birdwood Subdivision Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Bulotti Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 17, 23, 175
P.3d 179, 185 (2007) (quoting 20 Am.Jur.2d, Covenants, Etc., § 155 (2005) (an equitable
servitude arises "by implication from the language of the deeds or the conduct of the parties.");

see also Idaho Power Co. v. State, By & Through Dep't of Water Res., 104 Idaho 575, 587, 661
P.2d 741, 753 (1983) ("restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes" relate to "[a]greements
not to assert ownership rights.").
It is important to note that Idaho's approach to "equitable servitudes" or "equitable
interests" is unique. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court permits an equitable servitude to be
created "because of the actions of the parties, such as oral representations."

West Wood

Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 84, 106 P.3d 401, 410 (2005). Consequently, Idaho is
one of the few states that allows for the creation of equitable servitudes without a written
agreement.

The HOA fails to appreciate Idaho's unique approach to equitable interests in real

The Lees' are responding in part to the arguments the HOA is making in its Motion for
Summary Judgment, wherein it contends that the Lees arguments regarding "equitable
servitudes" are. precluded as a matter of law. Accordingly, much of the arguments asserted
herein are also contained in the Lees' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

3
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property and has attempted to persuade this Court to apply a more narrow doctrine to "equitable
servitudes" than has been adopted in Idaho courts. The West Wood case illustrates Idaho's
unique approach to equitable interests and why the HOA's arguments do not prevent this Court
from deciding as a matter of Idaho law, based on the undisputed facts, that the Lees are entitled
to summary judgment.
In West Wood the plaintiffs were a group of owners and associations that asserted an
equitable interest in certain real property--the claim, much like the claim here, was that they were
entitled to use or have access to a common area. See West Wood Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho 75,
83, 106 P.3d 401, 409 (2005) ("the interest asserted by the Owners [that they had a right to use a
common area] was an equitable interest ... "). This is significant because a primary argument
asserted by the HOA is that the Lees claims are precluded because they assert an affirmative
right to use property instead of a negative restrictive covenant.
The Lees are not seeking to limit Willow Creek's use of Kemp Road (which
would be a restrictive covenant). Rather, they are seeking a right of use over
Kemp Road (which is an affirmative easement). Because the Lees are not seeking
a restrictive covenant, which may be created by conduct, but rather they are
seeking an affirmative right to use the land of Willow Creek, in order to prevail at
trial they must provide a written agreement complying with the statute of frauds.
See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Memo., pp.5-6.

This argument 1s

wrong. Again, to be clear, the plaintiffs in West Wood were asserting an affirmative right to use
a common area, just as here, the Lees are asserting the existence of an affirmative right to access
and use Kemp Lane. The basis for that right is an agreement, the 1997 Agreement, of which, the
Lees claim the HOA had actual and constructive notice.
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As set forth in the Lees' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Lees' appreciate that other jurisdictions and the common law may make
a different distinction--however, this is clearly not the law in Idaho. Indeed, notwithstanding the
long legal treatise provided by the HOA regarding the development of equitable servitudes, it
cannot and has not identified any Idaho case that precludes this Court from recognizing the Lees'
equitable interest in the enforcement of an agreement regarding a right to use land, of which the
HOA had actual and constructive notice.
The HOA also claims that the equitable interest claimed by the Lees is precluded by their
assertion that there is no "common grantor of the properties at issue .... " See Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment, p.15-16 ("The Lees have no evidence that they purchased a lot in a
planned unit development from the Kemp Family Trust (or that there is some other common
grantor of property) and they are not contending they have a right to impose negative restrictions
on the use of Kemp Road.). Again, the HOA attempts to impose a test and a limitation that is not
adopted in Idaho. Clearly, a "planned unit development" can be the basis for imposing an
equitable interest in that it can be enforced based on actual or constructive notice. However, so
can other equitable circumstances. Indeed, the limitation suggested by the HOA would clearly
cut against the "equitable" nature of an "equitable" remedy and is contrary to the broad
directives of the Idaho Supreme Court.

As explained by the high court in West Wood,

"[e]quitable interests may arise because of the actions of the parties" even including "oral
representations." West Wood Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 84, 106 P.3d at 410. Clearly, if this
is the case, the Idaho Supreme is not limiting "equitable interests" to only equitable interests that
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develop from circumstances involving "planned unit development"--this would eliminate the
concept of an equitable remedy all together.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Lees respectfully request that the Court grant summary
judgment finding that Kemp Road, owned by the Willow Creek HOA, is subject to an easement
or servitude that allows the Lees to move forward with their designs to utilize the three access
points already designated and improved. Alternatively, to the extent this Court determines that
there are issues of fact regarding notice of the 1997 Agreement, that this Court find that the 1997
Agreement has been partially performed.
DATED: July 21, 2017.
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 21, 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

D
D

Christ T. Troupis
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801 E. State Street, Ste. 50
P.O. Box 2408
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D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
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Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch
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Association, Inc.

D
D

Matthew C. Parks
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
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Association, Inc.
Honorable Christopher S. Nye
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
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Daniel W. Bower, ISB #7204
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone: (208) 345-3333
Fax No.: (208) 345-4461
dbower@snn-law.com

M MARTINEZ, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD HORN

(!)JJlo-3¥dJ5

Plaintiffs,
vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and DOES I -X, inclusive,
Defendants.

STATEOFIDAHO )
County of Canyon

)

RICHARD HORN, declare and state as follows and under penalty of perjury pursuant to
the laws of the state of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct:
1)

I am over the age of eighteen (18) and make this affidavit of my own personal
knowledge and belief.
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I

2)

In the spring of 1999, my wife and I purchased Lot 2 of Block 1 in the Willow Creek
Subdivision accessed by Kemp Road from the Kemp Family Trust.

3)

At the closing of our purchase of the lot, I became aware of an easement agreement
between the Kemp Family Trust and the Lees that gave the Lees the right to access
their property from Kemp Road.

4)

We subsequently constructed a home on the lot and moved into the home in August
of 2000.

5)

Before Kemp Road was asphalted, three access points were created giving the Lees
access to Kemp Road.

6)

One of the access points was at the edge of our lot.

7)

At each access point there was a metal gate. It was obvious to me and anyone living
in the subdivision, that the Lees accessed their property from Kemp Road.

8)

On March 28, 2005, the Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Homeowners'
Association, Inc. ("HOA") was created and I became a member of the HOA and paid
dues and fees as a member of the HOA.

9)

I remained a member of the member of the HOA until I sold my residence and
moved.

10)

My understanding was that when the Lees subdivided their property and used the
three access points constructed to access their lots, that they would impose the same
or similar covenants, conditions and restrictions, as could have been enforced by the
HOA.
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FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 13th day of July, 2017.

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD HORN - 3

177

·-

-

-

•
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 21, 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Christ T. Troupis
P.A.
801 E. State Street, Ste. 50
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

TR0UPIS LAW OFFICE,

D
D
!ZI

~

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

D
D
IZI
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
Email: mcp@elamburke.com

D
D
D
IZI

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile:
Email: acahill@canyonco.org
Clerk Copy

Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch
Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners'
Association, Inc.
Matthew C. Parks
P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
ELAM & BURKE,

Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch
Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners'
Association, Inc.
Honorable Christopher S. Nye
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605
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Matthew C. Parks, ISB #7419
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83 70 I
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
mcp@elamburke.com
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L-t-( f)iPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates
No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

DALE LEE and KA THI LEE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV-16-3425*C
Plaintiffs,
WILLOW CREEK RANCH
ESTATES MOTION TO AMEND
ANSWER

vs.

WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES NO.
2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation;
and DOES I-X, inclusive,
Defendants.

Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association,
Inc. ("Willow Creek"), submits this Motion to amend its answer. Willow Creek seeks to amend
its answer to include affirmative defenses based on the failure to comply with the statute of
frauds, that the cause of action asserted by the Plaintiffs are bared by the applicable statute of
limitations, and that the members of Willow Creek are bona fide purchasers for value of their
respective interests in the common areas of the subdivision, including Kemp Road.
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Rule 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend a pleading
before trial should be freely given when justice so requires. It is well settled that, in the interests
of justice, courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend.

Wickstrom v. North Idaho

College, 111 Idaho 450, 453, 725 P .2d 155 (1986) (citations omitted).
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the
allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the
leave sought should, as the rules require, 'be freely given.' Of
course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the
discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the
leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not
an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and
inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.

PHH Mortgage v. Nickerson, 160 Idaho 388, 395-96, 374 P.3d 551, 558-59 (2016) reh'g denied
(citations omitted).
The court has liberal authority to grant leave to amend and
permission to do so "shall be freely given when justice so
· requires .... " I.R.C.P. 15(a). See Wickstrom v. Northern Idaho
College, 111 Idaho 450, 453, 725 P.2d 155, 158 (1986). For
example, in Kugler v. N. W. Aviation, Inc., 108 Idaho 884, 886--67,
702 P.2d 922, 92~5 (Ct.App.1985), our Court of Appeals held
the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing an
amendment of an Answer to assert a statute of limitations defense,
even though the motion was not made until one week before trial.

Westv. El Paso Prod Co., 122 Idaho 133,135,832 P.2d 306,308 (1992)
The Lees will not be prejudiced or delayed by the proposed amendments. With respect to
the statute of frauds, Plaintiffs and Defendant have submitted numerous briefs on this issue.
With respect to the affirmative defense based on the expiration of the statute of limitations for
causes of action based on a written contract, Willow Creek's initial answer asserted a defense of
laches based on the delay of the Plaintiffs to bring their cause of action seeking relief in the form
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of an equitable servitude.

Plaintiffs now assert they are entitled to an order of the Court

compelling Willow Creek to grant Plaintiffs an easement. This relief is distinct from the relief
sought by the Plaintiffs in that it is an action based on a written contract and governed by a
different statute of limitations than the relief sought by the Plaintiffs in their Complaint.
Moreover, the Plaintiffs cannot claim surprise or prejudice with respect to the statute of
limitations affirmative defense when the initial answer included an affirmative defense of laches,
putting Plaintiffs on notice that their delay in bringing this lawsuit would be an issue at trial.
Therefore, in the interest of justice, Willow Creek should be permitted to amend its answer to
include an affirmative defense to the Plaintiffs' request for specific performance.
In the interest of justice, Willow Creek requests the Court permit it to amend its answer
to include affirmative defenses to causes of action and for relief not readily apparent in
reviewing Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Plaintiffs had not indicated until filing their motion for summary judgment on July 21,
2017, that they sought specific performance as relief from this Court.

In their Complaint,

Plaintiffs had only requested a declaratory ruling that they were entitled to an equitable
servitude. In prior pleadings, including Plaintiffs' prior motion for summary judgment, Willow
Creek raised the defense of the statute of frauds and Plaintiffs failed to respond with any
argument concerning why the statute of frauds did not apply.

Likewise, Plaintiffs did not

articulate their desire for specific performance in their Pre-trial Statement.
With respect to the affirmative defense based on the status of the members of Willow
Creek as bona fide purchasers for value, Willow Creek raised as an affirmative defense in the
Answer that, "Plaintiffs did not record the sale agreement, or otherwise provide any prior notice
to the members of Willow Creek HOA who purchased and improved residential lots in the
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subdivision, ignorant of the undisclosed claims of the Plaintiffs, and in reliance upon the existing
state of the disclosed title to their respective lots and the common areas, including Kemp Road."
Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Complaint, p. 2. Although this affirmative defense was
combined with the affirmative defense of laches as the Third Affirmative Defense, Plaintiffs
were still on notice that Willow Creek would be asserting a defense based on the residents of the
subdivision not having notice of the alleged access rights when they purchased their lots and
accompanying interest in Kemp Road. In other words, that residents are bona fide purchasers for
value. Willow Creek seeks to clarify the affirmative defense to avoid any disputes at trial on the
assertion of the bona fide purchaser affirmative defense.
Additionally, the Lees have a letter from Willow Creek's attorney to the Board
identifying the bona fide purchaser defense as a legal defense to the Lees' claims.

See

Declaration of Dale Lee, filed June 17, 2016, Exhibit D.
No undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of Defendants being present,
and there being facts which support the requested amendments, Defendants should be granted
leave to file their proposed Amended Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in the interests of justice
so that full and complete relief can be had.
Willow Creek requests permission to amend its Answer to the Complaint to include the
following affirmative defenses:
Statute of Limitations. Plaintiffs' cause of action is
barred because it was not filed within the applicable time frame set
forth in the statute of limitations, Idaho Code§ 5-216, which bars
any claims for relief, including but not limited to specific
performance, based upon breach of a written agreement that are
not filed within 5 years of the accrual of the cause of action.
Statute of Frauds. Plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by
the statute of frauds as the purported grant of access rights was not
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made in a written agreement that satisfied the requirements of
Idaho Code § 9-503.
Bona Fide Purchaser for Value. Plaintiffs did not record
the sale agreement, or otherwise provide any prior notice to the
members of Willow Creek HOA who purchased and improved
residential lots in the subdivision for value, ignorant of the
undisclosed claims of the Plaintiffs, and in reliance upon the
existing state of the disclosed title to their respective lots and the
common areas, including Kemp Road. Plaintiffs' claims are
therefore barred by Idaho Code§ 55-812.

V.

CONCLUSION

Willow Creek respectfully requests the Court grant permission to file an amended answer
to include the affirmative defenses set forth above.
A separate Memorandum in support of the motion will not be filed.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS NOT REQUESTED.
DATED this

3

day of August, 2017.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:

~4v~

Matthew C. Parks, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the___!_ day of May, 2017, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Daniel W. Bower
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS, PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83713

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] pderal Express
['1"Via Facsimile 345-4461

Honorable Christopher S. Nye
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany St
Caldwell, ID 83605

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Facsimile
[-1"Email clerk copy acahill@canyonco.org

Matthew C. Parks
4839-1923-8728,v.2
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Matthew C. Parks, ISB #7419
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
mcp@elamburke.com
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Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates
No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV-16-3425*C
Plaintiffs,
vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES NO.
2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation;
and DOES I - X, inclusive,

WILLOW CREEK RANCH
ESTATES OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association,
Inc. ("Willow Creek"), submits this Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Willow Creek requests the Court deny .Plaintiffs (the "Lees") motion for summary judgment and
enter a finding that the Lees do not have an enforceable easement or equitable servitude over the
property in dispute in this case, Kemp Road and enter summary judgment dismissing the
Complaint.
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I.

SUMMARY OF OPPOSITION

The Court should enter summary judgment against the Lees because (1) they have not
established the requisite facts to establish they are entitled to an equitable servitude, (2) their
claims for an express easement are barred by the statute of frauds, and (3) the Lees have not
requested specific performance in their Complaint, (4) any claim for specific performance would
be barred by the statute of limitations, (5) any claim for specific performance is barred by the
doctrine of laches, (6) the Lees have not established sufficient part performance of the 1997
Agreement to escape the statute of frauds, and (7) the 1997 Agreement is an unenforceable
agreement to agree. 1
II.

REPLY ARGUMENTS

A.
The Lees have failed to demonstrate an absence of material fact concerning Willow
Creek's knowledge of the 1997 Agreement at the time Kemp Road was transferred to
Willow Creek
Willow Creek disagrees that it had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the 1997
Agreement when Kemp Road was transferred to in in 2005 .. The Lees only evidence in support
of the claim Willow Creek had actual knowledge of the 1997 Agreement fails to establish the
absence of a question of fact concerning this point. According to the Lees, because Alan Mills,
the real estate agent for the Kemp Family Trust, knew about the 1997 Agreement and Mills
initially served as a board member of Willow Creek, the knowledge of the Kemp Family Trust is
imputed to Willow Creek. But, the Lees failed to offer any evidence that Mills acquired any

1 The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment. Many of these grounds for denying the Lees' motion
for summary judgment are articulated in the pleadings Willow Creek submitted in support of its motion for summary
judgment, its motion in limine, and prior opposition briefing on the Lees previously denied motion for summary
judgment. The arguments in the pleadings filed by Willow Creek in support of its motion for summary judgment
and its motions in limine are incorporated herein as if set forth in full, specifically but not limited to Willow Creek
Ranch Estates Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed concurrently
herewith.
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knowledge of the 1997 Agreement in his capacity as a board member of the association, which
is required in order to impute such knowledge to Willow Creek. See Mason v. Tucker &
Associates, 125 Idaho 429,433, 871 P.2d 846, 850 (Ct. App. 1994) ("Knowledge acquired by an

agent during the course of the agency relationship, and while the agent is not acting in an
interest adverse to that of the principal, is imputed to the principal; and notice to an agent
constitutes notice to the principal.") (emphasis added).
In order to impute the knowledge of a board member to its principal organization, the
board member must have gained the knowledge in his or her official capacity. See Sulik v. Cent.
Valley Farms, Inc., 95 Idaho 826, 828, 521 P.2d 144, 146 (1974). In other words, the Lees must

demonstrate that Alan Mills received the knowledge of the 1997 Agreement in his capacity as a
board member of the association. The record contains no such evidence. While not exactly
clear, it can be assumed that Mills learned about the 1997 Agreement at the time it was executed,
as he writes in his letter that he "was the real estate agent for the Kemp Family Trust .... "
Declaration of Alan Mills, Ex. A. Mills learned about the 1997 Agreement while acting in his
capacity as the agent of the Kemp Family Trust, not Willow Creek. Willow Creek did not exist
when the 1997 Agreement was executed. See Affidavit of Matthew Parks, filed August 4, 2016,
Ex. E (Willow Creek Articles of Incorporation).
The knowledge of realtor Alan Mills cannot be imputed to Willow Creek. The record
contains no evidence to support a finding that the knowledge of Mills (or Mary Kemp) can be
imputed to Willow Creek. Mills may have known about the 1997 Agreement, but there is no
evidence in the record that Willow Creek, in 2005, when the Kemp Family Trust transferred
Kemp Road to Willow Creek, knew about the 1997 Agreement. When the road was transferred
to Willow Cre_ek, Mills was no longer on the board. The same argument applies with respect to
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
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Mary Kemp, the trustee of the Kemp Family Trust, who, according to Mills, also served as an
initial board member of Willow Creek. First, Mary Kemp has not submitted any affidavit or
statement, so any reliance on the allegation that Mary Kemp knew about the 1997 Agreement
and her knowledge may be imputed to Willow Creek fails for lack of evidentiary support. But,
in any event the argument would fail because Mary Kemp learned of the 1997 Agreement in her
capacity as the trustee of the Kemp Family Trust at the time of the execution of the 1997
Agreement.
As a matter of public policy, the Court should not impute the knowledge of the initial
board members to the subsequent innocent home buyers in the subdivision. The initial board
members were acting in their own interests while serving on the board, as they were developing
the land and hoping to make a profit. The developer never told the purchasers about the alleged
agreement to provide access to the Lees. Innocent people purchased the lots in the subdivisions
to construct homes without any knowledge of the 1997 Agreement and thus are bona fide
purchasers for value of their respective interests in the common areas of the subdivision,
including Kemp Road. The law and the equities favor not forcing these innocent home owners
who own homes within the Willow Creek subdivision to open up the private road they maintain
for the Lees. The Lees neglected to include the easement or servitude in the deed. The Kemp
Family Trust neglected to include the easements in the plat for the Willow Creek subdivision or
mention the alleged covenant in the declarations for the subdivision. These failures by the Lees
and the Kemp Family Trust should not result in an adverse ruling against innocent home owners
in the Willow Creek subdivision.
Finally, the testimony from Mills concerning what Willow Creek knew at the time of the
transfer of K~mp Road is speculative.

"A time-honored objection, speculation is generally
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understood to be "the art of theorizing about a matter as to which evidence is not sufficient for
certain knowledge." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 565, 97 P.3d 428, 432 (2004) (discussing
speculation in the context of a challenge to expert testimony) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1255 (5th ed.1979)). Our rules of evidence, specifically Rules 602 and 701,
generally do not permit speculative testimony." Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho
Transp. Dept., 142 Idaho 826136 P.3d 297 (2006). Despite Mills comment that he is reasonably

certain about the knowledge of the Board members at the time of the transfer of Kemp Road, he
provides no foundation for that statement and is speculating about what was in the minds of the
members of the Board. His testimony lacks foundation, is not based on personal knowledge, is
speculative, and should not be considered by the Court in ruling on the Lees' motion for
summary judgment.
Similarly, the statements of Richard Hom cannot satisfy the requirement that the Lees
demonstrate the members of the Board for Willow Creek knew about the 1997 Agreement and
the purported grant of any permanent access rights.

Richard Hom's testimony about the

knowledge of the members of the Board for Willow Creek should be struck and should not be
considered by the Court in ruling on the Lees' motion for summary judgment.
The records of the association contain no mention of the 1997 Agreement. Ray Tschohl,
became president of Willow Creek in 2005, and when he became president, he did not have any
knowledge of the 1997 Agreement. See Declaration of Ray Tschohl, filed August 4, 2016, ,r 1-3.
Tschohl learned the Lees claimed they had an easement over Kemp Road. Id. Tschohl searched
the records of the association and found no mention of the 1997 Agreement in any records of the
association. Id.

Willow Creek did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the 1997

Agreement.
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The Lees have also failed to demonstrate that Willow Creek had constructive knowledge
of the purported access rights.

The· Lees acknowledge they have not recorded the 1997

Agreement, which would have provided constructive notice of the alleged easement. Willow
Creek's president at the time of the transfer has stated that he was not aware of any easement
rights held by the Lees to use Kemp Road at around the time of the transfer and that the Lees
were told prior to 2006 that no easement existed for the Lees to use Kemp Road.

See

Declaration of Ray Tschol, filed concurrently here with, 14.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above in in Willow Creek's pleadings filed in support of its

pending cross-motion for summary judgment, Willow Creek respectfully requests the Court deny
the Lees' motion for summary judgment and dismiss the Lees' Complaint in its entirety with
prejudice.
DATED this

·:s

day of August, 2017.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:

JY/-J._a

Matthew C. Parks, of the firm ~
Attorneys for Defendant
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e ~ day of~, 2017, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Daniel W. Bower
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS, PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83713

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
[ ~ia Facsimile 345-4461

Honorable Christopher S. Nye
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany St
Caldwell, ID 83605

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Facsimile
[ ~mail clerk copy acahill(a)can yonco .org

Matthew C. Parks
4839-1923-8728,v.2
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Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates
No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV-16-3425*C
Plaintiffs,
vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES NO.
2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation;
and DOES I - X, inclusive,

WILLOW CREEK RANCH
ESTATES REPLY MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

Defendant Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association,
Inc. ("Willow Creek"), submits this Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Willow Creek requests the Court hold that the Plaintiffs (the "Lees") do
not have an enforceable easement or equitable servitude over the property in dispute in this case,
Kemp Road and enter summary judgment dismissing the Complaint.
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I.

SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT

The Court should enter summary judgment against the Lees because (1) they have not
established the requisite facts to establish they are entitled to an equitable servitude, (2) their
claims for an express easement are barred by the statute of frauds, and (3) the Lees have not
requested specific performance in their Complaint, (4) any claim for specific performance would
be barred by the statute of limitations, (5) any claim for specific performance is barred by the
doctrine of laches, (6) the Lees have not established sufficient part performance of the 1997
Agreement to escape the statute of frauds, and (7) the 1997 Agreement is an unenforceable
agreement to agree.
II.

A.

REPLY ARGUMENTS

The Lees are not entitled to an equitable servitude

The Lees have asked this Court to declare that they have the right to cross over Kemp
Road to access their adjacent property. The right to cross over property is an easement and is an
interest in property that is subject to the statute of frauds. The right to cross over property is not
an equitable servitude.
The Lees contend that an equitable servitude can provide access across property. See
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 12.

The Lees

characterization of the equitable servitude discussed in West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord,
141 Idaho 75, 106 P. 3d 401 (2005), as an affirmative property right is incorrect. In West Wood
(which was a planned unit development case), a developer if in a subdivision that had a common
area lot ("Lot 5") designated on the subdivision plat planned to construct a pool and a
community building on Lot 5, as noted on a recorded survey. Id. at 80-81, 106 P. 3d at 406-07.
The developer's lender foreclosed on Lot 5, but the district court held that the foreclosure did not
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impair the rights of the subdivision residents with respect to Lot 5. Id. The district court held
that the developer's successors would not be able to ignore the equitable rights of the subdivision
residents to have Lot 5 remain common area and that the residents had the exclusive use and
benefit of the common area and facilities constructed on Lot 5. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court framed the issues as follows:
This case addresses whether common area allegedly created by a
developer/mortgagor may establish an equitable interest in persons
who purchase a unit in the project, and whether such interests are
enforceable against the mortgagee's successor in interest.
Equitable enforcement of covenants restricting the use of
land was recognized in the common law of England after the
middle of the Nineteenth Century.
Id. at 82, 106 P. 3d 408 (emphasis added).
The restrictive covenant in West Wood was a restriction against developing Lot 5 for any
purpose other than as common area for the use of the subdivision residents. While the Lees
attempt to characterize this as an affirmative right, it is clear that the Idaho Supreme Court
considered the equitable servitude to be a restrictive covenant. The equitable servitude was
restriction was against removing Lot 5 from the common area of the development - it was not
affording the residents a right to use the common area. That right was not discussed in the case,
but can be presumed to arise from the subdivision plat that was recorded (as a common law
dedication) or from some other recorded document (such as the covenants, conditions, and
restrictions for the subdivision). In any event, the. West Wood decision concerns a restriction
against developing Lot 5 in a manner inconsistent with the use of Lot 5 as common area. It does
not stand for the proposition that an equitable servitude can be an affirmative right to use and
cross over another's property.
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In fact, the very case cited to by the Lees, in which they stated the concepts concerning
equitable servitudes were "well summarized" 1 by that court held as follows:
The language in the Declaration at issue here clearly creates
covenants running with the land or equitable servitudes as to lots
53, 62, 65 and 66. It creates restrictions as to the use of that land.
(4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Real Property, § 484, pp.
661-662.) It does not give the owners of the other lots in the
Beverly Highlands any interest in those lots or any right to use
those lots for their own enjoyment. Hence, it does not create any
"mutual or reciprocal easement rights appurtenant to the separate
interests" (Civ. Code,§ 1351, subd. (b)). (4 Witkin, Summary of
Cal. Law, supra,§§ 434,435, pp. 614-616.)
Comm. to Save Beverly Highlands Homes Ass'n v. Beverly Highlands Homes Ass'n, 92 Cal. App.

4th 1247, 1270, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732 (2001) (emphasis added). The California case cited by the
Lees differentiates between an easement and an equitable servitude and holds that equitable
servitudes do not provide holders of such servitudes with any interest in or right to use the
property subject to the equitable servitude. That case is consistent with the numerous cases cited
by Willow Creek, including Idaho cases, holding that equitable servitudes are not affirmative
property rights. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
pp. 5-9.
Idaho law does not provide for the creation of an affirmative property right in the same
manner as the creation of an equitable servitude. If that were the case, the statute of frauds
would never apply to the creation of easements - since (under the Lees' theory) easements and
equitable servitudes are not distinguishable and both provide an affirmative right to use the
property of another.

However, Idaho (and all other jurisdictions) recognizes a distinction

between an easement (which is an affirmative property right) and an equitable servitude (which

1 See

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,'filed June 16, 2016, p. 9 n~l.
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is a restrictive covenant).

Clearly, the Lees are seeking an easement and not an equitable

servitude. Therefore, they must demonstrate compliance with the statute of frauds and the claim
for an equitable servitude must be dismissed.
B.

Statute of Frauds
The Lees have conceded the statute of frauds applies to the transfer of an easement.

C.

Specific Performance not requested
In order to avoid the statute of frauds, the Lees argue the 1997 Agreement is enforceable

since it was partially performed. However, the Lees have never taken the position that they are
seeking specific performance of the 1997 Sale Agreement. That relief is not requested in the
Complaint and is not mentioned in the Lees Pre-trial Statement. The Lees have characterized
their theories of recovery as follows:
The Lees are entitled to the relief sought on two alternative legal
theories. First, the Agreement created an easement that is
enforceable against Willow Creek HOA regardless of whether or
not the Agreement was recorded - the Willow Creek HOA had
actual notice of the easement. Second, the Agreement, the acts of
the parties, including the initial construction of the culverts, gravel
road, wood fencing and metal gates that reflect the three access
points, create an equitable servitude that is also enforceable against
Willow Creek HOA.
Plaintiffs' Pre-trial Statement, p. 5.
The Lees also succinctly stated that the "dispute between the parties is not complicated - the
issue is simply whether certain land, a roadway, is encumbered by either an express easement2

2 Requesting the Court determine that the Lees have an express easement is not the same as requesting the Court
compel specific performance of the 1997 Agreement and require by order of the Court that Willow Creek grant the
Lees and express easement. The Lees appear to be asking the Court to compel Willow Creek to perform the
contractual obligations of the Kemp Family Trust as the successor in interest to Kemp Road. However, the Lees
have not asserted a cause of action for breach of that written agreement. As will be discussed below, the statutory
period to bring a cause of action for breach of the 1997 contract has expired. Therefore, the remedy of specific
performance of the contract is barred by the statute of limitations.
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or an equitable servitude." Id. p. 1 (emphasis added). The Lees did not make any reference to
specific performance or request that the Court specifically enforce the 1997 Agreement in their
complaint or any pleadings prior to July 21, 2017. The Lees have not move to amend their
Complaint to add a claim for specific performance. If the Lees want to request the Court compel
performance of the 1997 Agreement, the Lees need to amend their Complaint to request that
relief. However, that claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
D.

The Statute of Limitations for Specific Performance is 5 years
If the Lees were to move the Court to amend the complaint to add a claim for specific

performance, that motion would be denied because the Lees claim for specific performance is
barred by the statute of limitations. A cause of action for specific performance of a written real
estate purchase and sale agreement is a form of breach of contract and is subject to a five-year
statute of limitations. See Peterson v. Gentillon, 154 Idaho 184,189,296 P.3d 390,395 (2013)
(holding Idaho Code § 5-216 applies to claims for specific performance of a written agreement
and statute of limitations period to bring claims for specific performance of a written agreement
is 5 years). The 1997 Agreement was purportedly entered into by the Lees and the Kemp Family
Trust in 1997.

The Lees never developed their property and never took possession of the

purported easement over Kemp Road for driveways to homes they intended (and still apparently
intend) on building on their property. Therefore, the cause of action for specific performance
accrued in 1997. Id. The statute of limitations on any claim for specific performance has long
expired.
The Lees were informed by Willow Creek prior to 2006 that Willow Creek was not
interested in allowing the Lees to use Kemp Road to access their property for the development of
residential homes and told the Lees they did not. have any easement. See Declaration of Ray
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Tschohl,

1 4.

The Lees were informed before 2006 that they did not have any easement to use

Kemp Road and were on notice that their alleged property rights were in question. Even if the
cause of action for specific performance did not accrue in 1997, it accrued before 2006 when the
Lees were told they did not have any access easement rights over Kemp Road.
The five-year statutory limitations period for specific performance has expired. Willow
Creek requests the Court find the Lees are not entitled to specific performance and, to the extent
any cause of action for specific performance has been raised by the pleadings, that the cause of
action be dismissed.
E.

The Lees are barred from equitable relief under the doctrine of laches
"The rule is well settled that courts of equity do not favor antiquated or stale demands,

and will refuse to interfere where there has been gross laches in commencing the proper action,
or long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights." Johnson v. Strong Arm Reservoir Irr.
Dist., 82 Idaho 478,486 (1960).
The necessary elements to maintain a defense of laches are:
(1) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights; (2) delay in
asserting plaintiffs rights, the plaintiff having had notice
and an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge
by the defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to plaintiff or the suit is not held to be barred.
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359, 48 P.3d 1241, 1248 (2002), citing
Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444,449, 915 P.2d 6, 11 (1996).
When Willow Creek informed the Lees prior to 2006 that there was no easement for the
Lees to use Kemp Road, the Lees were on notice that Willow Creek would not recognize the
Lees purported access rights for to be developed homes on the Lees' property. The Lees delayed
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ten years from that time to bring this lawsuit and had notice of the dispute and an opportunity to
bring this suit, but inexplicably waited. Willow Creek had no way of knowing that the Lees
would wait ten years from being told there was no easement to bring this lawsuit. Finally,
Willow Creek will suffer injury and prejudice if the Lees are afforded a right to use Kemp Road.
Because of the passage of time, witnesses are no longer available and cannot recall with
specificity discussions that occurred ten to twenty years ago. The residents of Willow Creek will
be prejudiced if the Lees are afforded an access right based on the 1997 Agreement because the
residents, who are bona fide purchasers for value of their interest in Kemp Road as common area
of the subdivision without any knowledge of the 1997 Agreement, purchased their homes based
on the understanding that the road their houses were on was private and that traffic would be
minimal. By waiting between 10-20 years to bring this lawsuit, the Lees have unreasonably
delayed and their claim for an access right is stale. Based on the doctrine of laches, the Lees
complaint should be dismissed.
F.

The Lees have not established sufficient part performance
In response to the fact that the Lees cannot comply with the statute of frauds with respect

to the 1997 Agreement, the Lees argue they have partially performed the agreement and
therefore appear to argue that this Court can compel specific performance of the agreement. As
noted above, the Lees have not requested specific performance as a remedy. Nonetheless, even
if the Lees had requested specific performance of the 1997 Agreement as relief and that the relief
was not barred by the statute of limitations, the Lees have not sufficiently demonstrated a
question of fact concerning whether or not they sufficiently performed any obligations under the
1997 Agreement to entitle them to specific performance.
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Specific performance is an extraordinary remedy that
provides relief when legal remedies are inadequate. It is generally
presumed that in an action for breach of a real estate purchase and
sale agreement there is not an adequate remedy at law due to the
perceived uniqueness of land. A greater degree of certainty is
required to sustain a decree for specific performance than is
required to sustain a judgment for damages at law. Specific
performance is not available to enforce ambiguous or incomplete
real estate agreements.

Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430,435, 80 P.3d 1031, 1036 (2003) (citations and quotations
omitted)
Sufficient part performance by a purchaser of real property
removes the contract from the operation of the statute of frauds,
and although the equitable doctrine of part performance is
inapplicable to an action at law, satisfaction of the doctrine of part
performance would entitle [the plaintiffs] to specific performance.

The most important acts which constitute a sufficient part
performance are actual possession, permanent and valuable
improvements and these two combined .... In addition,
improvements made by a party and upon which they rely for part
performance must be substantial in relation to the value of the
property.
Hoffman v. S VCo., 102 Idaho 187,191,628 P.2d 218,222 (1981) (emphasis added).
Under the doctrine of part performance, when an agreement to
convey real property fails to meet the requirements of the statute of
frauds-as in this case where the alleged agreement was not reduced
to writing-the agreement may nevertheless be specifically enforced
when the purchaser has partly performed the agreement.
Improvements, in order to constitute part performance, must be
substantial in relation to the value of the property.
The acts constituting part performance must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence and the must also be definitely referable to
the alleged ... contract.

Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 722-23, 874 P.2d 528, 533-34 (1994).
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The Lees have not established that they have been in possession of the easement since
1997 and they have presented no evidence that they have made any substantial improvements to
Kemp Road. Therefore, they have not established sufficient part performance to constitute an
exception to the statute of frauds.
The Lees contend the construction of culverts and entries by the Kemp Family Trust is
evidence of part performance.

See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment, p. 9. However, the Lees need to demonstrate that they (not the Kemp
Family Trust) made substantial improvements to Kemp Road.

The record is void of any

evidence of improvements to Kemp Road made by the Lees, let alone evidence of substantial
improvements in relation to the value of the property.
Likewise, there is no evidence in the record establishing that the Lees have taken actual
possession of Kemp Road under and for the purposes set forth in the 1997 Agreement. The Lees
contend the access through Kemp Road was to be for development purposes. See Memorandum
in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 21, 2017, ,i 10 ("Recognizing
future development by the Lees, the 1997 Agreement expressly gave the Lees three access points
to the road."). It is undisputed that the Lees have not developed their property. Therefore, the
Lees have never accessed their property via Kemp Road pursuant to the 1997 Agreement.
Consequently, the Lees have not met the requirements for partial performance and they are not
entitled to specific performance of the 1997 Agreement.
G.

The 1997 Agreement is an Unenforceable Agreement to Agree

The 1997 Agreement is an agreement to agree in the future and is unenforceable for the
purposes of specific enforcement. See Karterman v. Jameson, 132 Idaho 910,914,980 P.2d 574,
578 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding specific performance not available to enforce an ambiguous or
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incomplete agreement). The 1997 Agreement, in a section entitled "Future Development" notes
that the parties were both "contemplating future development" and that "[i]n the event that Buyer
constructs a recreational center ... Seller shall be entitled to use .... Seller shall also be entitled to
3 driveway accesses from the gravel road to be constructed by Buyer adjoining Seller's
property." See Declaration of Dale Lee, filed June 17, 2016, Ex. B (copy of 1997 Agreement).
In 1997, Kemp Road had not been constructed. The parties to the agreement left for
future negotiations the location of the driveway accesses. "No enforceable contract comes into
being when parties leave a material term for future negotiations, creating a mere agreement to
agree." Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 614, 114 P.3d 974, 984 (2005)
(quoting from 17A Am.Jur .2d Contracts § 181 (2004)). The location of the driveways was a
material term of the agreement, if the agreement was meant to convey a right to use the
driveways. Clearly, since the road had not been constructed, the parties had no idea where the
purported driveways would be, leaving that issue open for future negotiations. The location of
these accesses was an integral part of the agreement that could not have been negotiated, since
the road did not exist. Additionally, the accesses were "subject to seller obtaining any necessary
government approvals." Id. Since the purported access was subject to government approvals, the
grant was confidential, not final, and is not enforceable. Consequently, the parties contemplated
future negotiations and the 1997 Agreement was an unenforceable agreement to agree.

V.

CONCLUSION
Willow Creek respectfully requests the Court grant Willow Creek's motion for summary

judgment and dismiss the Lees' Complaint in its entirety with prejudice.
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12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone: (208) 345-3333
Fax No.: (208) 345-4461
dbower@stm-law.com
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AUG O7 2017
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J COTTLE, DEPUTY CLERK

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV 16-3425
Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER

vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDNISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation; and DOES I - X, inclusive,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, Dale and Kathi Lee (collectively "Lees"), by and through their attorneys of
record, submit this brief in opposition to Defendant's Motion to Amend Answer.
INTRODUCTION
As a threshold matter, Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners'
Association, Inc. ("HOA" or "Willow Creek HOA")'s Motion to Amend Answer is untimely and
should be denied on this basis alone. The Motion to Amend is untimely for two reasons. First,
per Court directive on July 11, 2017, all substantive motions were due on July 21, 2017. Second,
even without that directive, the Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning clearly provides that
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"120 days before trial is the last day to file a motion to amend the claims between existing parties
to the lawsuit.. ." See June 16, 2016 Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning. Here, that deadline
has long past and this Court should deny the HOA's motion on this basis alone. Accordingly,
the Lees submit that the HOA's motion be denied. Additionally, even if those procedural bars
did not exist, the HOA's request misstates the issues before this Court in an attempt to frame this
legal action in an improper way. The HOA's attempt to "amend" is really an attempt to "frame"
the relief that the Lees seek in a way that offers the HOA a defense--as it stands, the HOA cannot
overcome the fact that the 1997 Agreement has already been substantially performed and
therefore continues to be an enforceable encumbrance, condition and/or restriction against the
HOA. Without any support, the HOA continues to misstate what the Lees actually seek in this
action. The Lees seek a declaratory judgment that they have a right to continued access of their
property from Kemp Road--the idea that the Lees are only seeking to enforce the 1997
Agreement as an equitable servitude or the idea that the Lees are seeking "specific performance"
is not accurate.
To be clear, the Lees are arguing that the 1997 Agreement has been partially (if not fully
performed) and consequently, that the 1997 Agreement is an enforceable encumbrance (either as
a partially performed easement agreement and/or an equitable servitude against the HOA). The
legal action, a declaratory action, simply asks that this Court to say just that. See Complaint,
,VIII ("The terms of the [1997 Agreement] were at least partially performed by the parties.");
Prayer for Relief <)[1 ("That the Court make a final determination that the Kemp Road, is
encumbered by equitable servitudes, conditions and restrictions allowing for access by the Lees
as set forth in the [1997 Agreement]; ... "). Significantly, the Lees are asking for a declaration of
their rights not specific performance.
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LEGAL STANDARD
It is well-established law that it is well within a trial court's discretion to deny a motion

to amend a pleading "on the grounds that [the motion] was untimely under the scheduling order"
and that, consequently, the opposition was prejudiced. See Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v.
Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 881-82, 42 P.3d 672, 674-75 (2002) (Recognizing that even where

the motion was made "six weeks before trial" that '[g]ranting the amendment would have
required the defendants to research the new causes of action and to alter their trial strategies, and
it would have disrupted their trial preparation."); see also DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar.
Co., 156 Idaho 749, 756-57, 331 P.3d 491, 498-99 (2014) ("[O]ther factors must combine with

timeliness to justify denying a motion to amend. Appropriate factors to consider include whether
the proposed amendment would delay upcoming hearings or trial, whether the motion to amend
comes after court-imposed deadlines have passed, and whether substantial work has already been
completed.").
In Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., the plaintiff filed motions to amend several months

after the deadline for filing motion to amend pleadings had passed. 141 Idaho 604,613, 114 P.3d
974, 983 (2005). There, "the district court stated: 'We are now two years into this case, the time
to amend pleadings has passed, and two discovery deadlines have expired. It is now simply too
late to further amend the substance of the pleadings .... "' Id. The appellate court affirmed the
district court's decision to deny on the basis that the untimeliness of the request put the plaintiff
in a prejudicial position. Id. Here, it is uncontroverted that the motion to amend is untimely.
And, as set forth below, to allow the amendment now, would, as it did with the respondents
above, create prejudice for the Lees.
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DISCUSSION

The HOA's Motion Should Be Denied As Untimely And Prejudicial And With Respect To
Statute Of Limitations Defense. Fails To State A Valid Affirmative Defense Based On The
Claims

It is incontrovertible fact that the HOA's Motion to Amend is untimely. First, all motions
were to be filed by July 21, 2017. To the extent this is a substantive motion, and the Lees would
submit that it is because it could potential change the ability of the parties to obtain dispositive
relief, this motion is untimely per the Court' directive on July 14, 2017. Moreover, the motion is
untimely based on the scheduling order stipulated by the parties and approved by the Court. See
June 16, 2016 Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning. Consequently, here, the dispositive
question for the Court is whether the untimeliness of the motion would require additional
discovery and/or impact trial preparation, i.e., is prejudicial to the Lees. It is uncontroverted fact
that the parties have already begun trial preparation. Indeed, the parties have already submitted
their Pre-Trial Statements. Thus, there can be little doubt that, at a minimum, allowing the HOA
to amend its pleading to add new affirmative defenses would require the parties to redo their PreTrial Statements including revising the facts, witnesses and exhibits that they identified in those
statements. In short, trial preparation will have to be redone. This is prejudicial, particularly to
the Lees who are prepared to go to trial.
The HOA's request to amend should also be denied because two of the affirmative
defenses identified would require additional discovery-namely "Bona Fide Purchaser for
Value" and "Statute of Limitations." As explained below, each of these affirmative defenses
requires additional discovery if the HOA was allowed to amend.
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Bona Fide Purchaser for Value

To be considered a bona fide purchaser, "a party 'must show that at the time of the
purchase he paid a valuable consideration and upon the belief and the validity of the vendor's
claim of title without notice, actual or constructive, of any outstanding adverse rights of another.'

" Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 859, 230 P.3d 743, 751 (2010) (quoting Imig v. McDonald, 77
Idaho 314,318,291 P.2d 852, 855 (1955)). "Further, one who purchases property with sufficient
knowledge to put him, or a reasonably prudent person, on inquiry is not a bona fide purchaser."

Imig v. McDonald, 77 Idaho at 318, 291 P.2d at 855. Admittedly, the issue of notice has been
addressed by the parties and could not be the basis for claiming prejudice. However, the issue of
whether the HOA actually paid consideration and that it was "valuable" is a significant question
mark and an issue that has not been fleshed out in this litigation. Given the nature of the transfer
from the developer, Kemp Trust, to the HOA, this remains an unknown. Accordingly, to allow
the HOA to assert this defense without an opportunity to conduct discovery on this issue is
clearly prejudicial and a basis for denial. 1

B.

Statute of Limitations

This issue has never been addressed or even mentioned in any of the pleadings or
motions. It appears that the HOA is trying to equate "laches" with "statute of limitations""Plaintiffs cannot claim surprise or prejudice with respect to the statute of limitations affirmative
defense when the initial answer included an affirmative defense of laches, putting Plaintiffs on

Further, it appears that the HOA maybe asserting that each individual HOA member (regardless of the
fact that they have no direct ownership interest in Kemp Road) is a bona fide purchaser. This argument is
completely new and would require that the Lees depose and conduct discovery as to each individual HOA
member. Again, evidence of the prejudice that the Lees would suffer if the HOA were permitted to
pursue this defense at this late stage of the process.
1
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notice that their delay in bringing this lawsuit would be an issue at trial." Willow Creek Ranch
Estates Motion to Amend Answer ("HOA Motion to Amend"), p.3.
This approach is misguided. As explained by a Georgia state court, statute of limitations
and laches are not synonymous.
[A] statute of limitation and laches are not synonymous. "A statute of limitation is
the action of the state in determining that after a lapse of specified time, a claim
shall not be enforceable in a judicial proceeding." 34 Amer.Juris. 15, § 3(1). The
statute of limitation signifies the fixed period within which an action may be
brought to preserve a right, while laches signifies a delay independent of the
statute. And as to the lapse of time necessary for an invoking of the doctrine of
laches, such time may or may not correspond with the time fixed by the statute of
limitations. "The defense of laches is peculiar to courts of equity." Equitable
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Brady, 171 Ga. 576, 584, 156 S.E. 222, 226. Laches in a
general sense is neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do
that which, by the exercise of due diligence, could have and should have been
done earlier, if at all.
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Sailors, 69 Ga. App. 628, 26 S.E.2d 557, 561 (1943). Thus, here, where

the defenses are not the same, different discovery and different arguments would be necessary to
address the issue.
Moreover, this affirmative defense is not even relevant to the declaratory relief sought by
the Lees. "If an amended pleading does not set out a valid claim or if the opposing party would
be prejudiced by the delay in adding a new claim or if the opposing party has [an] available
defense ... it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the motion to file an amended
complaint." DAFCO LLC, 156 Idaho at 757, 331 P.3d at 499. Trial courts are directed to
determine "to whether the opposing party would be prejudiced.... , whether the pleadings set forth
valid claim[s], and if the opposing party has an available defense." Id. Thus, to be allowed to
amend to add this affirmative defense, the HOA must explain how this defense is valid.

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
AMEND ANSWER- 6

209

-

-

Here, the HOA claims it needs to assert this new affirmative defense because the Lees are
requesting something new--"specific performance." See HOA Motion to Amend, p.3. This is
not accurate. The Lees are not asking for specific performance (the access points and the Lees
already have access and the HOA has nothing to perform). Rather, the Lees simply claim that
1997 Agreement is enforceable as an easement or an equitable servitude because it has been
performed. Consequently, there is no basis for amending the HOA's pleading to add an
"affirmative defense" addressing performance that does not exist and that is not requested. The
HOA's argument that the Lees are asking for specific performance is based on the fact that Idaho
Code § 9-504 states that the statute of frauds "must not be construed to ... abridge the power of
any court to compel the specific performance of an agreement, in case of part performance
thereof." The Lees cite that code section and related case law not to require performance but
rather enforcement or recognition of particular rights.

As recently explained by the Idaho

Supreme Court: "Under the doctrine of part performance, when an agreement to convey real
property fails to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, the agreement may nevertheless
be specifically enforced ...." Hoke v. Neyada, Inc., 161 Idaho 450, 387 P.3d 118, 121 (2016),
reh'g denied (Jan. 23, 2017) (Emphasis added.) (citing Bear Island Water Association, Inc. v.
Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 722, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994)). Here, as clearly articulated in the

Complaint, the Lees argue that because of the language of the 1997 Agreement and past
performance (the construction and use of the access points that gave the Lees access from Kemp
Road) the Lees are entitled to a declaration from the Court that Kemp Road is encumbered. See
Complaint, p.6 (Prayer for Relief, «j[l(That the Court make a final determination that the Kemp
Development Property, including Kemp Road, is encumbered by equitable servitudes, conditions
and restrictions allowing for access by the Lees as set forth in the [1997] Agreement .... ").
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Consequently, the Lees seek a declaration of their rights per the 1997 Agreement and the
performance of that agreement by the parties. Statute of limitations is simply not a valid defense
to that claim.
Accordingly, in addition to be being untimely and prejudicial, the HOA's request does
not state a valid defense to the claims asserted and, consequently, the HOA's request to amend to
add this defense should be denied.
CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Lees respectfully request the Court deny the HOA's Motion
to Amend Answer. The motion is untimely for two reasons and clearly impacts trial preparation
and potentially discovery.

Furthermore, with respect to at least one of the desired new

affirmative defenses, the HOA cannot state a valid defense because it is based on a non-existent
claim. Accordingly, the Lees respectfully submit that the motion be denied. 2
DATED: August 7, 2017.
STEW ART TAYLOR & MORRIS

PLLC

2 Regardless of whether this Court grants the HOA's motion, the Lees are entitled to summary
judgment. As set forth in the Lee's supporting Memorandum, none of these claimed affirmative
defenses have any impact on the Lee's request for summary judgment. The Lee's have also
agreed to submit this issue to the court on the briefs without oral argument.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,

Case No. CV 16-3425

Plaintiffs,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR
ALTERNATIVELY PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation; and DOES I - X, inclusive,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, Dale and Kathi Lee (collectively "Lees"), by and through their attorneys of
record, submit this reply memorandum in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
and Alternatively Partial Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
INTRODUCTION
The Lees maintain that the legal issue here is clear and simple--whether this Court can
rule, as a matter of law, that Kemp Road is encumbered by an agreement that has been partially
performed and that Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association,
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Inc. ("HOA" or "Willow Creek HOA") had both actual and constructive knowledge. The HOA
attempts to convolute that simple issue by making seven fragmented arguments. Those seven
arguments fall into three categories of arguments provided as follows: 1) the HOA claims there
is not sufficient factual basis to established an equitable servitude based primarily on its
proffered definition of an equitable servitude; 2) the 1997 Agreement is barred by the statute of
frauds and because the relief the Lees seek is "specific performance," something the HOA claims
was not pied in the Complaint; and 3) that the HOA did not have knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the 1997 Agreement when Kemp Road was transferred in 2005. 1 As set forth
below, these arguments (and their subparts) are not supported..
RESPONSNE DISCUSSION
I.

The Only Evidence In The Record Affirmatively Demonstrates That The HOA Had
Knowledge. Actual And Constructive, Of The 1997 Agreement
The HOA "disagrees that it had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the 1997

Agreement when Kemp Road was transferred .... " Willow Creek Ranch Estates Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ("HOA's MSJ Opposition Memo."), p. 2.
Notwithstanding this pronouncement, the HOA has not identified any evidence that contracts
HOA board member Alan Mills' statement that: "As a former HOA board member, I can say
with a high degree of certainty that the HOA at the time was aware of the [ 1997] Agreement and
its terms regarding the three driveway access." See Mills Deel., Exhibit A; see also Lee Deel.,
Exhibit D (emphasis added).

Alternatively, to the extent that this Court rules that the issue of actual or constructive knowledge is a
disputed fact, the Lees assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether the
agreement at issue was partially performed, thereby narrowing the issues to be tried by this Court.
1
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This statement could not be more plain or clear. Mr. Mills, a former member of the HOA
board, has testified that the HOA was aware of the 1997 Agreement. In response, the HOA
asserts--that only "knowledge acquired by an agent during the course of the agency relationship"
constitutes notice to the principal. See HOA MSJ Opposition Memo., p. 3. This argument is a
misdirection and not relevant.

Mr. Mills' s statement is not just that he knew of the 1997

Agreement and that the HOA knew because he knew.

His unequivocal and unconditional

statement is that the HOA was aware of the 1997 Agreement: "the HOA at the time was aware of
the [1997] Agreement and its terms regarding the three driveway access." As a member of the
HOA board, Mr. Mills is entirely able to make this plain admission--an admission by a party
opponent. 2

Significantly, the HOA has not submitted any evidence to contradict this

unconditioned statement. The fact that subsequent HOA board members and presidents, e.g.,
Ray Tschohl, can provide testimony that they did not know about the 1997 Agreement because
this information was not properly passed down by the HOA does not somehow disprove Mr.
Mills's testimony that the HOA had actual knowledge of the 1997 Agreement when he was on
the board. This evidence is damning to the HOA's argument. The uncontroverted evidence in
the record is that the HOA had knowledge of the 1997 Agreement.

It is incredible that the HOA argues in its brief that "the record contains no evidence to support
a finding that the knowledge of Mills (or Mary Kemp) can be imputed to [the HOA]." Mr. Mills
statement is what it is. It is up to the HOA to submit evidence that proves this statement was
limited or inaccurate. The HOA has not done that-they have failed to meet their burden. There
is no evidence in the record disproving Mr. Mills statement. Mr. Mills's statement, as a member
of the HOA Board, is that the HOA had knowledge of the 1997 Agreement. It is significant that
the HOA did not depose or make any attempt to obtain a sworn statement from Mr. Mills. There
is no evidence in the record to contradict Mr. Mills's testimony because the HOA chose to not
put it there. The HOA had knowledge of the 1997 Agreement. If the HOA wanted to qualify
that statement, they should have deposed Mr. Mills so that they could submit evidence that that
knowledge only came as a result of Mr. Mills work as the original real estate agent. The HOA
did not do this and, accordingly, is not even in a position to submit contrary evidence necessary
to preclude summary judgment as to this salient fact.
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The HOA has not and really cannot assert that it did not have "constructive" notice of the
1997 Agreement. According to Mr. Horn, a member of the HOA, because of the gates, culverts
and the access points constructed, it was obvious to him and to the other HOA members living in
the subdivision, that the Lees accessed their property through Kemp Road. See Hom Aff., '17 ("It
was obvious to me and anyone living in the subdivision, that the Lees accessed their property
from Kemp Road."). Moreover, per Mr. Hom's testimony, he was told of the 1997 Agreement at
the time he purchased his home in 1999.

Again, this testimony is uncontroverted and

unchallenged. The facts are what they are, the access points were uncontrovertibly constructed
and anyone that drives on Kemp Road can see them. See Lee Deel., 'l[ 14, Exhibit C (A color
copy is attached hereto for convenience purposes). Nothing submitted by the HOA contradicts
this fact. Indeed, there is not one statement from any member of the HOA claiming that they
were unaware of the constructed access points--nor could they honestly submit the same. In
sum, the uncontroverted evidence in the record affirmatively proves that the HOA had, not only
actual notice but, constructive notice of the encumbrance.
II.

The Partial Performance Of The 1997 Agreement Removes Claims And Defenses That
The 1997 Agreement Is Not Enforceable
The HOA makes a number of arguments related to the ability of this Court to enforce the

1997 Agreement. Those arguments include i) that the 1997 Agreement is barred by the Statute
of Frauds, ii) that the argument is barred because the Lees did not plead "specific performance,"
and iii) that the "Less have not established sufficient part performance of the 1997
Agreement .... " See HOA MSJ Opposition, p.2. These responsive arguments all lack merit.

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR ALTERNATNELY PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4

216

---·------

A.

The Uncontroverted Evidence Establishes Partial Peiformance Of The 1997
Agreement And Accordingly Precludes Application Of The Statute Of Frauds

The argument that the Lees have not established sufficient part performance is not
supported. The HOA argues the only thing it can, that the uncontroverted performance is not
performance enough. This argument is affirmatively disproved by facts in evidence. The Idaho
Supreme Court has explained that "what constitutes part performance must depend upon the
particular facts of each case and the sufficiency of particular acts is a matter of law." See Hoke
v. Neyada, Inc., 161 Idaho 450, 387 P.3d 118, 121-22 (2016), reh'g denied (Jan. 23, 2017). This

makes sense because "[a]cts constituting part performance must be specifically referable to the
alleged agreement." Id. (citing Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551,557, 381 P.2d 802, 805 (1963)).
The Idaho Supreme Court has also explained that "[t]he most important acts which constitute a
sufficient part performance are actual possession, permanent and valuable improvements and
these two combined." Id. (citing Roundy v. Waner, 98 Idaho 625, 629, 570 P.2d 862, 866
(1977)). Here, the acts that the Lees contend constitute part performance, the construction of the
access points and allowing the Lees access, is clearly related to the 1997 Agreement.
Accordingly, the HOA is limited to arguing the later, that they have not established actual
possession or permanent and valuable improvements: "[t]he Lees have not established that they
have been in possession of the easement since 1997 and they have presented no evidence that
they have made any substantial improvements to Kemp Road" and "[t]herefore, they have not
established sufficient part performance to constitute an exception to the statute of frauds." See
Willow Creek Ranch Estates Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment ("HOA Reply Memo in Support of MSJ"), p.10.
Again, the facts belie this argument. There is evidence of both possession, i.e. access, and
improvement, i.e., construction of the access points, including culverts and fencing. Dale Lee
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testified in his declaration that "culverts," "wood fencing and metal gates corresponding to the
access points [constructed by the Kemp Family Trust] were constructed giving the Lee property

clear and obvious access to Kemp Road." See Lee Deel., '][14. Mr. Horn, who was living in the
subdivision and who was a member of the HOA also testified that improvements were made and
that the Lees were given access: "It was obvious to me ... that the Lees accessed their property
from Kemp Road." See Hom Aff., '][7. These uncontroverted statements constitute evidence of
both improvement and possession consistent with the 1997 Agreement--stated differently, that
the 1997 Agreement has been sufficiently performed to justify enforcement regardless of the
statute of fraud concerns.
The HOA also fails to appreciate the reason for the ..partial performance" doctrine as it
relates to the "statute of frauds." The purpose of the statute of frauds is to act as an assurance for
the parties as a protectant of fraudulent behavior. To make sure the agreement is not a fraud. As
explained by the Idaho Supreme Court, the idea is that the partial performance of the agreement
is a recognition by the parties of the validity of an agreement, alleviating "validity" or "fraud"
concerns. This is reflected in the case law.
In the instant case it is alleged that the partition fence was erected under the oral
agreement. As to maintenance the agreement was recognized and acted upon by
appellants and respondent's lessor, in that it is alleged they maintained their
respective portions of the partition fence from 1917 to 1920 during the occupancy
of the land by respondent, who also recognized and acted upon the agreement.
Even if appellants were correct in their contention that the agreement in question
was one for the sale or lease of an interest in land, the statute of frauds would
have no application for the reason that both parties to the oral agreement
recognized its validity and acquiesced in its terms by erecting the fence and
maintaining it for three years, and the doctrine of part performance would take it
out of the statute offrauds.

See Tsuboi v. Cohn, 40 Idaho 102, 231 P. 708, 710 (1924) (citing 27 C. J. 343, § 427) (emphasis
added). Here, there is no concern regarding the validity of the agreement because the parties
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performed as per the terms of the agreement. The access points were created and the Lees were
provided access. Indeed, at the time of the token transfer by the Kemp Family Trust to the HOA,
there was nothing left for the Kemp Family Trust or the HOA to perform. The parties' actions
confirmed the validity of the 1997 Agreement and the encumbrance. The improvements were
permanent and substantial and actually provided the Lees with access. Accordingly, there is no
basis for challenging the validity of the agreement. The actions of the parties clearly address that
issue. Thus, the only real question left is whether the HOA had knowledge of the agreement,
and, as explained above, it unquestionably did.
B.

The Lees Are Not Pleading Specific Performance But A Declaration Of Their
Rights Related To The 1997 Agreement

The HOA makes a desperate attempt to argue that the Lees' are requesting new relief,
"specific performance" of the 1997 Agreement. See HOA Reply Memo in Support of MSJ, pp.
8-10. The HOA makes up this "specific performance" argument because it provides the HOA a
number of new and different defenses. However, the argument is based on a faulty premise--that
the Lees are asking this Court for specific performance. The Lees are not asking for specific
performance (the access points and the Lees already have access and the HOA has nothing to
perform). Indeed, a review of the pleadings affirmative proves this. The Lees simply claim that
the 1997 Agreement is enforceable as an easement or an equitable servitude because there has
been performance and they seek to have a declaration of their rights.
The HOA's argument that the Lees are asking for specific performance is based on the
fact that Idaho Code § 9-504 states that the statute of frauds "must not be construed to ... abridge
the power of any court to compel the specific performance of an agreement, in case of part
performance thereof." The Lees cite that code section and related case law not to require
performance but rather enforcement or recognition of particular rights they have already been
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given. As recently explained by the Idaho Supreme Court: "Under the doctrine of part
performance, when an agreement to convey real property fails to meet the requirements of the
Statute of Frauds, the agreement may nevertheless be specifically enforced ...." Hoke v. Neyada,
Inc., 161 Idaho 450, 387 P.3d 118, 121 (2016), reh'g denied (Jan. 23, 2017) (Emphasis added.)

(citing Bear Island Water Association, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 722, 874 P.2d 528, 533
(1994)).

Here, as clearly articulated in the Complaint, the Lees argue that because of the

language of the 1997 Agreement and past performance (the construction and use of the access
points that gave the Lees access from Kemp Road) the Lees are entitled to a declaration from the
Court that Kemp Road is encumbered. See Complaint, p.6 (Prayer for Relief, Cfl(That the Court
make a final determination that the Kemp Development Property, including Kemp Road, is
encumbered by equitable servitudes, conditions and restrictions allowing for access by the Lees
as set forth in the [1997] Agreement.. .. "). Consequently. the Lees seek a declaration of their
rights per the 1997 Agreement as confirmed by the past and present acts of the parties. Statute of
limitations is simply not an applicable defense to that claim.3 4

3 Indeed,

at least one court has recognized that partial performance is not limited to just specific
performance. See LaRue v. Kalex Const. & Dev., Inc., 97 So. 3d 251,253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2012) ("There the contract is for the sale of land and the relief sought is for specific performance
or other equitable relief, partial performance may remove an oral agreement from the statute of
frauds.").
The HOA also makes the assertion that because the Lees are seeking specific performance they
are barred because they claim the 1997 Agreement was an "agreement to agree." HOA Reply
Memo in Support of MSJ, p.10. The HOA claims that at the time of the agreement Kemp Road
had not been constructed and that the access points had not been determined. Id. Again, the
HOA fails to appreciate that these terms have all been fulfilled. Kemp Road was built, the
access points were constructed. And, again, the purpose of this declaratory action is not to seek
specific performance but a declaration of an encumbrance that will continue to allow the Lees
access and that can be recorded.
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR ALTERNATIVELY PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8
4

220

•
ID.

HOA Claims No Equitable Servitude Because Claims There Is Not Sufficient Factual
Basis to Established an Equitable Servitude Based Primarily on its Proffered Definition
of an Equitable Servitude
Even if there was no enforceable easement, the incontrovertible facts establish an

equitable interest that also provides the Lees with legal access. The parties are in agreement that
an equitable servitude is not an easement. See Birdwood Subdivision Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v.
Bulotti Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 17, 23, 175 P.3d 179, 185 (2007). However it is like an easement

in that it concerns a promise of the landowner to use his land in a certain way. See Idaho Power
Co. v. State, By & Through Dep't of Water Res., 104 Idaho 575, 587, 661 P.2d 741, 753 (1983)

("restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes" relate to "[a]greements not to assert ownership
rights."). Here, it is incontrovertible fact that the Lees, in the event that the 1997 Agreement
(and the performance by the parties) is construed to not give the Lees an encumbrance, are
asking that this Court to impose an equitable servitude against the HOA. The Lees are asking
this Court to preclude the HOA from asserting ownership rights that would preclude the Lees
from continued to access Kemp Road.
The Lees appreciate that the HOA is trying to argue that an equitable servitude can only
be construed as a negative restrictive covenant as opposed to an affirmative right to use. And
that here, we are only dealing with what the HOA is trying to characterizes as the Lees
affirmative right to use. As reflected in the HOA's opposition arguments, Idaho has clearly not
made this distinction. Indeed, the HOA primarily rests its argument on an interpretation of the
underlying encumbrance in West Wood Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho 75, 83, 106 P.3d 401, 409
(2005). This focus is misplaced and fails to appreciate the equitable nature of the relief at issue
in these cases. Significantly, the HOA concedes that "the right [meaning whether it was an
affirmative right to use or a restrictive covenant] was not discussed in the case, but can be
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presumed to arise from the some other recorded document." See HOA Reply Memo in Support
of MSJ, p.3. The right was not discussed because it was irrelevant. As explained by the
Supreme Court in West Wood, the equities tum on whether the parties had notice of the
agreement and not on how the right can be characterized.

Regardless, the HOA fails to

appreciate what actually happened in West Wood and similarities between what the petitioners
sought in that case and what the Lees seek here.

West Wood involved an agreement, reflected only in a conveyance, that a particular
building lot would be used for recreational purposes and could be used by the other members of
the planned community.

It is difficult to appreciate how this underlying agreement is

meaningfully different than the agreement here, where there was an agreement that would give
the Lees access to a common area, here, a road, where the Lees have had access to that road and
where the HOA could presumably prevent access. The court did not focus on the "kind of right"
it was dealing with because that did not matter. See West Wood Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho 75,
83, 106 P.3d 401, 409 (2005) ("the interest asserted by the Owners [that they had a right to use a
common area] was an equitable interest ... "). Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized that the trial
court erred by not focusing on "notice." West Wood, 141 Idaho at 85, 106 P.3d at 411 ("The
difficulty presented by this inquiry is that the district court did not ground its judgment in the
question of notice.").
Here, for obvious reasons, the HOA would like to avoid the issue of notice. And, the
primary argument asserted by the HOA is that the Lees claims are precluded because they assert
an affirmative right to use property instead of a negative restrictive covenant.
The Lees are not seeking to limit Willow Creek's use of Kemp Road (which
would be a restrictive covenant). Rather, they are seeking a right of use over
Kemp Road (which is an affirmative easement). Because the Lees are not seeking
a restrictive covenant, which may be created by conduct~ but rather they are
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seeking an affirmative right to use the land of Willow Creek, in order to prevail at
trial they must provide a written agreement complying with the statute of frauds.
See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Memo., pp. 5-6.

Again, to be clear, the

plaintiffs in West Wood were asserting for the same thing. The Petitioners in West Wood wanted
to be able to use a common area, just as here, the Lees are wanting to use Kemp Road. Both
asserted the the existence of an affirmative right to access and use common area, in West Wood,
Lot 5, and here, Kemp Lane. In West Wood, the basis of that asserted right was reflected in a
conveyance and the actions of the parties. Here, the basis for that right is an actual agreement,
the 1997 Agreement, of which, an agreement of which the evidence in the record shows the
HOA had actual and constructive notice. In terms of equitable relief, there is no difference. 5
Accordingly, the Lees submit that like the petitioners' in West Wood, they too are entitled to
equitable relief, an equitable servitude that precludes the HOA from asserting any right that
would preclude the Lees from using the access points created by the HOA's predecessor in
interest the Kemp Family Trust.

The HOA also that Idaho requires a "common grantor of the properties at issue .... "
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p.15-16 ("The Lees have no evidence that they
purchased a lot in a planned unit development from the Kemp Family Trust (or that there is some
other common grantor of property) and they are not contending they have a right to impose
negative restrictions on the use of Kemp Road.). Again, the HOA fails to appreciate the
equitable nature of the relief request and how Idaho focuses on these equities as opposed to other
states.
In Idaho, a "planned unit development" can be the basis for imposing an equitable
interest in that it can be enforced based on actual or constructive notice. There does not have to
be a written agreement. This is significant because it illustrates how Idaho focuses on the
equitable circumstances of each case. As explained by the Supreme Court in West Wood,
"[e]quitable interests may arise because of the actions of the parties" even including "oral
representations." West Wood Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 84, 106 P.3d at 410. Clearly, if this
is the case, the Idaho Supreme is not limiting "equitable interests" to only subcategory of
individuals that fall within a legal distinction. Idaho considers the circumstances in equity to
determine whether relief should be granted.
5
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CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Lees respectfully request that the Court grant summary

judgment finding that Kemp Road, owned by the Willow Creek HOA, is subject to an
encumbrance, an equitable servitude, condition and/or restriction that allows the Lees access to
Kemp Road consistent with the directives of the 1997 Agreement. Alternatively, to the extent
that this Court concludes that full summary judgment is precluded, the Lees would submit that
they are entitled to partial summary judgment on the question of whether the 1997 Agreement
has been partially performed.
DATED: August 7, 2017.
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
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Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners'
Association, Inc.
Honorable Christopher S. Nye
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605

D
D
D
IZI

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile:
Email: acahill@canyonco.org
Clerk Copy
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J COTTLE, DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

DALE LEE and KA THI LEE, husband and
wife,

)
)

)
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV 2016-3425

)

)
)
)
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES NO. 2 )
)
SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
)
ASSOCIATION, INC., and Idaho
)
corporation; and DOES I-X, inclusive,

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BOA'S
MOTION TO AMEND

)

---------------- )
Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Both parties move for summary judgment. The Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2
Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc. ("HOA") moves to amend its answer to add
affirmative defenses. The parties submitted these matters on the briefs. The court trial is set to
begin on September 21, 2017.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case is about whether Dale and Kathi Lee ("Lees") have a right to use Kemp Road.
The HOA owns Kemp Road.
The Lees and the HOA's predecessor in interest, the Kemp Family Trust ("Kemp"),
owned adjoining land in Middleton. The Lees and Kemp wanted to develop their respective
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properties into subdivisions. In June 1997, the Lees and Kemp executed an "Agreement for Sale
of Real Property" ("97 Agreement"), in which the Lees agreed to sell 1.8 acres to Kemp. The 97
Agreement provided:
Seller shall also be entitled to 3 driveway accesses from the gravel road to be
constructed by Buyer adjoining Seller's property. Such accesses shall be
constructed at Seller's cost and subject to Seller obtaining any necessary
governmental approvals.
(Dale Lee Deel., dated June 20, 2016, Ex. B). The Lees are the "Seller," Kemp is the "Buyer,"
and the "gravel road" ultimately became Kemp Road. The 97 Agreement did not have a legal
description and it was not recorded.
In August 1997, the Lees executed a warranty deed transferring the 1.8 acres to Kemps.
(Matthew C. Parks Aff., dated August 4, 2016, Ex. A). The deed did not reference or incorporate
the 97 Agreement. The deed did not expressly reference or reserve an easement for the Lees or
otherwise reference the Lees' right to use or access the road. The deed provided that the premises
are free from all encumbrances, EXCEPT those to which this conveyance is
expressly made subject and those made, suffered or done by the Grantee(s); and
subject to reservations, restrictions, dedications, easements, rights of way and
agreements, (if any) of record, and general taxes and assessments.
(Parks Aff., Ex. A).
Kemp began developing the Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 subdivision. In April
1999, Kemp recorded the Willow Creek subdivision's declaration of covenants, conditions, and
restrictions. Neither the CC&Rs nor the recorded plat of the subdivision mentioned an easement
or any other right of Lees to use or access Kemp Road.
Kemp completed Kemp Road in 2000. At that time, Kemp constructed 3 driveway access
points on Kemp Road. This construction included creation of 24-foot culverts and gravel
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extending from Kemp Road to the Lees' property. Around this time, fencing and metal gates
corresponding to the 3 access points were constructed along the property.
The HOA was formed in 2002. The Willow Creek subdivision homeowners took over
control of the HOA board in February 2005. In April 2005, Kemp deeded Kemp Road to the
HOA. The deed did not reference the 97 Agreement or any other right of the Lees' to use or
access Kemp Road.
The parties presented disputed issues of fact as to whether the HOA knew about the terms
of 97 Agreement or the Lees' purported interest in Kemp Road. The Lees' property is not
landlocked.
Both parties move for summary judgment on the question of whether the Lees' have any
enforceable right to access and use Kemp Road.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a). "A
material fact has 'some logical connection with the consequential facts,' and therefore is
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." State v. Yakovac,
145 Idaho 437,444 (2008) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed.1999)).
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the
assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits
or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of
the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot

produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
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1.R.C.P. 56(c)(l). "The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other
materials in the record." I.R.C.P. 56(c)(3).
In construing the record on a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable
inferences and conclusions must be drawn in favor of the party opposing
summary judgment. The nonmoving party, however, "may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by
affidavits or ... otherwise ... , must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." "A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a
genuine issue of fact," but circumstantial evidence may suffice. Still, the evidence
offered in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be
admissible.
The fact that both parties file motions for summary judgment does not necessarily
mean that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Moreover, the filing of
cross-motions for summary judgment does not transform "the court, sitting to hear
a summary judgment motion, into the trier of fact." When cross-motions have
been filed and the action will be tried before the court without a jury, however,
the court may, in ruling on the motions for summary judgment, draw probable
inferences arising from the undisputed evidentiary facts. Drawing probable
inferences under such circumstances is permissible since the court, as the trier of
fact, would be responsible for resolving conflicting inferences at trial. Conflicting
evidentiary facts, however, must still be viewed in favor of the nonmoving party.
Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 141 Idaho 117, 123-24 (2009)

(cites omitted); Huskinson v. Nelson, 152 Idaho 547 (2012); Beus v. Beus, 151 Idaho 235 (2011).
The Court can decide these motions as a matter of law, based upon undisputed facts.

IV.

DISCUSSION
The Lees ask the Court to determine their rights and interests with respect to Kemp Road.

They argue that they have an affirmative right to access and use Kemp Road, via either an
equitable servitude or easement.
In determining what property right a party has (if any), the Court analyzes the case based
on the nature of the right the party claims. Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 404, n. 2 (1984);

St. Clair v. Krueger, 115 Idaho 702 (1989); Dickson v. Kates, 133 P.3d 498 (Wash App. 2006).
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a. The Lees do not have an equitable servitude
Application or "imposition of equitable servitudes" is within the trial court's discretion.

W. Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 82 (2005).
Based on a review of the record and relevant legal authorities, the Court finds that the
Lees do not have an equitable servitude conferring a right to access or use Kemp Road.
An equitable servitude "restrict[s] the use of land." Acord, 141 Idaho at 83; Greenfield v.

Wurmlinger, 158 Idaho 591 (2015); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10 ed. 2014) ("equitable
servitude" defined as "restrictive covenant"). Examples include specifying or restricting lot size
requirements, building lines, ·architectural styles, and the uses to which the property may be put.

Birdwood Subdivision Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Bulotti Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 17 (2007);
Acord, supra; Sun Valley cases, 131 Idaho 657 (1998), 138 Idaho 543 (2002); Middlekauff v.
Lake Cascade, Inc., 110 Idaho 909 (1986); Thomas, supra; Middlekauff v. Lake Cascade, Inc.,
103 Idaho 832 (1982); Restrictive covenant, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10 ed. 2014). Unlike an
easement, equitable servitudes do not confer an affirmative right to enter and use another's land.

See id.; see also, Easements differentiated from real covenants, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS &
LICENSES IN LAND §

1:29; Fletcher v. Lone Mountain Rd. Ass'n, 396 P.3d 1229, 1233 (Idaho

2017) ("[R]estrictive covenants are in derogation of the common law right to use land for all
lawful purposes, [and] the Court will not extend by implication any restrictions not clearly
expressed. All doubts are to be resolved in favor of the free use of land."). The Lees are really
claiming an easement right. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229 (2003) ("An easement is the
right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use
of the property by the owner."); REST. (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) §1.2; Easements

differentiated from real covenants, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS & LICENSES IN LAND§ 1:29.
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Further support for this conclusion is the fact that more rigid formalities, like the statute
of frauds, are required to create an affirmative right to use land (e.g. an easement), whereas
equitable servitudes may arise from oral representations or the parties' conduct.
The Lees cite Acord, Bulotti, and Middlekauff to support their servitude theory. Those
cases are distinguishable from this case and they do not hold that an equitable servitude confers
an affirmative right to use land. Those cases dealt with rights of lot owners in planned unit
developments or residential communities to enforce restrictive covenants upon other lots within
their residential development. Though those cases talked about lot owners having a right to use
common areas, the lot owners' enforceable right was really to restrict selling or changing the use
of established common areas. None of those cases say that an equitable servitude confers an
affirmative right to use or access land. See also, Thomas, supra (not a PUD case).
The Lees do not have an equitable servitude giving them a right to access or use Kemp
Road. Therefore, summary judgment is granted in the HOA's favor on this theory.
b. The Lees do not have an easement
The Lees argue that the parties at least partially performed the terms of the 97 Agreement
and thus that they have an easement over Kemp Road.
Based on a review of the record and relevant legal authorities, the Court finds that the
Lees do not have an easement over Kemp Road.
After the Lees and Kemp executed the 97 Agreement, the Lees executed a warranty deed
conveying the subject property to Kemp. The 97 Agreement and the deed both related to the
same subject matter. See Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704 (2007); Estes
v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82 (1998); Jolley v. Idaho Sec., Inc., 90 Idaho 373 (1966). The deed did not

expressly create or reserve an easement for the Lees to use Kemp Road. The deed did not
expressly reference or incorporate the 97 Agreement. Non-descript, generic, or general
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
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"excepting" language in a deed is not sufficient to create or reserve an easement. Machado v.
Ryan, 153 Idaho 212, 219 (2012); Lawrence, 143 Idaho at 709 n. 4; Bulotti Const., Inc., supra;
Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 301 (2005). The deed is unambiguous. Even

though the deed's terms may vary from the earlier 97 Agreement, the Court looks only to the
deed to determine parties' rights. Since the deed does not reserve or create an easement for the
Lees' use of Kemp Road, the Lees do not have an easement over Kemp Road. This outcome is
supported by several appellate court decisions. Camp Easton Forever, Inc. v. Inland Nw. Council
Boy Scouts of Am., 156 Idaho 893, 899 (2014); Bulotti Const., Inc., supra; Lawrence, 143 Idaho

at 708-09; Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622 (2007); Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 771
(2005); Estes, 132 Idaho at 85; Jolley, 90 Idaho at 382.
The issues of notice or knowledge of a bona fide purchaser are irrelevant and moot.
Goodman, 143 Idaho at 626-27.

Alternatively, the Court finds that the doctrine of part performance is unavailable to
enforce the purported easement.
The doctrine of part performance provides that, when an agreement to convey real
property fails to satisfy the statute of frauds, the agreement may nevertheless be specifically
enforced when the purchaser has partly performed; however, before specific enforcement may be
obtained, the underlying contract must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and the
proof must show that the contract is complete, definite, and certain in all material terms, or that
the contract contains provisions that were capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty.
Nicholson v. Coeur D'Alene Placer Mining Corp., 161 Idaho 877, 882 (2017); Ray v. Frasure,

146 Idaho 625, 629 (2009); Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87
(2008); Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 396 (2007); Lexington Heights Development, LLC. V.
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Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276 (2004); Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717
(1994); Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 404 (1984). Material terms include parties to
contract, subject matter of contract, price or consideration, and description of property. Id.
The easement provision in the 97 Agreement is too indefinite, incomplete, and uncertain
in all of its material terms, and does not contain provisions that are capable in themselves of
being reduced to certainty, to allow enforcement by operation of the doctrine of part
performance.
Thus, summary judgment is granted in the HOA's favor on the question of whether the
Lees' have an easement over Kemp Road.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the HOA is entitled to summary judgment.
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ORDER
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT
1. The HOA's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED;

2. The Lees' motion for summary judgment is DENIED;
3. The HOA's motion to amend is DENIED as moot.

4. Counsel for the HOA is to submit a judgment that complies with this memorandum
decision and order.

DATED:

°3

~ A-y

(_ _
• 2017

~

Chris Nye
District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of August, 2017, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing ORDER by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:
Matthew C. Parks
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 8370 I

mJt.J.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
0 Overnight Mail
0 E-mail
0 Telecopy

Daniel W. Bower
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS, PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83713

'ff;, U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

D

5 Hand Delivered
0 Overnight Mail
0 E-mail
0 Telecopy

Clerk of the Court

ByDidW
Deputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - I0

240

•

.

y

•
OR\G\NAL

-

-~......____IA.M·----..P.M
L E D .
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK

t

Petr:J:iSON, OSPury

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV-16-3425*C
Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT
vs.
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES NO.
2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation;
and DOES I - X, inclusive,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

DATEDthisf'¾i-dayof

~

,2017.

CHRIS NYE
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

JU_

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of September, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Daniel W. Bower
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS, PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83713

t\/
n

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Facsimile 345-4461

~

Matthew C. Parks
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

U.S.Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Facsimile 384-5844

Clerk of the Court

JUDGMENT-2
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~ E

QM.

SEP 2 2'2017
Daniel W. Bower, ISB #7204
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83 713
Telephone: (208) 345-3333
Fax No.: (208) 345-4461
dbower@stm-law.com

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
2 VETOS. DEPUTY CLERK

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, husband and
wife,

Canyon County Case No. CV 16-3425

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
vs.
FEE CATEGORY: L4
FILING FEE: $129.00

WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation; and DOES I - X, inclusive,
Defendants/Respondents.

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES NO. 2
SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY,
MATTHEW C. PARKS, ELAM & BURKE, P.A., POST OFFICE BOX 1539, BOISE, IDAHO
83701, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellants, DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, appeals against the

above-named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment entered on
August 31, 2017 in the above-entitled action, Honorable Judge Chris S. Nye presiding.
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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2.

•

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment

described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule

ll(a)(l).
3.

Appellants provide the following preliminary statement on appeal which the

Appellants then intend to assert in the appeal. This preliminary statement, however, provides
only preliminary issues and shall in no way prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on
appeal. The preliminary issues on appeal are:

a. Did the district court err in concluding that the Lees do not have an equitable
servitude conferring a right to continued access and use of Kemp Road?
b. Did the district court err in concluding that the Lees do not have an easement
over Kemp Road, where the easement agreement was performed by the parties
and where the applicable deed related to Kemp Road states that it is "subject
to all existing easements and rights-of-way of record or implied"?
4.

The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R:

a. All pleadings, supporting memorandum, declarations and affidavits filed in
this action, including but not limited to 1) June 20, 2016 Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment, supporting memorandum and documents (including the
declarations of Alan Mills and Dale Lee); 2) May 18, 2017 Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, supporting and opposing documents
(including opposition memorandum and June 21, 2017 Affidavit of Richard
Hom); and July 21, 2017 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or
Alternatively Partial Summary Judgment on Issue of Partial Performance (and
supporting documents).

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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•
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•

I certify:
a. That we are not requesting a transcript and accordingly, no notice has been

provided to any reporter;
b. The appellate filing fee in the amount of$129.00 has been paid; and,
c. That service has been made upon the trial court and all parties required to be
served pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED: September 22, 2017
STEWART TAYLOR
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 22, 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, P.A.

801 E. State Street, Ste. 50
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

IZI
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile:
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

IZI
D
IZI
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
Email: mcp@elamburke.com

Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch
Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners'
Association, Inc.

Matthew C. Parks
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorneys for Defendant Willow Creek Ranch
Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners'
Association, Inc.
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In the Su~reme Court of the State ofl~ayol
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DEC 1~ 2017
CANYON cou· iy
,
K W."L
-ll Y CLERK

DALE LEE and, K.ATIII LEE, Husband and

)
)
Wife~
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
)
)
v.
)
)
WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES NO. 2 )
SUBDNISION HO~OWNERS'
. )
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation. )
)
Defendant-Respondent,
)
)
)
and
)
DOES I-X, inclusive,
)

A.M._

'!""'

"' DEMER 1'"',-p· .

ORDER TO WITHDRAW
' · •-c urv
DISMISSAL AND REINSTATE
APPEAL
Supreme Court Dock.et No. 4539o.:2017
Canyon County No. CV-16-3425

)

Defendants.

)

An ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL was issued on December 13, 2017, for the re8$0n the
balance due ($61.85) had not been paid by to the District C ~ pursuant to this Court's Order

14, 2017,
Gabrielle Col~ • Paralegal in the law firm of Stewart Taylor & Morris, contacted this Court and
Conditionally Dismissing Appeal entered on November 30, 2017.

On December

advised their firm did not receive the previous electronic notifications in this ap~al. Subsequently,
the District Court confirmed counsel for Appellant has now paid the balance due ($61.85) by credit

card. Therefore,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL issued by this Court
on December 13, 2017, shall be WITHDRAWN and proceedings in this appeal are REINSTATED.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the Clerk's Record shall be served on counsel and the due

. -~ for film; the ·ctE~'~-ORD.wlth this Cowt is reset to
. · ~~ '19t. ~018.
DA!BD this ~ d a y of December, 2017. ·
..
..... , , ,,
----

~:

.,

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
Di.strict Judge Christopher S. Nye
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF CANYON

DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, Husband and
Wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

-vsWILWW CREEK RANCH ESTATES NO. 2
SUBDMSION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
DOES I-X, inclusive,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-16-03425*C
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following
are being sent as exhibits as requested in the Notice of Appeal:

NONE
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this 15th day of December, 2017.
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Canyon.
By: !('' - ' . . ) ~
Deputy
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF CANYON
DALE LEE and KATHI LEE, Husband and
Wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-vs-

WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES NO. 2
SUBDMSION HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATON, INC., and Idaho
corporation,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
DOES I-X, inclusive,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-16-03425*C

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Record in the above entitled case was compiled and bound under my
direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this 15th day of December, 2017.
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy
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I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Record to the attorney of record to each party as follows:

Daniel W. Bower, STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS, PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100, Boise, Idaho 83713
Chris T. Troupis, TROUPIS LAW OFFICE. P.A.
801 E. State Street,Ste. 50, PO Box 2408, Eagle, Idaho 83616

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this 15th day of December, 2017.
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Canyon.
Deputy
By: ° k W ~
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